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Abstract

Through use of rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural theory, this study of IMF Low
Income Country (LIC) policy change from 1996 to 2010 identifies potential causal variables and
mechanisms that drive contemporary reform in the institution toward its poorest member states.
Patterns uncovered through principal-agent analysis suggest that coalition formation between at least
two actors is a necessary condition for LIC policy reform. Principal-agent analysis also establishes
that discontinuity among powerful states gives IMF management and staff greater openings to
initiate or block reform efforts. Constructivist analysis assesses if shifts in thinking among IMF
insiders and the broader epistemic community of development economists have causal effect on LIC
policy reform. Evidence gathered through process tracing methods shows that reform occurred after
economic ideas that underwrote previous policy positions lost legitimacy among influential elites
within and outside the IMF. Thus while IMF staff self -identify as rational technocrats, they are also
driven by concerns of pursuing what the broader elite community deems as appropriate policy
choices. When the boundaries of appropriateness change, we can expect reforms that are consistent
with new frames of acceptable policy choices to emerge.

Stepping outside of mainstream IR theory, historical structural analysis of IMF reform focuses on
the interrelation of contemporary capitalist crisis, hegemony, and “inclusive neoliberal” development
models. Here, the IMF is understood to hold a central role in the creation and perpetuation of the
current geopolitical order underwritten by globalizing capitalism. Recent IMF LIC reforms that
champion more participation, flexibility, and a nod toward Keynesian practices thus are seen as one
component of a broader political project pushed by global elites to undermine potential challenges to
the contemporary world order. Evidence gathered through discourse analysis and interviews shows

that IMF staff and management were cognizant of growing resistance to Washington Consensus
reforms and embraced less coercive and more participatory means to increase LIC buy in into
concessionary lending programs. The scope and character of contemporary IMF reforms paralleled
similar calls for rethinking how to ‘do’ development among global elites. This suggests that a
component of IMF policy response in LICs is tied to a broader political project focused on building a
more inclusive and hegemonic form of globalizing capitalism.

The juxtaposition of three theoretical frameworks to examine the same phenomenon also provides a
platform to evaluate current IR theory focused on IMF reform. Rationalist and positivist oriented
constructivist approaches provide clear analytical roadmaps to cut through the complex dynamics
found in the IMF, identify potential causal variables and mechanisms, and develop testable
predictive hypotheses related to institutional reform. However, if studies of IMF LIC reform rely
solely on current mainstream frameworks, explanation and analysis of how Fund policy change is
interrelated with shifts and tensions in capitalist social structures and the power relations therein
remain unexamined. This proves particularly critical when exploring why certain ideas considered
market distorting remained off limits in contemporary IMF debates and how post Washington
Consensus reforms reflect attempts by global elites to manage crisis points in the contemporary
historical structure. In conclusion, I assess the merits of IMF research open to the use of positivist
and historical relational paradigms. Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. However, I
maintain that despite this tension, the complexity of that world and processes of change within it
merit space for mainstream and critical ontologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore more
fully how diverse paths of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform.
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Chapter 1- The IMF, LIC Reform, and the post Washington Consensus
The International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund) is “back in business.”1 Dismissed as incompetent or
increasingly irrelevant following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, fallout from the 2008 global
economic crisis has restored the Fund’s prestige and policy influence across the globe. In the five year
period since the crisis, the IMF has boosted its lending capacity by $456 billion and lent out
approximately $75 billion annually to its member states.2 This stands in stark contrast to its pre-crisis
total lending portfolio in 2007 of $10 billion.3 Along with greater lending activity, the Fund has taken
on a leading role in the coordination of multilateral policy response to the aftershocks of the 2008
crisis, particularly in its work with the G-20 and European Union.4

This rebirth of the IMF in the post-2008 period includes another notable trend that serves as the point
of departure for this project. After several decades of involvement in low income countries (LICs),5
the IMF has substantially increased resources and institutional focus on its poorest member states.
Financing available for LIC concessional lending has doubled to $17 billion since 2008 while lending
to LICs from 2008 to 2012 totaled over $13.6 billion. This level of lending in annual terms is four

1

Current IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde made the following observation when serving as French Finance
Minister in 2009: “The major thing that happened is that the IMF is back in business. Only two years ago, people were
wondering whether the IMF was still serving a purpose. Now the IMF is busy with all sorts of things including its
traditional mandate, which has to do with financing those countries that are really in trouble.”
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/26/lagarde-imf-economy-business-washington-monetary-fund.htm
2
IMF, “IMF’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis”, 19 September 2013, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/changing.htm (accessed 5 October 2013).
3
For an overview of the pre-2008 diminished significance of the IMF, see Eric Helleiner and Bessma Momani, “Slipping
Into Obscurity: Crisis and Institutional Reform as the IMF,” in Can the World Be Governed? Possibilities for Effective
Multilateralism, ed. Alan Alexandroff (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008), pp. 353-388.
4
At the 2009 G-20 summit, member states requested that the IMF coordinate the so-called Mutual Assessment Process
(MAP). The MAP is designed to “identify objectives for the global economy, the policies needed to reach them, and the
progress toward meeting these shared objectives.” Since 2009, the Fund has presented an annual MAP report at the G-20
meetings. See IMF, “The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP)”, 26 September 2013, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (accessed 7 October 2013).
5
As of 2013, the Fund recognized 72 of its members as low income countries. The IMF defines LICs as states that have
GNI/capita levels that qualify them for World Bank concessional lending ( up to $1175/capita).

1

times the Fund’s historical average.6 Technical assistance programs, forums focused on LIC issues,
and institutional outreach to LIC stakeholders also have expanded since the 2008 crisis.7

As is well documented, IMF policy choices impact development outcomes for a significant percentage
of the world’s poorest people.8 Conditionality requirements tied to IMF loans to LICs include
monetary and fiscal policy requirements and economic restructuring mandates that impact growth and
poverty rates, education and health outcomes, environmental quality, and employment levels.9 Fund
technical support also impacts patterns of growth and economic redistribution. 10 Less well understood
are dynamics that drive the formation of IMF LIC policy and episodes of reform. Given the recent
increase of Fund resources and institutional attention toward LICs, addressing this gap in the literature
is critical for policy makers and activists focused on shaping contemporary IMF policy direction and
subsequent twenty first century development outcomes in poor states.

Several recent studies of the IMF have identified key actors involved in individual cases of LIC policy
change that occurred in the 1990s. Kathryn Lavelle uncovered evidence that the U.S. Congress pushed
the Fund to deepen its commitment to debt relief in processes leading up to the 1999 “enhanced”

6

See IMF, “Financing the Fund’s Concessional Lending to Low-Income Countries,” 13 May 2013, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/concesslending.htm (accessed 7 October 2013).
7
For an overview of LIC programs at the IMF and how these have become more ‘front and center’ in the IMF’s agenda,
see the recently launched Fund website on LICs at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/key/lic.htm.
8
As of 2012, approximately 847 million people live in LICs that participate in IMF and World Bank programs. See
http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/LIC.
9
Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press,
2006), pp. 141-178; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 45-72; Ian Taylor, “Hegemony, Neoliberal ‘Good Governance’ and
the International Monetary Fund: a Gramscian Perspective,” in Global Institutions & Development: Framing the World?,
eds Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.124-136.
10
Axel Dreher, “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality,”
World Development, 34, no.5 (2006), pp.769-788; James Boughton and Domenico Lombardi, “The Role of the IMF in
Low-Income Countries,” in Finance, Development, and the IMF, eds. James Boughton and Domenico Lombardi (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3-11; Graham Bird, IMF Lending in Developing Countries: Issues and Evidence
(London: Routledge, 1995) ; James Vreeland, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending (New
York: Routledge, 2007).
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Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative.11 Antje Vetterlein traced how the IMF’s Executive Board
responded to broad external criticism of conditionality requirements and pushed the institution to
approve the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper framework in 1999.12 Along with the Executive Board,
there is evidence that suggests Fund staff and management played an integral role in past cases of LIC
policy reform. IMF adoption of the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative in 1996, for example, was
strongly influenced by senior staff members and then Managing Director Michel Camdessus.13 André
Broome also established that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) successfully reframed LIC debt
relief as a moral issue in the 1990s, and in so doing, helped catalyse Fund reform.14

These investigations are an important first step as variables tied to individual episodes of IMF LIC
change are identified. No comparative analysis across cases of LIC reform, however, has been
undertaken. This limits understanding in several key areas. Can we observe, for example, any pattern
of policy actors and conditions that promote or block IMF LIC change? Does the evidence from past
cases of LIC policy reform point to any recognisable threshold conditions that must be met for reform
to occur? Can we discern any generalizable patterns in these cases that can be used to predict future
cases of IMF LIC policy change? Are these episodes of LIC reform reflective of deeper or broader
shifting power dynamics and social forces in the early 21st century? And if so, what are the primary
components of these structural changes that drive post Washington Consensus LIC policy and reform?
Contemporary scholarship focused on the Fund also has not engaged with the most recent case of LIC

11

Kathryn Lavelle, Legislating International Organization: The US Congress, the IMF, and the World Bank (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
12
Antje Vetterlein, “Lacking Ownership: The IMF and its Engagement with Social Development as a Policy Norm,” in
Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.93-112.
13
Bessma Momani, “Internal or External Norm Champions: The IMF and Multilateral Debt Relief,” in Owning
Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank, eds. Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 29-47.
14
André Broome, “When do NGOs Matter? Activist Organizations as a Source of Change in the International Debt
Regime,” Global Society 23, no.1 (2009), pp.59-78.
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reform that replaced the concessionary Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 2010. How did the
processes that facilitated this policy shift following the 2008 global financial crisis compare with LIC
reforms that occurred in the late 1990s? Inclusion of evidence drawn from this case is crucial, as it
updates understanding of early 21st century LIC policy dynamics in the IMF and broader development
outcomes.

Four major cases of IMF LIC reform occurred between 1996 and 2010 (see Figure 1.1 below).15

Figure 1.1: Four Cases of post-Washington Consensus IMF LIC Reform (1996-2010)
Title of Reform
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC)

Year
1996

Policy Change?`
-Limited debt relief for LICs

Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC II)

1999

-Replaced HIPC
-Introduces PRSPs

Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)

1999

-Replaced SAF &
ESAF

Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)
Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF)

2010

-Replaced PRGF

The 1996 Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) introduced a series of policies designed to
lower debt burdens of LICs. It also marked the first formal recognition by the institution that a decade
and a half of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) instituted after the 1982 Mexican debt crisis failed
to adequately address issues of severe poverty and poor economic performance in LICs. In 1999, the
HIPC was replaced with the HIPC II. HIPC II called for significant debt forgiveness and support of
15

This project thus consciously selects on the dependent variable (LIC policy change). As outlined by Alexander George
and Andrew Bennett, doing so is appropriate in early stages of research focused on identifying potential variables and
mechanisms that impact the dependent variable in question: “Cases selected on the dependent variable…can help identify
which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome. In addition, in the early stages of a
research program, selection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal
paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest. Later, the resulting causal model can be tested against
cases in which there is variation in the dependent variable.” See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Study and
Theoretical Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp.23-24.
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“pro-poor” growth strategies. This was organized through the introduction of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). PRSPs, still in use today, are individualized plans that spell out how the
recipient LIC in question will use resources from the IMF (and World Bank) to reduce poverty in
accordance with the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.16
1999 also witnessed the replacement of the major concessionary lending facilities for LICs.17 The
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), adopted
in 1986 and 1987 respectively, were replaced with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF). Both the SAF and ESAF were controversial in that conditionality requirements included a
three part policy cocktail of anti-inflationary stabilization, liberal market structural adjustment, and
moves toward export-led growth that produced short term economic retraction and social upheaval in
many poor states.18 The PRGF, in contrast, embraced a more diverse policy response and also
prioritized poverty reduction as an essential component of successful development strategy. As with
the HIPC II, the PRGF required that recipient states develop a PRSP to ensure a focus on poverty
reduction and ownership of policy decisions by various stakeholders in LICs.

2009-2010 saw the fourth major contemporary shift in Fund policy toward LICs. The PRGF was
replaced with the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), along with the creation of the Rapid Credit Facility
(RCF) and Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF). Loans under these initiatives are both highly concessional
and contain more flexible conditional requirements than the previous PRGF. Most notably, monetary
and fiscal policy conditions tied to ECF/RCF/SCF loans suggest a shift among IMF LIC policy makers
16

The success of these efforts led to further calls for debt reduction. In 2005, the G-8 proposed that the IMF, Bank, and
African Development Fund cancel 100 percent of multilateral debt claims of states that had reached HIPC II completion
points. Under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), the Fund formed two trusts (MRDI-I and MDRI-II) to pay off
the full stock of debt owed to the IMF for loans disbursed prior to 2005.
17
Loans that have a grant element equal to 35 percent are considered concessional.
18
As discussed in chapter 5, Latin America experienced an upsurge in social movements and protests in the 1980s and
1990s that focused on IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies.
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toward more Keynesian practices. ECF programs, for example, advocate countercyclical fiscal and
monetary stimulus during economic downturn and an increase in inflationary target rates and “pro
poor” spending.19 This position stands in stark contrast to nearly three decades of policy that
prioritized price stability and advocated pro-cyclical austerity during recessionary periods.

IMF and LICs in the post Washington Consensus

These four cases of IMF LIC reform fall within what is described by development scholars as the
current “post Washington Consensus” period. This term captures in broad terms a rejection of the
Washington Consensus paradigm that heavily influenced IMF and the World Bank policies from the
early 1980s to the late 1990s.20 Supporters of the Washington Consensus maintained that price
stability, privatization, and liberalization were the best strategy for poor states to successfully grow
and integrate into the emerging global economy.21 Specific to the IMF and LICs, this translated into
conditionality requirements in SAF and ESAF loans focused on dismantling the remnants of statecentered Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategies highly popular in developing capitalist
states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia between the 1930s and 1980s.22

19

IMF, “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy,” Staff Position Note SM/10/03, 12 February 2010 available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1003.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).
20
John Williamson, an economist at the Peterson Institute in Washington D.C., coined the term “Washington Consensus”
in 1989. In its original context, the Washington Consensus was a description of what Williamson saw as the broad based
consensus among “the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the administration and the technocratic
Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the think tanks” around appropriate reforms needed in Latin American economies at the time. Williamson
argues that the popular use of “Washington Consensus” that emerged in the 1990s equated the term with market
fundamentalism and misrepresented his original meaning. He maintains, for example, that his conception of the
Washington Consensus did not support carte blanche deregulation and privatization. Williamson also notes that he was
staunchly opposed to capital account liberalization pushed by the IMF until the late 1990s. See John Williamson, “A Short
History of the Washington Consensus,” in The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance,
eds. Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 14-30.
21
Woods, The Globalizers, pp. 146-153.
22
Proponents of ISI argued that developing states heavily involved in primary exports would see long-term decline in
demand and price for their products compared to manufactured goods. ISI policies therefore focused on industrializing
poor states through a series of measures that included: (1) Tariffs and quotas on imported consumer goods and overvalued

6

Facilitated in part by growing evidence that Washington Consensus reforms failed to produce expected
growth outcomes in poor states and the Asian crisis, the late 1990s witnessed broad based challenges
to the development policies pushed by the IMF and World Bank. Along with powerful political and
institutional leaders including Kofi Annan and World Bank President John Wolfensohn, an
ideologically diverse group of economists ranging from Joseph Stiglitz to free market advocate
Jagdish Bhagwati23 criticized the Washington Consensus model.24 At the eve of the 2008 crisis,
Stiglitz summed up the post-Washington Consensus thinking that emerged as follows: It rejects
development models that advocate a minimal role of the state and carte blanche privatization and
liberalization; it highlights the importance of effective market and state institutions; it emphasizes the
importance of addressing poverty; it stresses diversity in policy response rather than a “one size fits
all” development paradigm.25

As explored in the chapters below, these themes were prominently reflected in HIPC, HIPC II, and
PRGF reform efforts. In addition, policy debates around the relationship between inequality and

exchange rates to stimulate internal consumer demand for infant industries while allowing manufactures to import
materials needed for production, (2) High investment by the state in infrastructure required by industry (roads, water,
electricity), (3) Nationalization of key industries (oil, utilities) and/or creation of state-private consortiums, and (4)
Support of urban workforce through price controls and subsidizing basics including food. As developed further in chapter
5, there was broad consensus within the IMF in the 1980s that ISI policies were the main cause of balance payment
difficulties, economic inefficiency, and corruption seen in much of the developing world at the time.
23
While Bhagwati is a staunch advocate of multilateral free trade, he is equally adamant in his critique of carte blanche
financial liberalization and the IMF’s role in pushing for elimination of capital controls in the 1990s. For clarification of
these two positions, see chapter 13 in Jagdish Bhagwati’s In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004). Here, Bhagwati argues that the Asian crisis was caused by “hasty and imprudent financial liberalization”
underwritten by “gung-ho international financial capitalism” pushed by the “Wall-Street Treasury Complex.” He describes
the Wall Street- Treasury Complex as follows: “This is a loose but still fairly coherent group of Wall Street firms in New
York and the political elite in Washington, the latter embracing not just Treasury but also the State Department, the IMF,
the World Bank, and so on.” He made similar arguments in a 1998 publication in Foreign Affairs. See Jagdish Bhagwati,
“The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars,” Foreign Affairs 77, no.3(1998), pp.7-12.
24
The term ‘post-Washington Consensus’ was first used by then Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank
Joseph Stiglitz in a 1998 speech outlining his critique of the “market fundamentalism” of the Washington Consensus. See
Joseph Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post Washington Consensus.” The WIDER
Annual Lecture, Helsinki, 7 January 1998.
25
Joseph Stiglitz, “Is there a Post Washington Consensus Consensus?,” in The Washington Consensus Reconsidered:
Towards a New Global Governance, eds. Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3156 at pp.53-54.
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growth in LICs have emerged within the IMF. This is perhaps best exemplified by the institutional
signals sent by the Fund in the September 2011 issue of Finance and Development devoted
exclusively to the subject.26 Here, prominent Washington Consensus critic and former World Bank
economist Branko Milanovic penned the lead article that highlighted the positive role states can play
in reducing inequality and improving economic growth.27 In the same issue, senior staff in the Fund’s
influential Research Department also argued that policy makers rethink the notion that inequality is
good for growth and address severe and prolonged inequality as a necessary prerequisite for sustained
development in LICs.28

Fallout from the 2008 crisis has introduced an additional dimension to the post Washington Consensus
period that is linked to IMF LIC reform. As developed in detail in chapters 4 and 5, the crisis
facilitated a reassessment of three decades of monetary and fiscal policy that prioritized price stability
over all other macroeconomic outcomes. Within the Fund, this rethinking of monetary and fiscal
policy response was first initiated by former Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn (2007-2011)
and current chief economist Oliver Blanchard.29 What emerged from what Strauss Kahn described as a
“crisis of macroeconomics” are new IMF policy positions supportive of countercyclical fiscal
response, higher inflationary targets, and automatic fiscal stabilizers in LICs. These policies were first
formally integrated into LIC initiatives when the PRGF was replaced by the ECF/RCF/SCF lending
framework.

26

Finance and Development is the quarterly publication of the IMF and is self-described as “publishing analysis of issues
related to the international financial system, monetary policy, economic development, poverty reduction, and other world
economic issues.”
27
Branko Milanovic, “More or Less: Income inequality has risen over the past quarter-century instead of falling as
expected,” Finance and Development 48, no.3 (2011), pp. 6-12.
28
Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry, “Equality and Efficiency: Is there a trade-off between the two or do they go hand in
hand?,” Finance and Development 48, no.3 (2011), pp. 12-15.
29
See Dominique Strauss Kahn, “Opening Remarks: Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis,” Washington,
D.C., 7 March 2011, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/030711.htm (accessed 10 April 2012).;
and IMF “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”.
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In sum, the post Washington Consensus period is characterized by a broad based rethinking of the
relationship between states, markets, macroeconomic policy, and development. As described by Dani
Rodrik and supported by evidence in this project, rejection of the Washington Consensus has been
replaced by a diverse range of arguments on how best the IMF and World Bank should in fact “do”
development.30 The current flux of the post Washington Consensus period therefore represents a
critical juncture in the relationship between the IMF, development, and 21st century outcomes in the
world’s poorest states. Clarification of how and why the IMF has shifted positions in the recent past
therefore is particularly pertinent for those interested in strategically pursuing future reform efforts and
development policy trajectories in the global South.

Theoretical Approaches to IMF LIC Reforms

This study of post Washington Consensus IMF policy reforms also presents an opportunity to evaluate
strengths and weaknesses of theoretical frameworks focused on episodes of change in International
Organizations (IOs). In chapters 3-5, I apply three distinct theoretical frameworks and their
corresponding research methods to examine the same phenomenon of post-Washington Consensus
IMF LIC change. Two mainstream frameworks divided along ontological lines of rationalism and
constructivism currently predominate the literature of IO change. In chapter 3, I examine post
Washington Consensus LIC change through the theoretical framework and methods currently used by
rationalist inspired approaches. Here, I utilize principal-agent (PA) modeling to examine the external
conditions that shape if and when the IMF (agent) has greater autonomy in development policies

30

See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 44, no.4 (2006),
pp.973-987.
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primarily vis-à-vis the dynamics of member states (principals).31 PA models make the following
predictions: IMF policies should most directly reflect the preferences of the most powerful member
states when preferences of these states are relatively homogenous and information asymmetry between
states and the Fund is low. In the absence of these conditions, Fund management and staff are more
likely to pursue an independent agenda but will not generally enact policy choices or reforms that
would invite greater oversight and intervention by member governments. PA models focused on the
IMF and World Bank also integrate the concept of delegation chains into their predictive models. The
Fund is most likely to respond to demands for change from its most proximate principals (states)
rather than distal principals (voters, NGOs).32

Rationalist scholars focused on IOs also have recently integrated components of sociological
organizational (SO) theory to complement PA models.33 SO theory assumes that institutions have their
own unique organizational culture that impacts policy choices and processes of reform. Internal and
external studies focused on the Fund’s organizational culture describe the institution as rooted in a
scientific, technocratic, and rational worldview consistent with the broader epistemic and professional
economics field.34 The Fund historically also has maintained a strong normative position against
policies that are deemed market distortive. Despite the shifting ideological terrain of the post
Washington Consensus, we should not expect that LIC policy change was packaged in a form that
fundamentally challenged market based solutions to balance of payment and development issues.

31

Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, eds Delegation and Agency in International
Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
32
Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank
Environmental Reform,” International Organizations 57, no.2 (2003), pp.241-276 at pp.249-250.
33
Daniel Nielson, Michael Tierney, and Catherine Weaver, “Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide: Reengineering the Culture of the World Bank,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9, no.2 (2006), pp.107139 at pp. 114-116.
34
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Culture,” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 2 (2007), pp. 142-163.
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In chapter 4, I examine IMF LIC change through the lens of “conventional” constructivism.
Contemporary constructivist IO scholars focus their research on the impact of economic ideas,
economic schools of thought, and development norms on policy choices.35 Specific to the IMF, they
highlight three major themes. First, while changes in ideas and norms that exist outside the institution
matter in regard to potential shifts in policy direction, it is ultimately internal processes of how staff
interpret these ideas and norms and act on them that determines if and when reform occurs.36 Second,
staff and management decisions are driven in large part by notions of legitimacy.37 The economics
profession, member states, and private market actors are the three constituencies identified that grant
social acceptance to particular Fund ideas and policies.38 Policy change is more likely to occur when
these constituencies no longer grant legitimacy to particular economic ideas, economic schools of
thought, or development norms. Third, ideational change that shapes policy outcomes is an ongoing
process that involves stages of emergence, stabilization, and contestation. Here, three triggers
undermine economic ideas and development norms and a subsequent increased probability that reform
will occur: (1) acknowledgement that a particular policy doesn’t work; (2) an external shock; and (3)
mass condemnation. In chapter 4, inquiry into why IMF LIC policy changes therefore focuses on how

35
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economic ideas and development norms that shape IMF LIC staff evolve and identifies triggers that
reshape them.39

Do these approaches sufficiently capture the dynamics involved with IMF LIC policy change? Two
areas of concern merit broader theoretical investigation. In rationalist approaches, the state is often
conceptualized as a unitary actor. This ignores the multiple forces and interests that shape state forms
and their relations to multilateral institutions, including the Fund. A more dynamic approach that
highlights this weakness is offered by Robert Wade.40 In his study of the World Bank in the 1990s,
Wade demonstrated that the institution was influenced by two contradictory forces: a “finance agenda”
pushed by the U.S. Treasury and finance ministers from both the OECD and global South that
advocated liberal market reform in all sectors of the economy, and a “civil society agenda” pushed by
the U.S. Congress and NGOs generally more skeptical of liberal market development solutions.
Conceptualization of the state as a unitary entity in rationalist approaches thus limits our
understanding of diverging interests found within states that lobby for different policy direction in
IMF.

Constructivists conceptually account for the impact of both outside forces and institution specific
dynamics in their explanations of IMF change. Jeffrey Chwieroth, for example, argues that economic
ideas and specific economic schools of thought shape how IMF staff conceptualize problems and
appropriate policy response. Bessma Momani, Susan Park, and Antje Vetterlein, in a similar manner,
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highlight that development norms formed outside the IMF shape staff decisions.41 However, these
scholars are adamant that ultimately it is “change from within” that drives policy reform. The Fund
(and any institution) has its own unique organizational culture through which outside ideas and norms
are processed. As articulated by Chwieroth, this should dissuade IO scholars from embracing accounts
that prioritize the influence of broader structural change while ignoring the unique micro-dynamics of
the institution under study.42

I maintain that heightened attention to institutional process to explain IMF reform, while a critical
contribution, has downplayed how economic ideas and development norms are interrelated with
broader shifts in 20th and early 21st century capitalist social structures. Why, for example, have we
witnessed the replacement of the monolithic neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus with a
diversity of ideas on how one should approach monetary and fiscal policy and structural reform in
LICs? Can we accurately or fully explain LIC change within the Fund by focusing primarily on
internal institutional culture? Or are there underlying macro-structural shifts that explain why certain
economic ideas and development norms have become more or less influential in driving policy reform
within the halls of the IMF?

In response to these concerns, I also explore if a theoretical framework that draws from Gramscian
inspired historical materialism offers greater analytical leverage or unique insights into explanations of

41
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contemporary Fund LIC change.43 This historical structural approach highlights how shifting social
structures and productive relations within 20th and early 21st century capitalism have reshaped
contemporary power structures, state forms, and multilateral institutions, including the IMF.44 The unit
of analysis in this framework consists of an identifiable constellation of mutually constituted and
reinforcing social forces that make up a historical structure reproduced in part by a historic bloc.45 A
historical structure consists of three interrelated, reinforcing social forces (ideas/ideology, material
capabilities, and institutions) that set the broad context of political possibilities and agency within a
particular world order. These social forces, in turn, interact dialectically at three interlocking levels of
activity: social relations of production, state forms, and world order.46 By historic bloc, neo-Gramscian
scholars refer to a complex of productive relations, classes, and ideology that underwrite and give
cohesion to particular state forms and world orders.47

43

Historical structures and historical blocs, while
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Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Methods,” Millennium: Journal of International
Studies 12, no.2 (1983), pp.162-175; Robert W Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making
of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert W Cox, “Multilateralism and World Order,” Review of
International Studies 18, no. 2 (1992), pp.161-180; Robert W Cox, “Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization of
World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Approaches to World Order ed. Robert W Cox and
Timothy J Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 144-173; and Robert W Cox, The New Realism:
Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (London: Macmillan, 1997).
44
A focus on human material life is understood to encompass a broad range of historically contingent productive relations
and processes - “entailing political, cultural, and economic aspects of social life”- that allow humans to reproduce and
“remake their world and themselves. Mark Rupert “Marxism and Critical Theory” in International Relations Theories:
Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.150151.
45
As outlined by Rupert, social relations, while not empirically observable as things, have structures that can be explained
through analysis of “identifiable constellations of dominant social forces” in prevailing historical structures. See Mark
Rupert, Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge, 2000), p.42.
46
Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, pp.395-398.
47
Mark Rupert, “Producing Hegemony: State/Society Relations and the Politics of Productivity in the United States,”
International Studies Quarterly 34 no.4 (1990), pp.427-456 at p.433.

14

broadly cohesive, are never fully stable or uncontested. Contradictory tendencies and tensions within
historical structures and historic blocs produce periodic crises that may serve as flashpoints of change.

Historical structural studies of the contemporary world order and its relationship to the IMF frame
their analyses in four interrelated themes that characterize the past five decades: the shift from a world
economy made up of linked national economies to a globalized economy characterized by the
transnationalization of production and accumulation; the dismantling of Keynesian welfare state forms
in the global North and ISI state forms in the global South; the rise of a “globalist” historic bloc
dominated by an emerging transnational capitalist class that has been unsuccessful in its attempt to
build a hegemonic world order; and counter-tendencies that have emerged that challenge this nonhegemonic order.

For neo-Gramscians, the turmoil and crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the global financial
crisis of 2008 serve as the contextual foundation to explain post Washington Consensus policy change.
Specific to the IMF, the HIPC and HIPC II initiatives, the PRGF, and the post 2008 ECF/RCF/SCF
reforms are seen as components of a larger project initiated by progressive elements of the globalist
bloc to secure a hegemonic global order. William Robinson, for example, contends that the post
Washington Consensus period is an expression of an emerging “inclusive neoliberalism” that
ultimately serves the purpose to “…attenuate some of the sharpest social contradictions of global
capitalism…” in the interest of undermining challenges to the current historical structure.48 Arne
Rückert makes similar claims. 49 Through post Washington Consensus reforms, “…the World Bank
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William Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), p.163.
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and the IMF play an increasingly important role in the attempt to promote hegemony around inclusiveneoliberal practices, particularly in “weak” developing countries.”50 Chapter 5 assesses these claims.
Organization and Findings of Dissertation
This dissertation has five main goals. First, through a comparative case study of the four major cases
of IMF LIC reform from 1996 to 2010, it identifies potential causal variables and mechanisms that
drove these instances of policy change. Second, it assesses if the evidence gathered from these cases
suggests any generalizable patterns relative to LIC policy reform. Third, it analyzes if and how policy
reform is interconnected to changing social relations and social forces in the contemporary historical
structure. Fourth, it evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of rational, constructivist, and
Gramscian inspired historical materialist frameworks focused on IMF reform. And fifth, it explores if
we gain any additional analytical leverage in the study of contemporary IMF behavior through a
research model open to mainstream and critical ontological and epistemological frameworks.

Chapter 2 provides the institutional and historical context for the four cases of post Washington
Consensus LIC reform examined in chapters 3-5. The chapter first outlines the Fund’s formal
operations and LIC programs. This is followed by a focus on the IMF’s organizational culture.
Evidence gathered from interviews and internal Fund survey data highlights that LIC staff diverge
from a broader institutional culture characterized by a silo mentality and ideological conformity. This
suggests LIC staff exhibit a greater willingness to engage alternative ideas and policy positions than
their colleagues in other departments in the Fund. The second section of chapter 2 includes a brief
Strategy of Honduras,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 36, no.70 (2011); Arne Rückert,“The
Forgotten Dimension of Social Reproduction: The World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Paradigm,” Review of
International Political Economy 17, no.5 (2010), pp.816-839; Arne Rückert, “A Decade of Poverty Reduction Strategies
in Latin America: Empowering or Disciplining the Poor?,” Labour, Capital, and Society 42, no. 1&2 (2009), pp.56-81; and
Arne Rückert, “Producing Neoliberal Hegemony? A neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) in Nicaragua,” Studies in Political Economy 79 (2007), pp.91-118.
50
Rückert “Producing Neoliberal Hegemony? A neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
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historical overview of the IMF’s relationship with LICs from the creation of the institution in 1945 up
to the post Washington Consensus period. It highlights three trends. First, prior to the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the IMF’s role in poor states concerned itself primarily
with balance of payments correction. From the 1970s forward, IMF resources and focus on LICs have
substantially increased. Fund “mission creep” into areas of development also emerged in the 1970s.
Along with a focus on balance of payment correction, IMF conditionality evolved to include structural
conditionality requirements designed to reform LIC state institutions and legal systems. The nature of
structural conditionality took a radical liberal market turn through the introduction of SAF and ESAF
programs in the mid-1980s and set the stage for post Washington Consensus LIC reform efforts.

Second, the IMF exerted – and continues to exert- its power in LICs. Formal surveillance over LIC
activities and conditionality requirements demonstrates that the IMF has established what Michael
Barnett and Raymond Duvall describe as direct “compulsory” and indirect “institutional” power in its
relationship with its poorest member states.51 In regard to the former, the Fund’s influence in LICs is
rooted primarily in conditionality requirements tied to concessionary lending. The IMF also evolved to
fill an informal role as gatekeeper for LIC access to World Bank loans, other multilateral assistance,
and private bank lending. Agenda setting through its conditional lending programs also shapes what
poor states and development economists consider as legitimate policy positions. This ability to frame
the relative appropriateness of policy choices is a key mechanism of power that remains entrenched in
the relationship between the IMF and LICs.
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Third, a formula for dealing with balance of payment deficits emerged in the Fund in the 1960s that
highlighted the need for states with balance of payment deficits to undergo short term economic
contraction and governmental belt tightening. Known as the “Polak model,” this framework shaped
how the institution perceived economic problems in LICs and the general formula for corrective
action. Balance of payment problems and broader economic performance were considered primarily
the fault of deficit states, rather than an outcome that also involved the behavior of surplus states or
instability in global markets. As developed further in chapter 4, a key aspect of the Polak model has
been challenged in the post Washington Consensus period that has shaped LIC policy reforms. Rather
than focus primarily on balance of payment correction, an increase in balance of trade deficits may be
necessary in the medium term in LICs to allow for poverty reduction and subsequent improvements in
growth and development.

In Chapter 3, four cases of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform are studied through
application of principal-agent modeling and sociological organizational theory. Evidence from these
cases uncovers the following patterns. Two tiers of actors with different levels of influence shaped
LIC outcomes. Primary actors included the Managing Director (MD), powerful states, and staff.
Secondary actors included LICs, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. In all the cases examined, LIC policy
shift was successful either when a coalition formed between at least one primary and one secondary
actor or at least two primary actors. Evidence from these cases also suggests that a primary actor can’t
initiate reform alone. Without the support of other primary actors, staff, powerful states, and the MD
must have backing from a secondary actor to successfully produce policy change.
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As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided openings for
management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when staff and the
Managing Director shared preferences. In future scenarios, increased preference heterogeneity
between powerful states on the Executive Board should result in greater leverage from management
and staff to initiate or resist reform efforts. In regard to the impact of NGOs in delegation chains and
the impact of pressure applied distally to principals, the evidence is inconclusive. Disaggregating the
impact of direct and indirect lobbying on Fund policy choices requires further study before any
conclusions can be drawn. More conclusively, evidence from these cases demonstrates greater success
of direct lobbying when the NGO has at least one primary actor supporting their position. Finally,
strategically situated individuals in the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and African
Department reinforce or block coalitions of change in the institution if the LIC reform in question
substantially challenges the Fund’s culture.

In Chapter 4, post Washington Consensus LIC reform is examined through the lens of constructivist
theory. In broad terms, this framework is rooted in the notion that humans are social and reflexive
emotional beings driven by the “logic of appropriateness” and make decisions based on shifting
contexts of social identity and notions of legitimacy. Applied to this study, the role of economic ideas
and development norms that inform what are deemed appropriate policy choices relative to LICs thus
take center stage. Consistent with current trends in the constructivist literature focused on the IMF, I
adopt a positivist epistemological position in Chapter 4.

Evidence from interviews and policy documents points to two categories of ideas within the IMF that
shaped post Washington Consensus LIC policy reform. The first consists of ideas that have remained
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fairly stable and uncontested since the creation of the IMF and set the broad boundaries of what is
considered legitimate policy debate. These include the notion that transparent, market based
mechanisms are the best tools to allocate resources efficiently, support growth, and reduce poverty and
inequality in LICs. 52 An aversion to market distortive policies and support of free trade also fall within
this non-debatable category. Within the boundaries of acceptable debate, IMF staff have been
influenced by a diversity of economic ideas related to two distinct policy areas where the Fund is
actively involved: (1) monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment
disequilibria; and (2) structural reform that improves economic efficiency and stimulates growth and
development.

Constructivists argue that the primary constituency outside of the institution that reinforces the
legitimacy of particular ideas or development choices pursued by the IMF is the economics profession.
As such, chapter 4 then explores how the Fund has come to accept particular economic ideas that
constitute appropriate macroeconomic and development policy and how challenges to these
frameworks of thinking in the post Washington Consensus period have impacted policy reform efforts.
I outline five mainstream schools of economics that have influenced the economics profession and
IMF staff and management. These include traditional Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis,
monetarism, new classical economics, and New Keynesianism.

Constructivist analysis points to three prominent trends concerning the role of economic ideas and LIC
policy reform. A highly stable framework of what constituted appropriate monetary and fiscal policy
response (known as the “New Consensus”) emerged in the early 1980s and was not significantly
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challenged until the 2008 financial crisis. The New Consensus – influenced primarily by monetarism,
new classical economics, and New Keynesianism – argued against expansionary countercyclical
monetary and fiscal policy response. The 2008 crisis delegitimized the New Consensus among
development economists and IMF staff and has ushered in a new framework of economic ideas
supportive of more Keynesian inspired macroeconomic policy. As previously noted, this helped drive
replacement of the PRGF with the ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s, in
contrast, had little impact on monetary and fiscal policy reform efforts. However, fallout from the late
1990s led to the reevaluation of the role of the state in its relation to market efficiency, growth, and
development. Along with challenges to the Polak model, an emphasis on poverty reduction,
investment in human capital, and issues of inequality facilitated the replacement of the SAF/ESAF
with the PRGF. Despite this shift in thinking in the late 1990s, an aversion to market distortive
practices remains. LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or undervalued exchange rates,
subsidies, and large-scale government managed redistribution.

Chapter 5 examines LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus through the lens of a historical
structural framework. Given that this approach sits outside the mainstream of contemporary political
science, the first section of Chapter 5 outlines the differences between what Robert Cox describes as
“critical” and positivist “problem-solving” frameworks. In broad terms, a critical approach
conceptualizes the world as constituted by human agents dialectically interrelated with time specific
social structures that shape – and are shaped by – their action. Human nature and structures of human
interaction thus are never fully static or characterized by essential, timeless qualities. As such, critical
approaches reject the notion that generalizable causal patterns can be teased out from a series of cases
in one particular historical era and then used as a template to predict future outcomes. Explanation in

21

this context instead focuses on revealing the historical structures that produce regularities in one
particular era and how and why historical structures and subsequent world orders change over time.

Within this context, Chapter 5 then examines the interrelationships between shifting productive
relations, state forms, and historic blocs of the first half of the 20th century that forged the post-World
War II world order of pax Americana and its demise throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. During pax
Americana (roughly 1945-1973), the IMF played a central role in the establishment and reproduction
of a hegemonic global order rooted in a U.S. based “Fordist” historic bloc. Fordism describes the
social structures, ideology, and practices that facilitated the emergence and consolidation of mass
based factory production and consumption in the United States in the first several decades of the 20th
century. Following World War II, Fordism was internationalized through various U.S. supported
initiatives, including the IMF.

A critical factor that facilitated the internationalization of Fordist hegemony and the U.S. centered
liberal order in the post WW II era involved the emergence of class compromise between American
corporate capital and moderate elements of labor in the interwar years. Along with a series of laws
supportive of organized labor in the 1930s and 1940s, the emergence of a New Deal Keynesian
welfare state model committed to full employment policies helped undermine socialist and communist
elements in the American union movement.53 As highlighted by Mark Rupert and developed further in
chapter 5, a de-radicalized labor movement that identified in Fordist “politics of productivity” and
liberal notions of “free trade unionism” was a key element of the post-World War II U.S. centered
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historic bloc.54 IMF policy during the hegemony of pax Americana reflected the interests and tensions
between elements and interests of this historic bloc. While sympathetic to notions of liberal trade
pushed by the U.S. government and major industrial capitalists, the IMF did not actively push for
structural reforms that undermined the politics of class compromise embedded in Keynesian welfare
state models in the global North and ISI state models in the global South.

Chapter 5 then traces how the internationalist Fordist historic bloc and the hegemonic liberal world
order of pax Americana began to unravel in the late 1960s and 1970s. Liberalized global markets and
the spread of Fordist production methods and consumption patterns throughout Western Europe and
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s produced excess industrial capacity and increased competition between
wealthy capitalist states.55 As U.S. competitiveness fell and trade surpluses turned into deficits by the
early 1970s, American industrial capitalists and labor grew increasingly skeptical of free trade. This
skepticism also focused on the perceived unfairness of the Bretton Woods monetary regime that
required the U.S. to maintain fixed value for the dollar while other capitalist states enjoyed greater
flexibility to devalue their currencies.56 Richard Nixon (1968-1974) shared these sentiments. Between
1971 and 1973, Nixon opted for dollar devaluation that subsequently dismantled the Bretton Woods
modified gold standard regime. The spirit of positive sum game liberal internationalism of Bretton
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Wood was further undermined in the early 1970s by the rise of protectionist measures across the
OECD.57

High productivity levels that had facilitated both increased profits for capital and real wage growth for
labor since 1945 also began to fall in the mid-1960s.58 Increased tension between capital and labor
born from drops in economic growth, lowered productivity, and real wage stagnation by the late
1960s59 was further exacerbated by a series of crises in the early 1970s that produced periods of
stagflation throughout much of the OECD economies in the mid and late 1970s.60 With the subsequent
rise of neo-conservative political movements and elections of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and Ronald
Reagan (1980), Fordist class compromise forged through the interwar and Bretton Woods eras quickly
eroded. Corporate restructuring efforts, designed to revise productivity and profit, prioritized
weakening the bargaining power of organized labor through multiple means.61

NeoGramscian scholars point to the “crisis of capitalism” in the 1970s as the catalyst that sparked the
demise of the hegemonic world order of pax Americana. Starting roughly in the 1980s, a nonhegemonic world order has emerged that includes the following key dynamics. First, capitalist
processes of production and accumulation have increasingly globalized. Second, the establishment of
57
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globalized circuits of production and accumulation produced a new dominant “transnational capitalist
class.” The ascendant transnational capitalist class (TCC) forms the core of a “globalist” historic bloc
that also includes elite technocrats from multilateral institutions, including the IMF and World Bank,
politicians of powerful states, and popular cultural and media figures. Third, Keynesian welfare states
in the global North and ISI states in the global South have been dismantled and replaced with
neoliberal state forms. Neoliberal state forms, in contrast to the Keynesian welfare state forms of pax
Americana, are characterized by open hostility to organized labor and policy positions that have
increased the intensity and extensity of commodification. Fourth, while powerful, the globalist historic
bloc has been unable to produce a unified social vision to legitimate the restructuring of workplaces
and state forms in accordance to their interests. For NeoGramscians including Stephen Gill, the current
world order is therefore characterized by a more coercive and less consensual “politics of
supremacy.”62

Applied to a study of the IMF and LICs, its adoption of Washington Consensus thinking in the 1980s
and 1990s was interrelated with a world order shifting from hegemony and Fordist class compromise
to a globalized neoliberal order. This was expressed in SAF and ESAF structural adjustment lending
programs that helped dismantle the remaining vestiges of ISI state forms in these societies and
reorganized economies along liberal market lines.63 Secondary sources and internal Fund documents
highlight that the IMF sensed growing pushback from SAF and ESAF programs in LICs in the late
1980s and 1990s and pursued a program focused on “good governance” to rationalize structural
reform efforts. As resistance to neoliberal reform increased throughout the 1990s, neo-Gramscians
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focused on the Bretton Woods institutions argue that social upheaval and crisis caused by these
dynamics in LICs are one key component that explains current post-Washington Consensus reform
efforts. In order to facilitate long term support of market based development, IMF (and World Bank)
policy over the past decade has become more sensitive to concerns of weak economic growth, poverty,
and increased inequality in LICs. On an even broader scale, neo-Gramscians also hypothesize that
contemporary IMF reforms are a by-product of elements within the globalist bloc that hope to
(re)establish a hegemonic world order through a more inclusive form of globalizing capitalism.

Evidence from interviews with IMF staff and Executive Directors, internal Fund documents, and
secondary sources lends initial support to these hypotheses. The rollout of the HIPC, HIPC II, and
PRGF initiatives in the late 1990s was underwritten in part by two internal goals articulated by the
Fund’s LIC staff and management. First, there was a concentrated effort to increase support from
multiple civil society stakeholders in LICs to IMF reform efforts. Second, the IMF staff highlighted a
need to engage in a more consensual decision-making process with LIC stakeholders. Fallout from the
2008 crisis strengthened these trends. This was expressed most concretely in the elimination of
“structural performance” criteria in Fund lending arrangements in 2009 that has given LICs greater
flexibility and control over domestic reform efforts. Along with shifts in how LIC policy processes are
implemented by the IMF, World Bank-IMF annual meetings and the annual World Economic Forum
meeting in Davos over the past decade demonstrate that elements of the globalist bloc were
increasingly concerned with poverty and increased global inequality.

Chapter 6 briefly first summarizes the evidence uncovered in chapters 3-5. It then analyzes
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the relative strengths and weaknesses of rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural frameworks
in regard to the study of the IMF and IOs more generally. It finds that rationalist and constructivist
approaches to contemporary IMF LIC reform share the advantages common to positivist-oriented
research. These include an ability to conceptually simplify the phenomenon under study, tease out
potential causal relationships, and form predictive models. Rationalist models offer the best
opportunity for practical application of knowledge gained. Contemporary constructivist studies,
focused on the interplay between identity, legitimacy, economic ideas, and organizational culture,
have pushed IO scholarship in a much more empirically sound direction. Here, the focus on internal
micro-dynamics of the institution under study requires IO scholarship to be more careful in making
monolithic claims about IMF behavior.

A critical framework rooted in a social ontology examines three areas of Fund behavior that
mainstream frameworks are unable to engage. First, it introduces a causal story that sees processes of
contemporary Fund policy change as dialectically related to the multiple and often contradictory
dynamics embedded in the transnationalization of capitalist social relations. Second, it recognizes the
role that IMF reform plays in the production and reproduction of hegemonic or more overtly coercive
world orders. Third, the social relational roots of historical structural theory provide a foundation to
evaluate where and why certain ideas have been folded into post Washington Consensus reforms while
others have not, and what that signifies about the contemporary role that the IMF plays in the early 21st
century world order. As developed in chapter 6, the Marxist and Gramscian roots of a historical
structural framework is uniquely suited to explore why market distortive ideas remain off the table of
post Washington Consensus “pro-poor” reforms and why a technocratic self- understanding remains at
the core of IMF thinking around policy reform. It also may provide clues as to why this
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identity is essential to how the Fund participates in (re)building hegemony in the contemporary
historical structure through its policy choices in LICs. In short, while recognizing that IMF policy and
market based development more broadly need to “work” for the poor, the boundaries of what is open
for debate do not include policies that challenge deeply held beliefs in market efficiency. Following
the logic of Marx, this makes sense as debating the efficacy of market distortive policies would bring
politics into the arena that liberal market economists argue don’t belong. This, in turn, could
potentially open up more radical challenges to the current historical structure underwritten by
globalizing capitalist social relations.

Chapter 6 then assesses the potential benefits and drawbacks of research position open to use of
rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural frameworks focused on IMF change. It opens this
discussion by first affirming that each theoretical framework presents a reasonable causal story when
explaining contemporary IMF policy reform. Evidence uncovered in this project also does not
significantly undermine any major claims each framework makes that should disqualify it from future
research. For example, evidence suggests that policy change is impacted by the formation of coalitions
that either block or facilitate reform, shifts in how particular economic ideas gain or lose legitimacy
among IMF staff, and broader tensions in the current historical structure of globalizing capitalism.

If each theoretical framework presents a reasonable causal story on its own terms, does it therefore
make sense to study the phenomenon of multilateral institutional change through use of a diverse
ontological and epistemological arsenal? Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. However, as I
explore in the conclusion of Chapter 6, I maintain that despite this tension and at some level
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incompatible understandings of the world, the complexity of that world and processes of change
within it merit space for mainstream and critical ontologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore
more fully how diverse paths of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform.
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Chapter 2- The IMF and LICs
Analysis of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC policy reform first requires basic institutional
literacy in three areas: formal operations; informal dynamics of operational culture with focus on LIC
staff; and the evolving role of the IMF in LICs. Chapter 2 first summarizes the Fund’s formal
operations and institutional structure with an overview of the IMF and its contemporary role in
member surveillance, technical support, and lending. It then focuses on more informal characteristics
of the institution’s operational culture and explores several areas where LIC staff and procedures
diverge from broader institutional trends. The chapter then examines the evolution of the Fund’s
relationship with LICs from its birth nearly seven decades ago to the end of the Washington
Consensus period.

The International Monetary Fund
The International Monetary Fund came into force on December 27, 1945. Article I includes the
following “purposes”:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation…(ii) To facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade…(iii) To promote exchange stability…and to avoid
competitive exchange depreciation…(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system
of payments in respect to current transactions…and…elimination of foreign exchange
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. (v) To give confidence to members by
making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them…to correct
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of
national or international prosperity. (iv) To shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
balance-of-payment disequilibria.64

At the organizational level, the Fund is best conceptualized as an international credit union made up of
member states. Upon initial acceptance to the Fund, members are assigned a quota (currency
contribution) that is held as a deposit at the Fund. Quotas are determined by the relative size of the
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economy and engagement with international trade,65 and shape two key aspects of members’
relationships with the IMF. First, quota share determines how much the member must contribute in
full when initially joining the institution. Once the overall currency contribution is established, the
initial 25 percent of the quota must be paid in hard currency.66 Referred to as the “reserve tranche” or
“first tranche,” these resources can be accessed by a member state without any conditionality
requirements. The remaining three quarters (“upper credit tranches”) are paid in member-specific
currency and access to this credit is generally only granted with conditionality. Second, the quota
amount sets the limit on how much a member can borrow from the Fund. For non-concessionary
loans, this currently stands at 200 percent of its quota annually and 600 percent cumulatively.67 In
addition, the quota size determines the voting power of the member. As of 2013, the U.S. has the
largest quota and percentage of votes (17.69 percent) of the Fund and holds unilateral veto power over
significant Fund policy reform.68 Germany, Japan, France, and the UK have quota sizes in the five
percent range.

Quota shares are reviewed approximately every five years. Any change must be approved by 85
percent of the total voting power in the Fund. The 14th review, completed in November 2010, doubled
overall quota requirements to a total of approximately $756 billion.69 Quotas were initially denoted in
US dollar equivalents but were replaced with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 1969. Today, the
value of the SDR is determined by a basket of four currencies (euro, yen, pound sterling, and US
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Prior to 1973, the reserve tranche was paid in gold. Today, countries must pay in currencies including the U.S. dollar, the
euro, yen or pound sterling.
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China, Russia, Brazil, and India.
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dollar) and one unit currently hovers around the equivalent value of $1.50.70 A member state in need
of hard currency in world markets can obtain it through two mechanisms. It can voluntarily exchange
SDRs for usable currency with another member, or the Fund can designate states with balance of
payment surpluses to buy SDRs from those with payment deficits.

Along with quota subscriptions, two additional programs are implemented on an ad hoc basis to
supplement Fund resources for lending purposes. The “General Agreement to Borrow” (GAB),
established in 1962, allows the IMF to borrow up to $27 billion from 11 industrial countries on a
short-term basis. The “New Arrangement to Borrow” (NAB) serves as a source of funds to supplement
quota resources, particularly in times of financial crisis. Initiated after the Asian crisis, the NAB
currently involves 39 members who have committed $580 billion in resources to the arrangement as of
2011. Under NAB rules, proposals to access NAB resources must be approved by both 85 percent of
states that have contributed to the fund and the Executive Board. In March 2011, the NAB was
activated for six months in the amount of $334 billon.71

Organizational Structure
Voting formally takes place at two levels in the Fund. The Board of Governors is comprised of finance
ministers or central bank heads of each of the 187 member states (see Figure 2.1 below). The Board of
Governors retains the right to vote on policies including quota increases, SDR allocations, member
admittance and withdrawal, and amendments to Fund Articles of Agreements and By-Laws.72 This
body meets twice a year, at the fall Annual Meeting and Spring Meeting, and much of its business is
allocated to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (previously the Interim Committee).
70
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The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) “monitors developments in global
liquidity and the transfer of resources to developing countries; considers proposals by the Executive
Board to amend the Articles of Agreement; and deals with unfolding events that may disrupt the
global monetary and financial system.”73 The Development Committee, made up of Fund and Bank
members, is tasked with advising both institutions’ Board of Governors on economic development
issues in emerging and low-income states.
Figure 2.1: IMF Organizational Chart

(Source: http://www.elibrary.imf.org)
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Day to day operations are delegated to a 24 member Executive Board whose Executive Directors
(EDs) are elected or appointed to two year terms. Eight appointed EDs currently represent individual
countries with the largest quotas (the U.S., Germany, France, Britain, Japan, China, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia) while 179 members are represented by the remaining sixteen. The Managing Director (MD) is
appointed by the Executive Board, serves a five year term, and by convention is European. Christine
Lagarde (see Figure 2.2 below) serves as the current MD and is assisted by the First Deputy Manager
(by convention a U.S. citizen) and two Deputy Managing Directors. The Independent Evaluation
Office (IEO), founded in 2001, sits outside the IMF and conducts ongoing reviews of Fund policies
and programs.74
Figure 2.2: IMF Managing Directors: 1946-2013
Managing Director
Camille Gutt
Ivar Rooth
Per Jocobsson
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer
H. Johannes Witteveen
Jacques de Larosière
Michel Camdessus
Horst Köhler
Rodgiro de Rato
Dominique Strauss-Kahn
Christine Lagarde

Tenure
1946-1951
1951-1956
1956-1963
1963-1973
1973-1978
1978-1987
1987-2000
2000-2004
2004-2007
2007-2011
2011-present

The Fund staff of approximately 2500 individuals is distributed across eight functional and five area
departments. Functional departments include: Finance; Fiscal Affairs; IMF Institute; Legal; Monetary
and Capital Markets; Strategy, Policy, and Review; Research; and Statistics. Area departments
include: Africa, Asia and Pacific, European, Middle East and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere.
Staff members across all departments are formally involved in three primary activities for member
states: monitoring economies, providing technical assistance, and designing short-term loan packages
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for states with balance of payments difficulties. In regard to the former, under Article IV of the
Articles of Agreement, members agree to collaborate with the IMF and one another to promote
international economic stability. The Fund is charged with monitoring both individual member
economies (“bilateral surveillance”) and reporting on global and regional economic trends
(“multilateral surveillance”). Bilateral surveillance is accomplished through Article IV consultations.
IMF staff travel to individual member states to evaluate monetary, fiscal, financial, and exchange rate
policies and meet with various stakeholders to discuss and advise future policy direction. Upon return
to the Fund, a report is filed with the Executive Board and then forwarded to the member state in
question. Multilateral surveillance efforts include publication of two semi-annual reports, the World
Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).

Technical assistance is primarily geared toward developing countries. It includes staff support for
creating and managing macroeconomic policy, monetary and fiscal policy design and implementation,
banking systems, taxation reform, financial systems, fiscal management, and foreign exchange policy.
Delivery of assistance takes various forms. Staff missions are sent to member states for short term
analysis and advice or may also remain for longer in-house placements. Training programs are also
offered at the IMF Institute in Washington, D.C. and seven new regional technical assistance centers
throughout the global South.75 Funding for technical assistance makes up approximately one fifth of
the Fund’s operating budget, with two thirds of these funds provided by external sources.76

Lending Facilities
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These are located in Fiji, Barbados, Tanzania, Mali, Gabon, Lebanon, and Guatemala.
Multilateral donors include: the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Caribbean Development
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the
European Commission, and the United Nations Development program.
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As of 2013, IMF loan instruments (“facilities”) are divided into three main categories. Nonconcessional loans (Figure 2.3 below) are made available through either the Stand-By Arrangements
(SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), or Precautionary Credit
Line (PCL). The interest rate charged on non-concessional loans (“rate of charge”) is based on the
SDR interest rate and is adjusted on a weekly basis. Non-concessional lending arrangements with
member states are facilitated through a Letter of Intent (LOI). Through the LOI process, Fund staff
meet with country authorities and draft what the government plans to pursue in return for financial
support. The LOI is then presented to the Executive Board for approval.

Although the Executive Board is formally empowered to reject or veto lending arrangements, staff
have considerable autonomy in setting and monitoring member agreements. Staff assessment
determines if a member has abided by conditions and qualifies for further lending. Staff can also
require member states to implement “prior action” or “preconditions” before forwarding LOIs to the
Board. Directors on the Executive Board also do not have access to confidential documents between
staff and member governments during the LOI process. As such, Executive Board influence on LOIs is
mostly informal, while formal control is limited to minor changes in staff proposals.77
Concessional loans designed for LICs include the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Standby Credit
Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).78 All concessional loans sit at below market
interest rates and reflect policy commitments developed through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs). PRSPs involve Fund and World Bank co-sponsored efforts to work with “domestic
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loans was zero.
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Figure 2.3: IMF Lending Facilities
Non-concessional IMF Lending Facilities
IMF Loan Instruments
Stand By Arrangement

Introduced
1952

Description
-1-2 year loan/ Repayment due 3-5 years
-Designed to address short-term balance of payments deficits
-Bulk of IMF conditional lending

Extended Fund Facility

1974

-3 year loan/ Repayment due 4-10 years
-Designed to address longer –term balance of payments problems
-Often focuses on deeper structural reform

Flexible Credit Line

2009

-1-2 years/Repayment due 3-5 years
-Line of credit for crisis prevention for states with “strong
fundamentals”
-No conditionality requirements

Precautionary Credit Line

2009

-1-2 years/ Repayment due 3-5 years
-Renewable line of credit for crisis prevention for states with“
sound fundamentals” but facing “moderate vulnerabilities.”
-Commitment to address vulnerabilities identified in
qualification process

Concessional IMF Lending Facilities
IMF Loan Instruments
Extended Credit Facility

Introduced
2010

Description
-Succeeds Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
-Main tool for medium-term support for LICs
-Zero interest rate/5.5 year grace period/10 year final

maturity

Standby Credit Facility

2010

-Short-term support for LICs
-Zero interest rate/4 year grace period/ 8 year final maturity

Rapid Credit Facility

2010

-Rapid, limited conditional support for LICs
-Zero interest rate/5.5 year grace period/ 10 year final maturity

Emergency Resources
IMF Loan Instruments
Post-Catastrophic Debt
Relief Trust

Introduced
2010

Description
-Assistance for LICs who have suffered a natural disaster
-May involve debt flow relief or debt stock cancellation

Emergency Natural
Disaster Assistance

1962

-3-5 year non-conditional assistance for natural disaster
-Standard interest rate/ Up to 50 percent of quota

Emergency Post
Conflict Assistance

1995

-3-5 year non-conditional assistance for post-conflict emergency
-Standard interest rate/ Up to 50 percent of quota
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stakeholders” to develop “macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to promote
growth and reduce poverty.”79 Emergency resources for poor states that qualify for concessional
lending are also available via the Post-Catastrophic Debt Relief Trust (PCDR). Non-LICs are eligible
for crisis assistance through either the Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance (ENDA) or Emergency
Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) programs.

Since the mid-1990s, the Fund also has increased initiatives focused on global financial stability.
Along with promoting “codes of best practice” regarding fiscal and monetary policies, the IMF has
developed and lobbied states to abide by a Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and General
Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS) “as guidelines for government production of economic and
financial data, with a view to improving the operation of global capital markets.80 Following the 2008
crisis, the Fund has worked in partnership with the G-20 on its Mutual Assessment Process (MAP)
focused on how best to restructure the global economy.81

Operational Culture

The current IO literature recognizes four major components of organizational culture. Routines include
the standard operating procedure that over time produce patterns in behavior in an institution. Ideology
is defined as the underlying belief system that sets the agenda and parameters of policy choices.
Norms include collectively shared principles and values. Constructivist scholar Catherine Weaver
additionally maintains that an institution also develops its own internal language “which enables the
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organization to create a common and efficient means of communicating the shared meaning of
ideology and to consistently identify, categorize, and apply standard solutions to tasks.”82

I maintain the relationship between organizational culture of the Fund and its impact on policy shift is
most effectively analyzed if organizational culture is separated into two components. Operational
culture includes the routines as defined above. Standard operating procedures and the reproduction of
“how things are done” produces specific patterns of behavior that shape how calls for reform move
through the institution irrespective of the substance or ideological slant of the policy reform in
question. Normative culture instead consists of predominant economic ideas, development norms, and
language found in the organization. Evidence from this project points to procedural and ideological
patterns among LIC policy makers that are at some levels distinct from the broader operational and
normative culture of the Fund. I outline the Fund’s operational culture below and explore dynamics of
normative culture in chapter 4.

Momani, in her 2007 study of the Fund, highlights an evaluation completed in 2006 by the
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) that documents several prominent characteristics of the IMF’s
operational culture.83 In the study, staff members were asked to assess if various categories of behavior
accurately described the Fund. 84 The survey response points to four primary cultural characteristics:
bureaucracy, hierarchy, homogeneity, and technical/economistic thinking.

Bureaucratic
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The Fund follows a series of standard operating procedures with new proposals and country reports
that produce and reinforce bureaucratic tendencies in the institution. Country reports follow a chain of
command within area departments (e.g., African, European) starting with the desk officer and moving
upward to division chiefs and then to the responsible area department’s senior staff.85 Following
review by senior staff in the area department, the document in question then is sent to the Strategy,
Policy, and Review (SPR) department for review. SPR consists of two strategy divisions and six issue
divisions (see Figure 2.4 below), two of which are solely focused on LIC issues. SPR serves as the
main gatekeeper of Fund policy positions and also is seen as the main generator of new initiatives.
Figure 2.4: Strategy Policy and Review Department
SPR
Strategy Divisions
Strategy Unit
Low Income Country Strategy Unit

Issue Divisions
Surveillance Policy
Advanced Economies
Emerging Markets
Trade, Institutions, and Policy Review
Low Income Countries
Debt Policy

SPR is designed to maintain institutional coherence in its policy recommendations. Relative to its role
as gatekeeper, SPR’s review process focuses on two objectives. First, through its extensive review and
editing process, SPR reinforces coherence in application of the Fund’s institutional mission. Second,
as SPR is not tied to any particular member-state or area department, its review process provides a
more objective take on policy choices.86 Once approved by SPR, the policy document is forwarded to
the Managing Director and finally to the Executive Board for adoption or rejection. If rejected by the
Executive Board, the report or policy recommendation is returned down the chain of command for the
next round of review and revision.
85

Momani, “IMF Staff: Missing Link in Fund Reform Proposals,” p.45.
Richard Harper, Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology, and Organizational Action (San Diego,
CA.: Academic, 1998), p.238.
86

40

Extensive documentation is thus a common complaint from staff. Specific to mission chiefs and
others involved with LICs, the PRSP process and coordination with the World Bank on LICs has
added multiple layers of review and bureaucracy to the policy making process. 87 Demands for timely
documentation within the bureaucracy also produce a dynamic where “need for speed” are often in
conflict with “need for local knowledge.” 88 Staff are often not given sufficient time to understand the
particular dynamics of countries and also feel pressure to quickly report findings and issue
recommendations to their superiors.
Hierarchical
Several studies of Fund dynamics highlight that an institutional mandate focused on short term crisis
management reinforces a hierarchical culture in the institution. Former UK Executive Board director
Ian Clark, in an internal 1996 study focused on the Fund’s adaptability, noted how the institution
prized and identified in its “crisis management capability” and how this favored hierarchical
tendencies: “A prized element of the Fund’s culture…is its organizational discipline and crisis
management capability. The goal of presenting a single corporate line in negotiations with countries
requires a somewhat hierarchical managerial style and highly developed internal procedures to
encourage questioning and debate at an early stage but to act with Cabinet-like solidarity after
decisions are made.”89
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Momani’s investigation of Fund staff culture highlights how hierarchical tendencies in the Fund
produce a “silo-mentality” that discourages coordination and communication across departments.90
Several studies support this claim. An internal 1991 report concluded that Fund staff had “a sense of
allegiance to an individual department, which rewarded loyal service and was protective of staff.
[This] produced a situation in which departments were reluctant to explicitly identify or address
performance problems, or sought to arrange for the transfer of weak performers to other less
influential departments which tended to become repositories for problem cases.”91 A 1999 review of
surveillance noted how lack of communication between the Research Department (RES) and the Asia
and Pacific Department (ADP) didn’t allow for concerns around South Korea’s poorly regulated
financial sector to be properly explored and may have led in part to the Asian crisis.92 A 2006 IEO
report also concluded that the Monetary and Capital Market Department (MCM) seeks little input
from area departments when it creates its annual Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).93 And
finally, a 2011 IEO report focused on the IMF’s failure to identify risks in the global financial system
in the run-up to the 2008 crisis was due in part to staff reluctance to share information or seek
consultation outside of their departments. 94

Despite silo thinking broadly found within the institution, LIC staff interviewed for this project
maintained that there is collaboration between the SPR and area departments, particularly the African
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Department, when designing new policy directives. 95 As articulated by a senior staff member of the
African Department,
SPR carries the pen in terms of policy development but they do so quite collaboratively
with other departments. The department that has the biggest stake is us [African
Department]. The initiative typically comes from them. But we can play and have played a
role when we see a particular need.96

Based on their career tracks in the Fund, senior level staff involved with LICs interviewed have not
remained in one department. Rather, the general trend was that senior staff moved between SPR,
Research, and the Africa departments during their tenure. This dynamic may also guard against the
extensity of silo mentality seen more broadly in the institution.
Homogenous/Conforming
60 percent of staff surveyed in the 2004 IEO report characterized the Fund as homogenous and
conforming. A 2011 IEO evaluation focused on research at the Fund found that conformity to “IMF
views” and “pre-set policy prescriptions” remains. 43 percent of staff noted that research at the Fund
shunned alternative perspectives while 62 percent reported that research and conclusions had to be
aligned with IMF views.97 A series of Fund evaluations identify several standard operating procedures
that reinforce conformist tendencies. First, extensive review processes within departments often
hamper inter- and intra- department communication and innovation. A 1999 external report noted that
staff complained that “the process [of internal departmental reviews] hinders innovation and
flexibility; departments are inhibited from trying to do things differently.”98 Second, staff reports
forwarded to SPR and the Executive Board are designed to present a team view, and thus represent
areas where staff have only found general agreement on the topic of concern. As reported by staff, this
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produces a process “preoccupied with getting their analysis agreed and accepted internally.”99 Third,
all staff documents must conform to an accepted writing style. Staff reports that have reached the
Executive Board, for example, are first given to the Fund Secretary who standardizes them. Momani
argues this is one additional process where dissenting or critical staff voices may be toned down or
even eliminated.100 Chwieroth also notes that a focus on team work and assimilation is reinforced by
Fund protocol with new recruits. Here, a two-year training program commonly includes time abroad
where the new staff members are expected to assimilate and work with mission teams.101

The Fund’s hiring practices are also a variable that reinforces a homogenous culture in the Fund. Since
1970, the primary recruiting tool for new staff has been through the Economist Program (EP). From an
annual initial recruitment pool of between 1500 and 2000 applicants, roughly 20-50 economists are
hired through the EP each year. Comparison of data from 1985-87, 1991-97, and 2007-10 (see Figure
2.5 below) shows a prominent increase in percentage of women (from 5 percent to 44.4 percent) and
those from “underrepresented” regions (from 33 percent to 59.3 percent) brought into the Fund
through the EP program.102

Female
Underrepresented
regions

Figure 2.5: Economist Program Recruits (1985-2010)
1985/87
1991/97
5%
22%

2007/10
44.4%

33%

59.3%

34.7%
(Source: Momani, 2005 and IMF, 2010)

However, recruitment data also shows that the majority of new recruits from underrepresented regions
comes from East Asia and the former Soviet and Eastern European communist states. On average,
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only two new economists from Africa and the Middle East were recruited into the Fund annually
between 2007 and 2010 through the Economist Program.103

Longer term trends charted by the Fund’s Diversity Office that focused on staff make-up also show the
percentage of Africans working at the Fund has remained between 6 and 7 percent between 1995 and
2010. In the same time period, the share of economists from the Middle East fell from 5 percent to 4.4
percent. Nationals from former communist states (2 percent to 9.5 percent) and East Asia (7 percent to
10 percent) increased their representation in the Fund during this period. Comparing trends among
industrialized regions, European representation increased from 38 percent to 44 percent while U.S. and
Canadian nationals declined from 24 percent to 15 percent.

Despite efforts to increase staff diversity by national origin and gender, staff remain predominately
male (74.5 percent) and from industrial countries (53.7 percent). The U.S. (12 percent) and UK (5.2
percent) have the greatest representation among staff by nationality. Only 6.5 percent and 4.4 percent
of economists working at the Fund are from Africa and the Middle East respectively.104 Along with the
greatest representation of staff by nationality, the majority of IMF staff receives their academic
training in the U.S. and UK. As of 2010, 72.2 percent had earned their PhDs from the U.S. (63
percent) or UK (9.2 percent) while 1.2 percent of staff held doctoral degrees from universities outside
of the U.S., Canada, or Europe.105 The majority of new recruits currently are graduates from 15
universities in the U.S. and 4 universities in the UK.106
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As articulated by a senior staff member involved in hiring processes, lack of diversity in training has
produces problematic dynamics of group-think in the institution:
You have people who are normally argumentative and have their own views. Why do they
agree with each other so easily? It could be that the mind-set is very similar. A problem we
have is that the economists are all trained roughly in the same place, either in Europe or the
U.S. Even though we may come from different parts of the world, we are filtered through
the U.S. and European system. Just because we look different doesn’t mean we think
different. There is some sense that this needs to change. We are giving a lot of attention to
diversity in all dimensions including intellectual diversity. We need people who think
different as well.107

An effort to intellectually diversify through hiring and recruitment appears to be gaining
traction in the institution but “is at an early stage”:
We are trying to hire a little bit more from institutions outside of the U.S. and Europe. We
have people now with PhDs from Asia, from Latin America, from Russia. But it is at an
early stage. I am not saying we have succeeded in making it intellectually diverse but we
have succeeded in recognizing that this is an issue we need to address. And that is the first
step that needs to happen before anything can change.108

Specific to LIC policymakers, two IEO studies provide evidence that staff involved with LICs are less
homogenous and conforming in their thinking and interactions with country authorities than the
institution at large. A 2011 IEO survey shows that 21 percent of authorities from LICs “strongly
agreed” that Fund research was open to alternative perspectives and was not driven by pre-set policy
prescriptions. In comparison, only 4 percent of authorities form advanced states and 8 percent of
emerging states responded in the same fashion.109
Technocratic/Economistic
Architects of the IMF, including John Maynard Keynes and Dexter White, were wary of the influence
that states would exert on policy choices of the institution. In response, the Fund was structured in a
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manner where the staff remained separate from the Executive Board.110 This has translated into a
policy process in which the staff is mainly responsible for key aspects of Fund functions, including
loan negotiations, program monitoring, designing conditionality, and communicating Fund policies.
Although the Executive Board has the ultimate power to approve policy decisions, it is normally not
involved in the “nuts and bolts” of particular terms and conditions for loan arrangements or policy
reform.111 By design, it is the Fund’s staff of macroeconomists that ideally set policy.

The institutional power granted to a staff dominated by macroeconomists has reinforced a technocratic
operational culture that historically has focused primarily on issues of economic efficiency when
developing policy for member states. Drawing primarily from macroeconomic modeling, policy
recommendations tend to downplay or sometimes ignore country-specific political and institutional
dynamics. Internal and external reviews point to a history of complaints from member state
representatives on the practicality of Fund recommendations. A 2004 study reports that “Fund advice
fails to take into account existing political constraints, or is so optimistic about the ability of the
governments to overcome them that it does not consider second-best policy choices that would be
consistent both with maintenance of macroeconomic stability and country-specific realties.”112

According to a senior SPR staff member heavily involved in LIC policy design, there also has been a
slow evolution within the Fund to think about macroeconomic advice more holistically and within a
broader context of other social and development goals:
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Where there has been a real cultural change is that if you go back to the late 70s and early
80s, the conventional view in the Fund was that there is a clear separation between
macroeconomic policies and everything else. Development policies, things like
composition of spending, income distribution, and the social effects of policies we saw as
important but felt that the Fund had no business in those areas. These were political issues
and were for other people to worry about and we could pursue our macroeconomic policy
agenda completely independently of those kind of considerations. That is what has really
changed in the Fund. No one really believes that anymore.113

Despite this shift, the same staff member also articulated that this change in operational thinking is
not complete and has produced some confusion as to how the Fund now engages in its policy work:
We are still learning that we need to make linkages between politics and economics. I don’t
think we are all the way there yet. Recent events in North Africa, for example, have been a
wakeup call again that you cannot ignore factors like lack of opportunity, perception about
corruption and subsequent legitimacy of the state if you’re going to be concerned about
stability and sustainability of economic policies. Political factors can undermine the macrostability that we are trying to achieve. We are still trying to figure what that implies for the
nature of our engagements and the policy work we get into.114

LIC staff also still see themselves as practical economists who objectively evaluate data and focus on
“what works” rather than ideologues pushing a particular agenda. A senior staff member responsible
for the design of current ECF/SCF/RCF framework described this dynamic as follows:
I would not pin the Fund’s position too much on any internal change in culture and thinking
but perhaps more of an evolution also of the countries that we work in. So there has been a
shift in what’s possible because many countries have made a lot of progress in
macroeconomic stabilization. Probably more circumstances have shifted than internal
views of people. I can assure you that within the staff there have no debates where terms
including “neoliberal”or “Keynesian” have been uttered.115

This sentiment was reiterated by a current Executive Director representing LICs:
I would try to correct a sense that the IMF is ideologically driven….Within the institution,
every view is available. There is not a particular ideology within the institution that policies
align to, but for the IMF is it rather “what can work today.”116
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In sum, prominent aspects of the Fund’s organizational culture and several trends that diverge from
these norms found in LIC staff are as follows. First, the Fund operates in a bureaucratic, hierarchical
fashion. Policy review follows a standard process that moves up the chain of command that includes
various points of review. At the staff level, SPR serves as the main gate-keeper of potential policy
reform for the Fund. Specific to LIC policy makers, three divisions within SPR (Low Income Country
Strategy Unit, Low Income Countries, and Debt Policy) are responsible for review of all LIC policy
documents before these are passed up the chain of command to the Managing Director and Executive
Board.

Second, a culture of “silo mentality” exists between departments in the institution. There is, however,
evidence of collaboration between the African, Research, and SPR departments concerning LIC issues
that diverges from the broader institutional trend. Third, the staff is made up of economists primarily
trained in elite universities in the U.S., UK, and Europe who identify themselves as non-ideological,
practical technocrats. Fourth, despite recruiting patterns and institutional design that reinforces
homogeneity in staff thinking, survey evidence demonstrates that LIC policy makers are more open to
alternative perspectives than other departments. Adoption of the PRSP process in 1999, for example,
has widened the variables included in policy design in the first decade of the 21st century. Greater
openness to alternative perspectives also appears to give LIC staff greater intellectual room to explore
ideas that historically stood outside the norm of Fund thinking. As explored in chapter 4, for example,
LIC staff have been the main institutional actors pushing the institution to seriously address issues of
poverty in policy design.
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Based on its formal operations and operational culture, an argument can be made that the Fund is
simply a technocratic institution that objectively responds to facts on the ground to alleviate balance of
payment crises and promote international economic stability and growth. As is the general consensus
among IO scholars focused on the IMF, I argue that the institution is much more than a technical
support instrument for its member states’ monetary and fiscal concerns. Since 1945, the IMF’s power
in the international system also makes it a key political actor that formally and informally shapes
development outcomes across much of the global South.117 To support this claim and to give context
to my focus on the post-Washington Consensus period in chapters 3-5, I outline below the evolution of
the Fund’s relationship with LICs from its birth nearly seven decades ago to the mid- 1990s.
1944-1952: The Bretton Woods Framework and the rise of IMF Conditionality
At the end of the Second World War, U.S. and British policy makers led negotiations with allied states
to reconstruct the international monetary and financial system. Several areas of concern marked these
deliberations. Since the Great Depression, states had abandoned the classic gold standard of foreign
exchange rates for floating exchange rate systems.118 This shift had dramatic effects in multiple policy
areas. Under the fixed exchange rate of the gold standard, states generally implemented deflationary
monetary and fiscal policy when currencies came under pressure from balance of trade deficits.119
With floating exchange rates, states instead corrected deficits through currency depreciation and
increased trade barriers. Along with disruptions from two major wars, this pattern of competitive,
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“beggar thy neighbor” devaluations and protectionism resulted in major contractions of global trade
and production.

Shifts in domestic political forces also pushed states away from the gold standard in the interwar years.
While deflationary monetary and fiscal policy to support fixed currency value was relatively easy to
implement in the pre-WW I period, increased electoral franchise and the growing power of organized
labor made such measures less politically tenable. Governments instead came under increased pressure
to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal measures during economic downturns and deficit
spending more generally in support of emerging welfare states. Following the Great Depression,
governments also began instituting capital controls to support domestic expansionary policy initiatives
and counter increased speculation in the run-up to the global economic collapse of the 1930s.120

Key then for those given the task of rebuilding the international financial order was a multilateral
institutional framework that would reconcile domestic priorities of emerging social welfare states and
full employment policies with a desire to move away from protectionism and competitive devaluations
seen in the interwar period. This tension between domestic welfare state policy objectives and desire
to restore a liberal, international trade framework manifested itself in what John Ruggie describes as
the compromise of “embedded liberalism” adopted by capitalist states through the Bretton Woods
arrangement: “The embedding of commitment to economic openness – the liberal element – within
domestic economic and political objectives was attained through the inclusion of provisions in the
rules of international trade and finance that would allow governments to opt out, on a temporary basis,
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from their international commitments should these threaten fundamental domestic economic
objectives.”121

Within this context, the Bretton Woods framework was built around three pillars. To encourage trade
liberalization, states committed to reducing protectionist barriers through the multilateral framework
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).122 Currency stability would be reestablished
through a flexible gold standard arrangement built around IMF monitoring and support. States pegged
their currencies to the US dollar convertible at $35/ounce and agreed to hold exchange rates within
one percent of those levels. With IMF consultation, member states could correct a “fundamental
disequilibrium” by up to 10 percent devaluation of currency. States contributed to an IMF monitored
stabilization fund from which members could borrow to finance temporary balance of payments
deficits rather than be reliant on private funds. These policies would substitute for harsh domestic
austerity adjustments as seen under the classic gold standard. Finally, states could control short term
capital flows as deemed necessary under the new Bretton Woods regime, facilitating individual state
autonomy in instituting monetary and fiscal policy that would support full employment policies and
the subsequent stability needed for long-term liberalization.123

In its original institutional form, the Fund had no mandate to deal with development issues. This was
left to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). While given
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clearly distinct roles, the Bretton Woods design also directly linked the two institutions via a provision
in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement making membership to the Bank preconditioned on membership
to the Fund. For the Bretton Woods framers, this linkage was driven by two concerns. Fund
membership required that states agree to exchange rate and currency restrictions and surveillance of
domestic economic policy. Bank membership, in contrast, involved only the benefit of access to
development loans. Linkage would therefore reduce the risk of freeriding behavior. The framers also
argued that monetary stability was an essential prerequisite for successful Bank lending. Fund
membership served as leverage to push states to have their fiscal and monetary “houses in order” as a
precondition of Bank development loans.

The Bretton Woods framework also reflected different tensions seen among powerful states at the
time. The U.S., as the clear political and economic hegemon, advocated for economic liberalization.
European powers, particularly a weakened Britain, focused more on issues of long-term stability,
regulation, and a framework that supported post-war reconstruction.124 Another controversial area
specific to Fund activity involved conditional lending for short term balance of payments deficits.
Britain and European states argued that conditionality requirements on short-term balance of payments
deficits be strictly limited. By 1950, conflict between Fund staff pushing for conditionality and
European resistance to these efforts set off a crisis in the institution as no members drew on Fund
resources for the year. In response, Managing Director Ivar Rooth (1951-1955) proposed and
ultimately persuaded member states to agree to a system of tiered conditionality. Each member state
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would have conditional free access to the first 25 percent of its quota paid to the Fund in gold (the
“gold tranche” at the time).125 Any loan amounts greater than the gold tranche would be subject to
Fund conditionality and surveillance. Approved in 1952, tiered conditionality arrangements would be
negotiated via Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs). In return for access to “upper credit tranches,” states
agreed to implement specific policies laid out in SBAs. SBAs remain the primary non-concessionary
lending tool of the Fund.
1954-1962: IMF common sense, the Polak Model, and SBAs
Poor states were not the primary concern of the early Bretton Woods system. Only five of the original
members of the Fund and Bank would be considered low income by today’s standard. Several factors
quickly broadened the institutional focus of the Fund to include the concerns of developing states in
the 1950s. First, the IMF was shut out of European reconstruction efforts as Marshall Plan aid was
conditional on not tapping Fund (or Bank) resources. As such, the IMF was eager to broaden its
membership.126 Decolonization movements also increased the number of poor states in the
international system and subsequently membership in the Fund and Bank. The role the Bretton Woods
institutions played in the emerging Cold War was perhaps most crucial in early Fund activity in the
global South. Here, the Fund and Bank pushed an evolutionary model of development that rejected
non-capitalist approaches espoused by the Soviet Union and a growing number of leftist and
nationalist revolutionary movements. The values and thinking of “modernization theory” pushed by
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the Fund and Bank are best captured in U.S. economist Walt Witman Rostow’s highly regarded The
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Rostow outlined key prerequisites
necessary for successful development and “economic take-off” in poor states. These included
technological and scientific expertise; appropriate infrastructure; education; the rule of law; private
property rights; and the rejection of both traditional values and communism.127 John McCloy, the first
president of the World Bank, was even more explicit in his description of the role that Bretton Woods
institutions played in the support of U.S. and Western geopolitical imperatives. The World Bank “…
would create markets for US trade…[and] stop Communism.”128 Within this context, the Fund
formally entered its first agreement with a developing state in 1954 (a $12.5 million SBA arrangement
with Peru) and steadily increased its activities in Latin America, Africa, and Asia in the 1950s.129

A critical driver of the emerging “common sense” behind Fund conditionality found in SBA lending at
the time, and arguably still at some level today, is the work of IMF’s Research Department under the
leadership of Jacques Polak (1959-1979). In the early post-War period, economists at the Fund and the
broader economics field had not developed the analytical and theoretical tools to engage with the new
Bretton Woods system. In response, the Research Department under Polak developed a model that
drew from the “absorption” and monetarist approach to balance-of-payments. In regard to the former,
much of the work in the interwar period that concerned the impact of currency devaluation on balance
of payments deficits focused its analysis on shifts in supply and demand of imports and exports in the
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devaluing country.130 Polak rejected this approach. Rather than focus on multiple elastic variables, he
instead proposed a “simple social accounting” premise regarding balance of payment deficits:
…the existence of balance-of-payments deficit implies that the country absorbs more
resources in consumption and investment than it produces. Therefore, if devaluation is to
cure this deficit, it must either increase production with consumption and investment
constant, or decrease consumption and investment with output constant, or achieve some
combination of the two.131

Polak’s focus on level of consumption as the primary variable that impacts balance-of-payments
deficits served as the foundation of the Fund’s focus on domestic policy choices of its members.

While the absorption approach shifted the analysis of Fund economists onto features of the domestic
economy, no model existed to examine how different components of economies contributed to balance
of payments problems and what policy tools could be used for correction. Polak’s “monetary model”
demonstrated that states could not correct balance of payment deficits in the long term solely through
either increases in exports or import restrictions. Correction of deficits instead only occurred if the rate
of monetary expansion remained below growth rates of real gross national product. Deficit correction
therefore required either decreases in domestic consumption or increases in productivity. Given that
substantive productivity increases were difficult to obtain within the time frame of Fund short-term
lending, the Polak Model pushed for reduction in government spending, deflationary monetary policy,
and/or tax increases. Along with narrowing policy focus for Fund staff, Polak argued that this model
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was practical as information needed for the model (banking and trade statistics) was generally
available while data needed for elasticity models was incomplete and often inaccurate.132

Polak’s model and subsequent Fund thinking thus clearly placed the onus of correction on deficit
states and their domestic policy choices. It is important to note there were other ways Fund thinking
may have evolved concerning deficits and adjustment. Since the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the
Fund has focused greater attention on the role of surplus states in creating global imbalances and
called on these governments to adjust.133 Another possible framing of balance of payments issues is
the role of exogenous, systemic conditions that undermine the ability of states to increase export
earnings to correct trade imbalances. In the 1950s, however, the analytical framework of the Fund did
not emphasize the policies of surplus states as causes of global disequilibria. Instead, a focus on
domestic issues in deficit states produced a series of anti-inflationary policy choices and operating
procedures that became standard for Fund engagement with LICs.134 Ngaire Woods contends this
framework resonated most strongly due to the fact that it was easier for the IMF to deal with domestic
causes of balance of payments deficits over which it could apply institutional leverage than with
broader systemic issues. Powerful member states including the United States also were supportive of
Polak’s framework.135
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By the late 1950s, there was also evidence of early engagement with development issues tying Polak’s
deflationary model to areas of growth in poor states. This is captured in excerpts from the Fund’s 1959
Annual Report defending the need for short-term anti-inflationary adjustment:
Notwithstanding the realization that is now fairly general that sound economic
development is not compatible with the distortions that rapid or chronic inflation always
creates, a number of less developed countries have had great difficulty in abating or
slowing down the rates of inflation…The temporary deterioration of the standard of living
[due to] a stabilization program is inevitable [and] may be interpreted by some sections of
the public as an indication of the failure of the program, and give rise to the claim for
prompt upwards adjustments in wages and salaries and form more liberal credit terms,
which, if granted will again generate inflationary pressures.136

In the 1961 Annual Meeting, Fund Managing Director Per Jacobsen (1956-1963) reinforced this
vision of the Fund as a tool for stabilization for long term gaps of capital inflow during periods of
adjustment.137
1962- 1971: Push Back, Early Concessionary Lending, and LIC Technical Assistance
The implementation of Polak-inspired adjustment in developing states was not without its critics.
Conservative voices including the Economist argued that restrictive monetary policy pushed by the
Fund was undermining Western influence in the Cold War. In a 1961 article, Per Jacobsen was
described as “Mr Khruschev’s secret weapon” overseeing potential “serious social eruption” in
developing states.138 Pushback from the left came in two primary varieties. Deflationary prescriptions
in Fund policy and a push to eliminate multiple exchange rates139 stood in sharp contrast to ISI theory
popular in Latin America and much of the global South at the time. Among other policies to stimulate
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industrialization for developing states, ISI frameworks embraced heavy government intervention in the
economy. Inflation for ISI advocates was simply a by-product of state-driven investment and
subsequent monetary expansion, and remained desirable within limits.140 More radical critiques tied
IMF policy to broader attempts by wealthy countries and capitalist elites to undermine efforts of poor
states to diversify and industrialize. Here, dependency theorists including Celso Furtado pointed to the
fact that U.S. aid and access to private capital were often linked to states first agreeing to antiinflationary SBAs.141 For Furtado, the IMF “operated primarily as a U.S. serving control instrument
over the economic and financial polices of other countries, especially the so-called underdeveloped
countries.”142

Concern over SBAs also emerged within the Fund and Washington policy establishment in the early
1960s. An internal IMF staff document focused on Colombia, for example, concluded it was “not too
strong to say that the Colombian case tends to support many of the recent criticisms of the Fund.”143
In 1966 a Bank paper harshly criticized Fund policy in regard to short-term stabilization and called for
“urgent reconsideration of the IMF’s approach to the performance of developing countries.”144
External and internal critiques and the attention created by a new concessionary branch of the World
Bank (the International Development Group or IDA145) pushed the Fund to create its first loan facility
focused on the needs of poor states in 1963. The “Compensatory Financing Facility” (CFF)
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acknowledged that volatility in primary commodity prices did in fact impact balance of payments
issues in states dependent on agricultural and mineral exports. Temporary low conditionality funding
to accommodate downturns in commodity prices thus could be more appropriate than short term
austerity.146 Under the CFF, overall Fund lending to LICs increased from $243 in 1963 to $723 million
in 1967.147

By the mid-1960s, a growing number of developing states also pressured the Fund to address causes of
commodity price fluctuations. This was a major goal shared by states that formed the United Nations
Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. UNCTAD also pushed the IMF to focus
on the drop of global liquidity seen throughout the 1960s. Developing states argued that inconsistent
access to short term lending resources was a key element in causing disruptive balance of payment
crises. Pressure from developing states and emerging European economies helped catalyze the 1969
adoption of “special drawing rights” (SDRs):
One vision of what would eventually become the SDR saw an important role for what
came to be called the “link” with development, on the grounds that the effects of liquidity
shortage in dealing with short-term balance of payments problems were felt most acutely
outside the developed world.148

Growing tension between the Fund and Bank also emerged during this period. A series of Bank loans
in Latin America and Asia in the early and mid-1960s, for example, included conditions on exchange
rate policies and macroeconomic initiatives. In response to growing turf wars, Bank and Fund
leadership reached an agreement that clarified the primary responsibilities of each institution in late
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1966. The IMF was given jurisdiction over “exchange rates and restrictive systems, for adjustment of
temporary balance of payments disequilibria and for evaluating and assisting members to work out
stabilization programs as a sound basis for economic advice.” The Bank’s primary responsibilities
would involve “composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evaluation,
including development priorities.” Areas “of interest to both institutions” included “the structure and
functioning of capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of a member country to generate
domestic savings, the financial implications of economic development programs…foreign debt
problems, and so on.”149 As outlined further below, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and
the oil shocks of the 1970s would chip away at the clear roles outlined in the 1966 concordat.

The Fund role in providing technical assistance to LICs also expanded in the 1960s. In response to the
fact that most new African states at the time had no central banks, the Fund created its “Central
Banking Service.” In 1964, the IMF Institute was opened in Washington, D.C. “Prominent in the
curriculum were courses on financial programming, which taught national officials how to use the
Fund’s analytical techniques in their own policymaking at the national level.”150 Increased Fund
missions to LICs “demanded certain kinds of data for their analysis from members” that in turn shaped
what those member states would examine in their societies. In reaction to weak data collection seen in
LICs, the Fund also opened its Bureau of Statistics in 1969.151
1971-1982: Breakdown of Bretton Woods and Early Structural Conditionality
While the Fund’s role in the global South was established by the early 1970s, several factors pushed
the institution more firmly into the realm of LIC development. The most influential factor was the
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collapse of the Bretton Woods system of adjustable pegged exchange rates between 1971 and 1973.
As industrialized states adopted floating exchange rates, a primary component of the Fund’s original
institutional responsibility evaporated. An institutional focus on chronic balance of payments issues in
developing states filled this vacuum. The Fund also found itself marginalized in its role of financing
balance of payments deficits in middle income states. Major commercial banks flush with OPEC
petrodollars accelerated lending to the global South and undermined the IMF’s presence in emerging
and middle-income countries.152 By the mid -1970s, the IMF’s main policy interventions were in the
world’s poorest states deemed too risky for private investment.

As the Fund’s clientele became poorer, three initiatives were introduced to meet LIC needs: the Oil
Facility, the Trust Fund, and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Both the Oil Facility (1975-1983) and
Trust Fund (1976-1981) were financed outside the Fund’s general account and represented the first
generation of Fund concessional lending.153 The EFF (introduced in 1974) signified a watershed
moment in regard to the Fund’s contemporary role in LICs. The three year EFF loan was designed by
Fund staff to fill a gap between short-term SBA financing and long-term World Bank development
aid.154 Unique to the EFF was its focus on correcting long term structural issues in member states that
produced “slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position” that undermined “an
active development policy.”155 While Polak inspired macroeconomic policy conditionality focused on
short term issues, structural conditionality went deeper as it pushed for substantial reform in national
152
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economies and their legal systems and linked reform to broader issues of development.156 Structural
conditionality focused on liberalizing economies became the new norm of Fund and Bank policies
following the 1982 Mexican debt crisis.
1982-1996: The Washington Consensus and Liberal Market Restructuring
By the early 1980s, LICs accounted for 44 percent of the IMF’s membership and over 60 percent of its
borrowers.157 These states faced a series of daunting challenges sparked by a perfect storm of events
from 1979-1982. The second oil crisis of the decade cut into national income for non-oil producing
states and reinforced already existing patterns of high inflation across the global South. Inflationary
concerns were not limited to LICs, as the U.S. Federal Reserve dramatically curtailed monetary supply
from 1979 to 1982. The subsequent combination of higher interest rates for global debtors and reduced
demand from industrialized states for their products pushed up unemployment, increased balance of
payments deficit and debt levels, and reduced access to cheap private financing.

The initial response to the 1979 oil shock included increased pressure from borrowers and creditors on
the Fund to increase LIC lending. Managing Director Jacques de Larosière (1978-1986) responded in
kind with a strategy pushing for increased conditional lending. With a move toward greater use of
SBAs and the EFF for LICs, overall Fund upper tranche conditionality lending grew from an annual
average of $1.25 billion in 1973-1978 to $3.23 billion from 1979-1984.158

Fall out of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis also proved a significant factor in the Fund’s relationship with
its poorest member states. Here, IMF conditionality requirements that emerged worked to dismantle
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the remnants of state-heavy ISI strategies seen as responsible for high inflation, corruption,
inefficiency, and chronic balance of payment problems across much of the developing world at the
time. As introduced in chapter 1, these were described as “Washington Consensus” reforms and
included trade and financial liberalization; privatization of state enterprises; reduction and elimination
of subsidies; liberalization of labor markets, restructuring taxation toward consumption based systems;
and strengthened institutional protection of private property rights.

Washington Consensus reforms were pursued in LICs through two concessionary lending
arrangements. In 1986, the IMF introduced the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). The SAF
merged concessionary lending (0.5 percent interest, ten year maturity, and repayment in 5 ½ years)
and structural conditionality requirements into one loan program for the first time. Using IDA
eligibility as the income criterion for access to the three-year SAF, 60 LICs qualified to draw from
approximately $3.2 billion in lending resources.159 Conditionality requirements of the SAF were
designed to be stricter and broader than those previously enacted under the Trust Fund. Whereas the
Trust Fund was designed to “carry out programs of balance of payment adjustment,” policy reforms in
SAFs were spelled out in a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) where the member state in question would
outline “a three-year adjustment program…to correct macroeconomic and structural problems that
have impeded balance of payment adjustment and economic growth.”160 The PFP process also
included World Bank participation at various steps. After a state requested a SAF loan, Fund and Bank
staff collaborated to draft an initial PFP to be negotiated with country authorities. Once the PFP
negotiation process was complete, the Bank’s Executive Board would review the agreement and
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forward its recommendation to the Fund’s Board. Despite low funding levels, stricter conditionality,
and a cumbersome review process, 29 countries borrowed a total of $2.4 billion through the SAF
program from 1987 to 1999.161
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), initiated in 1987, tripled the resources available
to qualifying states through the establishment of the ESAF Trust. LICs applying to the ESAF also
could draw on a substantially higher percentage of their quota (140- 185 percent over three years) than
under the SAF (63.5 percent). To strengthen conditionality requirements, the ESAF introduced
procedures that linked semiannual disbursement of funds to successful completion of PFP negotiated
“structural benchmarks” and “structural performance criterion.” Performance criteria, eliminated in
2009, were easily measurable benchmarks set by the Executive Board that a member state was
expected to adopt before further disbursement of loans. Failure to meet performance criteria required a
waiver from the Executive Board for any future distribution of loan resources. Structural benchmarks,
also approved by the EB, “are applied to measures that cannot be specified in terms that are
objectively monitorable, or to measures where non-implementation to a single component would not
be judged sufficient to derail the program.”162 Between 1988 and 1999, the ESAF became the primary
concessional loan instrument of the Fund, disbursing over $10.7 billion in lending through 90
arrangements to 52 LICs.163

Conclusion
Six trends from 1945-1996 highlight the Fund’s contemporary role in formally and informally shaping
LIC policy choices. First, the focus of the Fund shifted from industrial economies to poor states during
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this time. By the 1960s, less than 10 percent of Fund lending went to OECD members, and from 1975
to 2007, no Western industrialized states received Fund loans.164 Second, since the establishment of
Polak-inspired conditionality in the 1950s, members are granted access to resources contingent on
implementation of Fund-directed policies. While these conditions changed over time, the leverage of
the Fund to impose rules or reform remains in place in LICs. Third, the Fund evolved to fill an
informal role as gatekeeper for member access to World Bank loans, other multilateral assistance, and
private banks. Fourth, adoption of the Polak model shaped how the institution perceived economic
problems in LICs and the general formula for corrective action. Balance of payments problems and
broader economic performance were considered primarily the fault of deficit states. Adjustment and
belt tightening in LICs, rather than a focus on the behavior of surplus states or instability in global
markets, is the primary lens through which policy is developed and implemented.

Fifth, the Fund’s focus on statistics and technical data as the basis of policy decisions influenced what
data member states measured and the rules and procedures undertaken to collect this information.165
Member governments, in turn, responded by creating new categories of measurement and subsequent
policy focus. And finally, the framing of Fund policy choices and technical assistance as based on
objective, apolitical “facts” and econometric modeling helped established the Fund as a legitimate
authority in LICs. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore,
The IMF uses rules to reason and also to justify and explain its decisions to its publics, and
in this way is no different from the UN Secretariat or UNHCR…But its form of reasoning
is different because of its reliance on quantitative analysis…Because analyses based on
numbers, models, and rules seem impartial and fair, they are a defense against accusations
of politicized and unprofessional behavior that can undermine bureaucrats’ authority as
experts. Indeed, it is the objective and depoliticized nature of these policy
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recommendations that allows them to garner political support and mobilizes people to
implement the recommended policies.166

Establishment of legitimate authority in turn supplemented the Fund’s growing power in shaping LIC
outcomes.167

This power remains today and is manifested in multiple forms.168 As outlined above, the Fund exhibits
compulsory power in its ability to directly alter LIC behavior through denial of funds or categorization
of a member state as off the “right track.” Its more indirect institutional power stems primarily from its
bilateral and multilateral surveillance and technical support activity. The Fund also has a specific way
of categorizing economies and their progress, and uses particular data points to determine if a LIC is
meeting benchmarks necessary for continued or future funding. Through data collection and
determination of what problems exist in LICs to be solved and how these problems should be
addressed, the Fund exhibits productive power in helping to constitute “what matters” in these
societies. Finally, the Fund’s engagement in LICs also reflects broader structural power relations
highlighted by neo-Marxist scholars. As developed further in chapter 5, the IMF’s policy directive in
LICs can be interpreted as one component of broader processes that facilitate and reproduce the state
forms and policy choices necessary for globalizing capitalism.169
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Two prominent themes developed in chapters 1 and 2 thus highlight the rationale for an in-depth study
of contemporary post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform. First, the Fund “matters” in regard to
LICs and will continue to play a prominent role in early 21st century development outcomes. It is in
the best interest of those inside and outside the IMF to understand what dynamics facilitate change in
its policy directives. Second, while the role of the IMF in LICs is firmly established, the post
Washington Consensus period has produced a more complex landscape of how the Fund expresses it
power and leverage in LICs. Rather than a strict top-down, “one size fits all” development model
pushed by IMF during the Washington Consensus period, the past two decades are marked by a more
consensual and multilayered reality. The complexity of this dynamic is reinforced further by LIC staff
that exhibit greater openness and flexibility than their peers in other more prominent departments in
the institution. In chapter 3, we begin unpackaging the multiple layers of post Washington Consensus
LIC policy reform.
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Chapter 3 - Coalitions of Change: Rationalist Explanations of LIC Reform

Chapter 3 investigates four cases of post Washington Consensus LIC reform through a framework that
combines principal agent modeling and elements of sociological organizational theory. It identifies
four patterns in regard to LIC policy reform. First, two tiers of actors were involved in LIC change.
Primary actors included powerful states, the Managing Director, and senior staff. Secondary actors
consisted of poor states, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. Policy change occurred only when a coalition
made up of two primary actors or a primary actor and secondary actor formed. Second, as
hypothesized by principal agent theory, increases in powerful state preference heterogeneity granted
staff and management greater room to initiate or resist policy change. Third, direct NGO pressure
proved most effective when a sympathetic primary actor was present. Fourth, individuals in the
Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and African Department and the Managing Director were
key actors who reinforced coalitions around LIC change.

Theorizing IO Change: PA Modeling and SO Theory

IO scholars Daniel Nielson, Michael Tierney and Catherine Weaver contend that stand alone
rationalist and sociological organizational (SO) approaches fail to effectively explain change in
multilateral institutions. Rationalist approaches, grounded in principal-agent (PA) theory, have
difficulty explaining why some patterns of institutional behavior remain in place even when heavily
targeted for change by powerful state actors or management. SO approaches reciprocally fail to
explain why staff opposed to certain reform initiatives concedes to powerful state or management
demands seemingly at odds with the institution’s culture. Nielson et al. call for an “empirical
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synthesis” of PA modeling and SO theory to best capture the interplay of “top down” and “bottom up”
dynamics.170

PA models ground their analysis in the following two assumptions. First, IOs are not simply
manifestations of powerful state preferences in the international system.171 Rather, they are entities in
and of themselves and exhibit relative autonomy from powerful states: “We emphasize the importance
of IOs as actors that implement policy decisions and pursue their own interests strategically.”172
Despite political agency, IOs face constraints on policy direction, as they are ultimately granted
conditional authority by states to perform tasks in the international system. In PA parlance, states are
“principals” that delegate authority to IOs through formal or informal “contractual” agreement.173 IOs
are “agents” that function within the constraints of conditional grants of authority. This dynamic sets
up a fluid situation witnessed by changing degrees of “agency slack” and “autonomy.” Agency slack
refers to “independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal.” Autonomy is the range of
potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of
control.174
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PA theory maintains that the nature of the contractual relationship produces predictable dynamics
concerning institutional behavior and change. For the principal, the main concern is how authority is
delegated without losing control. Agents are opportunistic and commonly engage in several forms of
behavior to increase slack and autonomy. Most common are processes that hide information or involve
taking action behind the back of the principal.175 For their part, states reduce “agency slippage”
through five primary mechanisms. First, they formally determine what authority is delegated to the IO
and have the power to alter contracted agreements. Second, principals have control of the selection,
hiring, and firing of IO management. Third, agents also can monitor principals directly or through
third parties. Fourth, principals can structure IOs in a manner that keeps individuals in the institution
in check. This is accomplished through creation of institutional checks and balances or through
empowering more than one agent with the same mandate (e.g., adjustment lending in both the Bank
and Fund). Finally, states can punish or reward the IO. In the case of the IMF, states ultimately can
withhold funding of quota resources.176

PA models also focus on the form of principal agent relationships. At its simplest, PA models involve
a single principal delegating to a single agent (see Figure 3.1 below). In reality, delegation of authority
to agents often involves a principal made up of multiple actors (“collective principal”) or a situation
where a single agent has more than one contract with organizationally distinct principals (“multiple
principals”).177 All else being equal, PA models predict greater agency slack and autonomy as the
number of principals increases. Room for agents to shirk principal demands also is predicted to
increase as divergence in preferences among principals (“preference heterogeneity”) increases.
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Figure 3.1: Types of PA Relationships
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(Source: Lyne et al., “Who Delegates?,” p.45)
PA models also focus on what are termed “proximate” principals in predicting IO change (see figure
3.2 below). In a delegation change visualized here for the Fund, the proximate principal is the entity
with the closest formal authority to the agent in question. While pressure for change may come from
actors (voters, NGOs) several places removed in the delegation chain (“distal principals”), Fund
management and staff will most likely ignore these demands and instead focus on signals from their
proximate principal: “Because staff members of IOs are not rewarded, or may even be punished if they
respond too vigorously to stimuli other than the demands of their proximate principal, they should tend
to ignore or discount demands made by interest groups in given member countries.”178 PA models
thus predict little change due to NGO “street heat” or direct lobbying of the Fund. Rather, NGO
pressure on states should prove more effective in producing reform in policy direction.
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Figure 3.2: Hypothetical Chain of Delegation for IMF
Private actors (voters)
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PA modeling is incorporated to clarify the outer structural constraints within which IO policies may
diverge from state (or managerial) preferences and which actors carry the greatest leverage over policy
choices. Answers to how and why the Fund changes policy direction within semi-autonomous
relationship with principals instead draws from sociological organization (SO) theory. SO theory
assumes that IOs have their own internal social life, norms, and organizational culture through which
external demands from states, NGOs or senior management are refracted and internally processed. It
also holds that internal policy culture and subsequent policy choices may sometimes even change
without external pressure and develop a path-dependent life of their own potentially at odds with
powerful state interests.179

Several variables that can shift internal culture and policy choices are identified in the SO literature.
Foremost is the role of internal “norm entrepreneurs.” Individuals pushing a new idea will command
the greatest influence if they occupy a position within the bureaucracy that: (1) has access to
management; (2) can serve as a veto point for policy initiatives; and (3) has access to resources. 180

179

Antje Vetterlein, “Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and the Role of Social Policies. The Evolution of the World
Bank’s Social Development Approach,” Global Governance 13, no.4 (2007), pp.513-533 at p.515.
180
Jeffrey Chwieroth, “Organizational Change ‘From Within’: Exploring the World Bank’s Early Lending Practices,”
Review of International Political Economy 15, no.4 (2008), pp. 481-505 at p.494.

73

Staff and management also maneuver through the organizational bureaucracy, promoting new beliefs
that can potentially alter the organization’s culture and practices.181 These agents promote particular
policy outcomes through three primary avenues.182 First, they interpret historical experience through
the assumptions and worldviews that will support their ideas and actively search for evidence that will
reinforce their beliefs. Second, these actors may also engage in small scale experiments to test their
assumptions. In the IMF, for example, this dynamics is seen when staff circulate position papers or
articles published in Finance and Development that explore and test questions concerning appropriate
policy response. Third, actors that push for change will also engage strategically in ideological battles
to win support for their ideas.183

The ultimate success of reforms proposed also is tied to the form and depth of change advocated.
When staff interpret new information and events that fail to meet expected outcomes, “they tend to
change their beliefs about legitimate means in an ad hoc fashion rather than changing their beliefs
about legitimate goals.”184 Shifts in thinking and subsequent policy choice reform are therefore most
likely due to “adaptation.” Defined as a change in beliefs about desirable means to reach a policy
outcome, this is manifested in various forms including “changes in organizational language, structures,
symbols, and small modifications of behavior.”185 Adaption differs from more fundamental processes
of “learning.” Rather than questioning the efficacy of policy process to achieve a certain outcome,
learning challenges policy goals. Given that learning is a deeper process of change that can
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fundamentally challenge organizational culture, SO theorists predict that IO policy shift occurs most
frequently through processes of adaption.186

Successful reform also hinges in part on the degree of discursive influence individuals hold. Seasoned
staff and management considered authorities advocating change encounter less resistance from less
senior colleagues. Position in the bureaucracy also matters. Staff situated in leadership positions more
easily lobby management, initiate or block potential reforms, and control information.187 Specific to
LIC policy reform at the Fund, we should expect that senior staff found in the Africa, SPR, and
Research Departments are key gate-keepers that influence the potential success or failure of reform
efforts.

PA Modeling, SO Theory and Fund Policy Change
For purposes of this project, I focus on two levels of delegation (see Figure 3.3 below): State to Fund
management (level 1) and management to staff (level 2). At level 1, powerful states represented by the
Fund’s Executive Board serve as the collective principal. Member states of the Fund delegate authority
to the 24 member executive board (EB), which oversees day to day operations of the Fund. As noted
in chapter 2, each Executive Director (ED) has different weighted voting power based on quota size of
state(s) represented. The U.S., Germany, Britain, Japan, and France each have individual
representation on the EB and the largest weighed voting power since 1945. Decisions on the EB are
mainly finalized through consensus rather than formal votes and require coalitions built around
support of the above shareholders, particularly the United States.188 Along with the greatest voting
186
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share, the U.S. differs from other powerful states in its presidential government design. The model
below therefore includes the U.S. Congress as an additional principal that can contract with Fund
management.189

Figure 3.3: Principals at Two Levels of Delegation Chain
Level 1 EDs
U.S. Executive
Branch/ Japan
UK /Germany
France

Level 1

IMF
Management

Level 2
IMF Staff

U.S.
Congress
ss

Congress confirms the ED appointed by the President and must approve any quota increase to the
Fund. Congress also must consent to any supplemental lending to the IMF via the General
Arrangement of Borrowers (GAB), the New Arrangement of Borrowers (NAB), and sale of IMF gold
resources. In addition, Congress passes mandates that direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct
the U.S. ED to pursue specific policy objectives:
Policy mandates seek to foster or advocate certain policies at the IMF by directing Treasury
to instruct the U.S. Executive Director to use his or her “voice,” “vote,” or both, on behalf
of the United States at the Executive Board to bring about a policy change at the IMF. For
example, the U.S. Executive Director is directed to encourage the IMF to adopt
internationally recognized worker rights for borrowing countries. Directed vote mandates
are more prescriptive, in that they instruct the United States to “oppose” or “vote against”
loans or other IMF assistance to particular countries or categories of countries.190
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As of 2005, the Government Accountability Office has identified 70 legislative mandates passed by
Congress since 1945.

As outlined in chapter 2, the Fund’s operational culture is characterized by hierarchical and
bureaucratic tendencies. The staff is also rooted in a scientific, technocratic worldview that is
consistent with analysis found in the broader epistemic and professional economics field. Shifts in LIC
policy should not be expected to occur rapidly or be shaped extensively by political pressure from
outside the institution. Reform of LIC policy is also more likely if the reform in question resonates or
is packaged in way that is congruent with a culture historically supportive of liberal market solutions
to development issues (see chapter 4).

Drawing from the PA and SO frameworks, the following hypotheses are derived for explaining LIC
policy change:
H1: If pressure for LIC policy change comes from staff and runs counter to state or management
preferences, increased/decreased heterogeneity of principal preferences strengthens/weakens the
ability of staff working to shift policy direction.
H2: If pressure for LIC policy change comes from state principal demands on the Fund and runs
counter to internal staff and management interests, increased/decreased heterogeneity of state
preferences weakens/strengthens the ability of management and staff to shift policy direction.
H3: LIC policy change only occurs due to proximate principal pressure. Direct NGO or citizen
(“leapfrogging”) pressure on the Fund will not produce LIC policy change.
H4: A strategically situated “norm entrepreneur” is a necessary component of LIC policy change
when the change in question challenges the Fund’s institutional culture.
H5: Framing of policy reform shifts as a need to address policy implementation (adaption), rather
than a fundamental challenge to Fund thinking on macroeconomic policy (learning), and increases the
change of subsequent implementation of reform in LIC policy choices.
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Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC)
Liberal market policy positions pushed by SAF and ESAF structural conditionality (see chapter 2) sets
the stage for examination of the first substantial shift in Fund policy away from a strict Washington
Consensus model. Facilitated in part by growing evidence of stagnant growth and rising inequality and
poverty across much of the developing world in the 1980s, critics of the IMF and World Bank argued
that conditional lending to LICs was a primary cause of unsustainable debt levels and called for
substantial multilateral debt relief.

The debate around debt relief first formally emerged in Paris Club191 negotiations of bilateral debt
levels in the 1980s. The general consensus from creditor states at the time was that debt levels of poor
states were manageable if correctly addressed. Rather than debt forgiveness, extension of terms of
payment or reduction in interest rates was seen as the appropriate response for bilateral agreements.
By the mid-1980s, growing debt levels – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – prompted British
officials to propose a framework of bilateral debt relief through the Paris Club. The proposal,
introduced by UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson in 1987, called for Club members to
convert bilateral aid loans to grants, increase repayment periods to twenty years, and reduce the rate of
interest on outstanding debt by one-third for debtor states in good standing with the Fund.

British lobbying continued through 1987 and 1988 at the Paris Club, the Venice and Toronto G-7
Summits, the Commonwealth Finance of Ministers, and IMF/World Bank Annual meetings. Despite
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initial broad opposition from other rich states (Germany, Japan, and the U.S.), the G-7 endorsed the
“Toronto Terms” in 1988. Through the Paris Club, creditors could choose from three options for
dealing with debtor states: long-term rescheduling, lower interest rates, and a partial write down of
stock of debt.192 Inertia toward bilateral debt relief was further enhanced with several U.S. initiatives,
including the 1989 Brady plan,193 and a 1991 reduction of Egyptian debt for its contribution of military
forces in the first Gulf War. Further proposals increasing bilateral debt relief pushed by the UK were
adopted throughout the early 1990s, culminating in the Lyon Terms agreement at the 1996 G-7
Summit. Under this agreement, highly indebted states in good standing with the Fund and Bank could
have up to 80 percent of bilateral debts written off through the Paris Club.194

As bilateral debt relief increased through the late 1980s and early 1990s, the percentage of debt owed
to multilateral institutions increased substantially.195 In addition to calls from NGOs (see below), the
UK (along with the Netherlands and the Nordic states) formally initiated the notion of Fund and Bank
debt relief for LICs at the 1994 spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank. Although broadly
resisted by the majority of wealthy states and management at the Fund,196 growing pressure to
examine multilateral debt relief continued. Along with lobbying by the UK and NGOs, newly
appointed World Bank President James Wolfensohn was sympathetic to looking at the issue.197
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In February 1995, The Fund and Bank staff presented a joint paper on issues of debt sustainability and
concluded that for the majority of LICs “debt service ratios on currently outstanding multilateral debt
will be essentially unchanged or lower in the coming three years (1995-1997) and will decline further
in most cases over the next decade.”198 As such “there was no unmanageable hump of debt servicing
to multilaterals for the vast majority of heavily indebted poor countries.”199

Reaction at the Executive Board was mixed. At a February 24 meeting, critics of the staff report most
sympathetic to multilateral debt relief included the EDs from the UK (Evans), Nordic states (Srejber),
and those representing LICs (Dlami and Koissey). Evans, for example, concluded “…that the problem
is more serious than the Fund staff paper admits. And that the Fund has a role in resolving the
problem.”200 The U.S. (Lissakers) and Canada (Clark) provided more reserved support. Clark argued
“that the Fund and Bank cannot be grant agencies. Nevertheless these multilateral credit organizations
cannot ignore that their interest charges…divert some productive resources away from the debtor
country.”201 EDs from Germany (Esdar), Japan (Mesaki), France (Autheman), and Italy (Grilli)
resisted calls for debt relief. Division of powerful state preferences on the issue of debt relief remained
in subsequent EB debates in 1995 and 1996. Most notable was U.S. movement from a mild supporter
of the UK position to a strong advocate for debt relief in 1996. ED Lissakers, for example, critiqued an
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April 2, 1996 revised staff proposal on multilateral debt relief as biased and too rigid to effectively
address debt issues in LICs:
….the proposed framework would not give the Fund sufficient flexibility to assess the
needs of individual cases, including those where it might be appropriate to take bolder
actions in tandem with other bilateral and multilateral creditors within a shorter time
frame to provide effective debt relief and place the country on a path toward higher
rates of sustainable growth.202

France, Germany, and Japan remained staunchly opposed to the UK and U.S. position and were even
critical of staff’s reference to poverty issues in the report. Japanese ED Mesaki, for example, stated:
…it would not be appropriate to indicate that…principal donors and multilateral creditors
…undertake to implement a set of measures aimed at the achievement of a sustainable debt
level consistent with a country’s strategy to improve growth prospects and reduce poverty.
The Fund’s efforts should be aimed at helping countries strengthen their overall
macroeconomic framework, not at achieving objectives related to longer-term growth or to
social issues…. Therefore, we did not see a need to expand on the prospective role of the
Fund in resolving the debt problem of the HIPCs.203

Despite this division, there was consensus among wealthy states that any program on debt relief going
forward would require strong conditionality requirements and continual staff oversight.204

Staff was generally skeptical of any moves toward debt relief. As noted above, an initial paper on the
issue of debt sustainability in LICs issues on February 7, 1995 maintained the majority of poor states
could manage debt levels. This conclusion was based on assumptions of annual nominal export growth
rates of 6 percent and annual nominal 3 percent growth rate of new concessional lending. When
challenged by NGOs on these figures, the Executive Board asked staff to revisit the issue. A March 30
revised staff report increased the number of countries that could be adversely affected from 8 to 23 but
argued again that multilateral debt was manageable if sufficient concessionary lending came
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forward.205 Two further studies requested by the Development Committee and the Board in 1996
focused on individual LIC cases. Staff once again argued that the majority of highly indebted states
could pay back multilateral debts. The paper also focused on issues of moral hazard and noted a
potential upside to some form of debt relief if the Fund and Bank maintained strong conditionality and
oversight of the process:
A potential advantage of refinancing/rescheduling (accompanied by conditionality)
relative to explicit up front debt reduction may be that by allowing the Fund and the
Bank to constantly monitor policy performances in the indebted countries, it leads to
better policies and less moral hazard problems.206

In response to an Interim Committee request for some form of debt relief proposal, the staff presented
its framework in February 1996. Under a two-step program over a six year period, highly indebted
LICs under Fund and Bank surveillance would first be granted up to 90 percent debt relief from Paris
Club and commercial creditors. If the LICs met Fund and Bank standards of reform, they then would
graduate to phase two where debt owed to the Fund, Bank, and other multilateral institutions would be
reduced to sustainable levels.

Along with staff, management was wary of HIPC. Camdessus supported staff positions in regard to
debt sustainability and rejected calls for substantive multilateral debt relief:
I would conclude…there does not seem to be at this stage a generalized problem of debt to
multilateral institutions…For the Fund, the clear implication is the need to have available
resources on ESAF terms for the foreseeable future….there appears to be no need for major
changes in the Fund’s facilities or in their concessionality for most of the poorest
members.207
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Due to the split between powerful state preferences on staff HIPC proposals in spring 1996,
Camdessus advocated for a proposal put forth by the German (Esdar) and Japanese (Mesaki) EDs that
the staff position on HIPCs be considered endorsed by management and not the Executive Board.208
Despite critiques from the UK and U.S. EDs that the staff proposal was too conservative and “neither
economically effective and efficient nor politically sustainable,” the split on the board and Camdessus’
support for Esdar’s proposal allowed the staff framework of debt relief to go to the Interim Committee
in April 1996. The HIPC initiative was then endorsed by the Board of Governors and Executive Board
in September 1996.

In regard to NGO influence on HIPC adoption, methods included indirect pressure on powerful states
and direct lobbying of Fund staff and management. Most prominent in shaping Fund policy change on
debt was the European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) and Oxfam International.
Starting in 1994, Eurodad organized a campaign on multilateral debt forgiveness that targeted the
Bank and IMF.209 By 1996, “over 150 NGOs, NGO networks, academics, debt experts, representatives
from the UN, UNCTAD, UNDP, the Non-aligned Movement, the Commonwealth Secretariat and
other interested institutions” had joined the campaign.210 NGO pressure was applied indirectly to
powerful state legislatures and finance ministers in several venues. Prior to the July 1995 Halifax G-7
summit, for example, Eurodad heavily lobbied G-7 leadership around issues of multilateral debt relief.
In its communiqué, the G-7 acknowledged that the “IMF and World Bank should lead in developing a
comprehensive multilateral approach to assist countries with multilateral debt and debt-service ratios
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above prudent levels in addressing their debt burdens, through the flexible implementation of existing
instruments, and new mechanisms where necessary.”211

Relative to direct action, Eurodad was also the primary actor that pressured Fund and Bank EDs and
management to review the assumptions of the February 7, 1995 staff report initially downplaying the
severity of multilateral debt issues. Eurodad, Oxfam, and the Debt Crises Network also actively
lobbied Fund management and staff on debt issues, and participated and demonstrated at the joint
annual meetings of the Fund and Bank during this time.212 Religious organizations were also outside
players that actively pushed the Fund to address debt relief issues. Catholic Church leadership, for
example, met with Camdessus in London and Washington in 1996, where the MD “was reported to
have been deeply affected by the meetings as he came face to face with the hostility of world Catholic
leaders toward the institutions he led and its economic policies.”213
HIPC Results:
Returning to the hypotheses introduced above, the evidence in the HIPC case points to the following.
H1-H2: The division between two blocs of powerful states (U.S./UK and Germany, Japan, and France)
allowed the MD and staff to initially block HIPC reform efforts. While pressure from the U.S. and UK
and NGOs ultimately led to adoption of the HIPC, the fact that Germany, Japan, and France resisted
these efforts increased the leverage of the MD and staff in shaping the final design of debt relief. Strict
conditionality requirements and increased surveillance of LICs as a component of debt relief pushed
by the staff, for example, were included in the HIPC. This suggests that powerful state preference
heterogeneity increased management and staff power in the shaping of reform efforts.
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H3: NGOs applied pressure both on IMF management and staff and on state principals. PA theory
maintains that NGO pressure applied directly to IMF management and staff will not have significant
impact on Fund policy change. Effective pressure applied to powerful states, in contrast, is
hypothesized to produce a dynamic where the IMF responds to the new demands of its proximate
principal. In the HIPC case, NGOs applied pressure both directly on Fund management and staff, and
indirectly on powerful states in their support of debt relief. While these efforts helped produce a
change in policy direction, the evidence from this case is thus unable to definitively discern to what
degree direct or indirect pressure helped spur adoption of the HIPC.
H4: Evidence does not point to any individual within the IMF who pushed for the HIPC.
H5: IMF management and staff initially resisted debt relief for LICs. As documented above, multiple
staff position papers initially downplayed the severity of LIC debt and its impacts. When adopted, the
HIPC in its final form was framed in a manner that did not fundamentally challenge Fund thinking.
Debt relief, for example, was presented in a manner whereby recipient states would see increased
conditionality requirements and Fund surveillance.
“Enhanced” Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC II)
The Fund and World Bank replaced the HIPC with the “enhanced” HIPC (HIPC II) in 1999. HIPC II
promised to provide “faster, deeper, and broader debt relief” for LICs and tied debt forgiveness to a
series of new poverty reduction initiatives introduced with the PRGF (see below). Dynamics leading to
the adoption of HIPC II included broad support from a series of actors, including powerful states,
LICs, the Managing Director, staff, and NGOs supportive of the initiative. Both liberal and
conservative wings of the U.S. Congress also played an active role in pressuring the Fund to adopt
HIPC II. As developed below and further in chapter 4, broad support of a more aggressive stance on
debt relief and its relationship to both poverty and development outcomes also points to a broader shift
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both within the Fund and the broader policy-making community between 1996 and 1999. This is
arguably tied in part to the fallout from the Asian crisis, which significantly challenged Fund
competence and Washington Consensus policy prescriptions.

NGOs were perhaps the most important actors pushing the Fund to adopt HIPC II changes in 1999. As
articulated by a Fund staff member,
The NGO community, having tasted blood with HIPC, decided to push harder…push
further. They said we set the sustainability threshold too high… [and the process of debt
relief] is taking too long… And there is not enough linkage between debt relief operations
that you are doing and the ultimate objectives of reducing poverty. So they pushed for all of
these things as part of a reformed HIPC and the international community eventually bowed
to that pressure. You have to hand it to the NGOs, they were extremely effective and in
some respects, they got it right.214

Jubilee 2000, launched in 1996, was the key NGO pushing for HIPC II. Specific to direct lobbying,
Jubilee (along with Oxfam and Eurodad) regularly met with EDs, staff, management, and the
Development and Interim Committees between 1996-1999 and pressed their concerns. Jubilee 2000
also organized direct action and lobbying campaigns. By 1999, Jubilee had petitions circulating in
over 100 countries and had collected over 17 million signatures demanding debt cancellation.215 It also
was a primary player in organizing highly visible demonstrations at the 1998 Birmingham and 1999
Cologne G-7 Summits.

In the U.S., Jubilee 2000 and other NGOs pushed Congress to pressure the Fund in two primary areas.
First, lobbying took place to build support for a symbolic Congressional mandate in 1998, instructing
the U.S. ED “to use aggressively his voice and vote to enhance the general effectiveness of the IMF
214
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with respect to….core labor standards, social safety nets…especially the world’s poorest, heavily
indebted countries.”216 The Jubilee campaign also built a successful coalition of liberal Democrats and
conservative Republicans that eventually secured $435 million of Congressional funding for Fund debt
relief.217 Pressure was also exerted on Congress in 1998 in regards to the Fund’s 11th Quota review.
While much of the critique came from conservative members focused on the fallout from the Asian
financial crisis, hearings in Congress included witnesses critical of Fund programs for the poor.218
NGO pressure also targeted the Clinton administration and governments in the UK, France, and
Germany.

Staff and management thinking around the relationship between debt relief and Fund policy objectives
in LICs also shifted during the 1996-1999 time period. Most striking was the rise of internal debates
about the efficacy of the Polak model when applied to LICs. As noted by a senior staff member in the
African Department:
When I first came here, it was all about closing a balance of payment gap. Every program
that you designed had to show that the balance of payments gap closed within a three to
five year period. If it didn’t show this, out the window it went. Starting with… the HIPCs,
we started questioning that. If a country is really developing and is really poor, that can’t be
true. It has to borrow from abroad. In fact, you have to have a balance of payment gap that
opens over time, not one that closes.219

The primary role of debt relief therefore no longer was seen by staff as a bridge to allow for an orderly
process of correcting balance of payments deficits. Rather, it was one tool to allow LICs to increase
short-term balance of payment deficits that would allow for long-term poverty reduction and
subsequent improved development outcomes.
216
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NGO pressure and internal staff debates led to a joint IMF-World Bank review of the HIPC in 1998. In
April 1999, Camdessus and Wolfensohn outlined their position for modifying the initiative. This
included:
1. Debt relief should reinforce the tools of the international community with the wider aim of
promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction.
2. Debt relief should strengthen the incentives for debtor countries to adopt strong programs
of adjustment and reform.
3. Enhanced debt relief should focus on poorest countries.
4. Debt relief should be irrevocable.
5. Simplification of the HIPC framework.220

A joint Fund-Staff paper summarizing critiques and possible options going forward was debated at the
EB on April 16. Here four areas were discussed: depth, breadth, and timing of debt relief, and issues of
conditionality. Most notable was the shift in position of the Japanese (Yoshimura) and German (Esdar)
EDs from three years earlier. While wary of debt forgiveness and a move toward development issues
in the HIPC process in 1996, they were now open to deeper and quicker debt forgiveness in 1999 and
linking debt issues to poverty. Yoshimura, in endorsing a move toward HIPC reform, argued “…social
development and poverty alleviation are among the ultimate targets of HIPC countries, and no one
disagrees generally on the need for tighter links among debt relief, poverty reduction, and social
policies.”221 The German position was more explicit in calls for deepening debt relief and linkages to
poverty and reflected the position of the new Social-Democratic government under the leadership of
Gerhard Schröeder:
We should aim to speed up the debt relief process, so that HIPCs can benefit from debt
reduction as early as possible. The debt relief process should lead to an immediate freeing
up of internal budgetary resources for poverty reduction measures by granting debt service
relief. We should increase the volume of delivered debt reduction, so that more funds can
be released for measures to fight poverty and to promote sustainable development. The debt
220
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relief process should be embedded in a development strategy promoting sustainable
development and in particular focusing on the reduction of poverty in debtor countries.222

This position of speeding up and deepening debt relief was shared by the UK (Pickford) and EDs
representing LICs (Barro Chambrier, de Morais), the Nordic states (Lehmussaari), Netherlands and
Eastern Europe (Wihnholds), and Canada, Ireland, and the Caribbean (Bernes).223 The U.S.
(Lissakers), while supportive of deepening relief, was cautious on issues of timing:
We believe that the presumption of a six year track record of reforms should be
maintained…Providing debt relief outside a framework of macroeconomic stabilization and
broader structural reform will not support the type of sustained improvements in growth
and poverty alleviation at the heart of this initiative. Stabilization efforts and reform need
time to take hold…we do not do these countries any favors by rushing to a completion
point.224

France (Milleron) was least enthusiastic on deepening and broadening the HIPC framework:
We are also ready to reflect further on tightening the links between debt relief and poverty
reduction. We recognize that we do not have specific views on how to proceed at this stage.
But, we nevertheless believe that debt cancellation cannot substitute for traditional ODA
support, which has the additional advantage of positive externalities. …. Debt relief
measures, however generous, can only accompany, not substitute for development policies.
France therefore believes that only countries with irreproachable economic and social
management as well as governance should benefit from this enhanced exceptional effort by
the international financial community.225

As with the HIPC process, negotiations around HIPC II saw broad agreement from powerful states and
staff on the importance of structural reform, conditionality, and Fund involvement in any new debt
relief scheme. This is best captured by EDs from poor LICs who reaffirmed this sentiment pushed by
creditor states. ED Chambrier, for example, stated:
While we see merit in de-linking debt relief from ESAF compliance, we understand the
concerns expressed on the need for assurances regarding policy performance….
Concerning the use of performance requirements after the completion point, we can
endorse the arguments outlined by the staff, given the risk related to the fact that this
situation could entail difficult judgments about the delivery of debt relief.226
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Feedback from the 1999 April meeting was forwarded to G-7 leadership for discussion at the Cologne
Summit meeting in June. Merging various proposals from the Fund and Bank, the G-7 leaders
“recommended relaxing the eligibility criteria to provide speedier and deeper debt relief to more
countries.”227 In September, 1999 HIPC II was approved by the Interim and Development Committees
pending funding, and formally adopted by the Fund and Bank Executive Boards in December 1999.
HIPC II Results
H1-H2: In contrast to the HIPC, preference heterogeneity of powerful state was low in the HIPC II
case. This cohesiveness undermined any attempt by staff and the MD to resist implementation of the
reform.
H3: Similar to the HIPC, NGOs applied pressure both directly on IMF management and staff and
distally on state principals. In this case, staff interviewed more clearly articulated that pressure from
NGOs and direct lobbying of staff and management were integral to the implementation of the HIPC
II reform. While this analysis is unable to measure the degree to which direct pressure vs. indirect
pressure produced policy change, the evidence suggests that direct lobbying efforts that leapfrogged
the delegation chain proved effective.
H4: As with the HIPC case, there was not a primary individual or set of individuals who pushed for
the adoption of the HIPC II internally.
H5: Two major shifts in how the HIPC II was framed within the institution are of note. First, the
notion that the introduction of the HIPC II would serve a broader agenda for LIC poverty reduction
marked a watershed moment for IMF policy direction. Second, the fact that some staff began to
reevaluate the appropriateness of the Polak model signaled that the ideas debated went beyond
adaption and into the realm of learning as described above.
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Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
Unlike the process that led to the HIPC II, replacement of the Fund’s decade-old concessionary
lending programs (the ESAF) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 did not
enjoy broad institutional support. Most strident in opposition was the majority of staff wary of moving
the Fund too far into issues of development. This became particularly controversial when advocates
for the PRGF argued that the new lending facility would include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs). As introduced in chapter 1, PRSPs included a formal assessment of how specific
macroeconomic and social policies should be designed and implemented to reduce poverty. Heading
the charge for an overhaul of the ESAF at the time was Managing Director Camdessus and a few
select staff members in the Policy, Development and Review (now SPR) and African departments.
NGOs also played a role, but less so than in the HIPC and HIPC II cases. Powerful member states
were generally supportive while evidence from Executive Board documents shows division among
LIC EDs.

As with the HIPC and HIPC II, initial concerns raised about the ESAF were pushed by the NGO
community and focused on two areas. First, lending arrangements under the ESAF did not address
deeper issues of poverty. Second, conditionality frameworks were not sensitive to specific conditions
on the ground for the LIC in question. External and internal reviews of the ESAF completed in 1997
reiterated similar themes. ESAF conditionality had not sufficiently protected the poor; the program
had not effectively defined the role of the Fund and Bank in implementing ESAF loans; and attention
to linkages between inequality, poverty, and growth were necessary in future Fund lending.228
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Camdessus, nearing retirement, argued before the Executive Board on August 30, 1999 that a new
thinking had to emerge in the Fund around policy toward LICs: “…we have made important strides in
increasing the attention given to poverty reduction and social sector issues in ESAF programs. It is
time to consolidate this progress and formalize some of the reforms envisaged for transforming the
ESAF into a new renamed instrument, not least so that it can play the role foreseen for it in the HIPC
cases.”229 At the September 13, 1999 EB meeting, Camdessus outlined his case for reform:
The current framework that ties the policies in ESAF-supported programs to poverty reduction
is insufficiently comprehensive and lacks the elements needed to ensure the consistency of
these policies with the country’s social goals and vice versa… To remedy these problems, the
ESAF must be made to benefit from an open and comprehensive approach that starts with an
understanding of the main obstacles to growth and poverty reduction, and iterates toward a
constellation of macroeconomic, structural and social policies sufficient to achieve realistic and
monitorable goals for poverty reduction….Hence the proposal-which has the joint support of
both Bank and Fund managements-to create a new comprehensive vehicle, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, that is government-led, poverty-focused, based on an open and
consultative process, and from which all ESAF and IDA operations should stem.230

The proposal was most enthusiastically supported from EDs representing the U.S. (Lissakers), UK
(Pickford), France (Milleron), Belgium, Austria, and Eastern Europe ( Kiekens), Italy, Portugal and
the Mediterranean (Faini), and the Nordic and Baltic states (Hansen). Lissakers, for example, argued
for a comprehensive reform of the ESAF that integrated poverty and social development issues into
concessionary lending arrangement:
I fully agree with the Managing Director’s statement that the current framework still
lacks all of the elements needed to ensure the consistency of ESAF supported policies
with the country’s social goals and vice versa. We do need a more fully developed
integrated strategy….We fully support the establishment of the proposed procedures for
PRSPs as a starting point for both the Bank and the Fund operations, with the PRSP
replacing the PFP over time.231
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A focus on poverty reduction was also shared by Pickford: “The poverty reduction strategies
developed by countries to serve as the basis for Fund and Bank supported programs are clearly the
right way forward…it seems clear that the Fund has a key role in poverty reduction.”232

EDs representing Japan (Yoshimura) and Holland and the Caucuses (Wijnholds), while generally
supportive of ESAF reform, expressed some reservations in regard to the Fund’s traditional mission
and a new focus on poverty reduction. For Yoshimura, “the Fund should…deal with social policy
issues only insofar as they are necessary to achieve its main purpose, which is to realize
macroeconomic stability...sound macroeconomic policies should not be compromised for the sake of
social policy concerns.”233 Winjholds argued along similar lines, “I do not think it would be expedient
to turn the Fund into a multidisciplinary institution. The Fund should do what it does best: offer
macroeconomic policy advice. The Fund is not properly equipped to advise on social issues.”234 For
Germany (Esdars), support for reform was framed in maintenance of successful macroeconomic
policy: “Effective poverty alleviation requires at first the full commitment of the countries themselves
to tackle the roots of poverty, to restructure the economy and to pursue macroeconomic policies that
ensure a sustainable high-quality growth process.”235

Middle income and poor state ED representatives’ reactions were mixed. Barro Chambier argued that
“we should strongly support the MD’s proposal that the PRSP underlining the link [between] debt
relief [and] poverty reduction be an integral part of PFPs, or ultimately could replace the existing
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framework.”236 Morais was broadly critical of the proposal and instead argued for greater funding of
the current ESAF.237 These concerns were shared by EDs Shalan (Egypt and Arab states) and Kelkar
(India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka), who also remained wary of “mission creep” into poverty
areas. For Shalan:
There is no question that the pursuit of poverty reduction, and the promotion of poverty
reduction and the promotion of macroeconomic and social policies that support it, should
be at the forefront of the economic development agenda at a global level. …It is important,
however, that we approach this subject in a practical manner…While we can appreciate the
desire for some in the donor community, and some NGOs, that the Fund take on a more
active role in this process. Our contribution, as an institution, toward the goal of poverty
reduction, should stem from ensuring macroeconomic stability, thereby providing an
optimal environment for sustained growth, while addressing the potential adverse impact of
stabilization of the poor.238

Another area of concern shared by middle income and poor state EDs was the notion that the PRGF
would set specific quantitative targets on social spending levels. Morais worried that “earmarking
funds for social sectors would detract us from the multi-dimensional efforts and flexibility that should
be embedded in any poverty reduction strategy.”239 Kelkar was even more specific in his concerns:
“In sum, we do not agree to the Fund incorporating structural benchmarks or performance criteria
related to social safety nets or social reforms or social issues at large.”240

Interviews of LIC staff members also point to broad initial skepticism of the PRSP framework and
reforming the ESAF:
We didn’t have any problems getting management to agree with it [the PRSP]. And the
shareholders liked it. The [majority of] staff had concerns from various angles. …a lot of
people had problems with the practicality of the PRSP process that required a great deal of
coordination. Some people were concerned about branding, putting poverty reduction up there
as the sort of headline on our facility. Some people thought it represented mission creep. Some
236

Ibid., p.75.
Ibid., p.93.
238
Ibid., p.19.
239
Ibid., p.92.
240
Ibid., p.18.
237

94

people thought we were taking too much responsibility as the Fund on an issue that we had
little experience.241
For Fund staff, the notion that all of a sudden we would be involved in poverty reduction
came as a strain at first. Wasn’t poverty reduction the job of the World Bank? That was
my reaction. This wasn’t the way we do things.242

Camdessus also challenged the institutional culture of staff through his framing of the reform:
The staff view was that macroeconomic stability was necessary for growth and growth was
necessary for poverty reduction….At the same time, Camdessus, in his last days, was pushing
very, very hard. He wanted to go one more step. We had said, “First, macroeconomic stability,
then growth and poverty reduction.” He wanted to close the circle and say that poverty
reduction leads to growth. There was a lot of work done trying to show that and he pushed in
that direction. The institution was not comfortable doing that.243

While the majority of the staff was skeptical of the adoption of PRSPs and reforms of the ESAF,
several key staff members were sympathetic to a shift in policy direction:
There were certain IMF staff who were supportive and understood the stakes. Jack Boorman,
who was head of Policy, Development, and Review at the time, Hugh Bredenkamp, and Masood
Ahmed. But there were often lone voices in the wilderness. It was against a bit the grain and
there was a need for a certain number of us to push against the culture that pushed aside and
minimized this work.244

For these staff members, the main argument toward a more aggressive stand on poverty reduction
focused on the fact that despite decreased balance of payment gaps in the 1980s and 1990s, LICs had
stagnant growth rates. As with the shift in thinking with adoption of the HIPC II, this also challenged
the primary assumptions of the Polak model:
With the Polak model, the assumption is the faster you close the balance of payments gap,
the faster you will grow. The old way of thinking in the 1980s and 1990s was to develop a
plan that allows a balance of payments gap that lets you go to zero. In that framework, you
want to tighten and close the balance of payment gap because that gap is created by bad
policy. That was the business of the 1980s and early 1990s. The thought was, if you close
all these gaps, all these countries will start growing. But they weren’t. And that’s where the
institution woke up to the fact that development isn’t just about macroeconomics. That is
where you saw Camdessus saying it is about poverty reduction and growth, it is not about
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structural adjustment anymore. Structural adjustment was closing that gap. Poverty
reduction and growth is about opening that gap.245

Along with support from a few strategically situated staff members, public pressure also was a
variable in adoption of the PRSP and PRGF. As described in the Fund’s 2000 Annual Report, “…the
persistence of poverty – and mounting public pressure – underscored that more had to be done…In
effect, the IMF transformed the ESAF into the PRGF to make poverty reduction a key element of
growth oriented, country-owned strategy by combining concessional lending from the IMF in support
of appropriate macroeconomic policies with antipoverty assistance from the World Bank and other
development agencies.”246 NGOs were also broadly supportive of reforms focused on poverty
reduction. Oxfam, for example, “welcomed this new approach as an opportunity to develop economic
policies which are genuinely country-owned, and which have poverty reduction as their central
aim.”247
PRGF Results

H1-H2: Preference heterogeneity among powerful states was low in this case and supported the
replacement of the ESAF with the PRGF and subsequent PRSPs. The Managing Director, as a primary
initiator of this reform, shared preferences with powerful states. Unlike the HIPC case, a coalition of
powerful states and the MD allowed the reluctant staff little room to resist or shape the adoption of the
PRGF and PRSPs.
H3: Unlike the HIPC and HIPC II, NGOs played a more cursory role in the PRGF reform. Raising
awareness in regard to the problems of the ESAF in the mid-1990s was their primary contribution to
this shift in IMF LIC policy.
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H4: As demonstrated by the Executive Board minutes and interviews cited above, Managing Director
Camdessus was the primary individual who pushed the resistant IMF staff to rethink how it
conceptualized the relationship between poverty and growth. Several senior staff members within the
influential Strategy, Policy, and Review Department also supported these efforts. These individuals
were situated in powerful positions in the institution and thus were able to assert leverage on fellow
colleagues.
H5: As with the HIPC II, the ideas pushed by advocates of replacement of the ESAF with the PRGF
stood well outside the norm of Washington Consensus thinking that was still strongly embedded in the
institution in the late 1990s. The evidence from this case suggests that under circumstances where
coalitions were among powerful states and the Managing Director, the relative “cognitive dissonance”
the reform may produce for resistant staff is unable to block reform.

Extended Credit Facility/ Rapid Credit Facility/ Stand-by Credit Facility (ECF/RCF/SCF)
In mid-2009, the Fund’s Executive Board scrapped the PRGF-ESF Trust and replaced it with the
Poverty Reduction Growth Trust (PRGT).248 In January 2010, the PRGF was replaced with three new
loan facilities that drew from the PRGT. These included the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Rapid
Credit Facility (RCF), and Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF). Adoption of the ECF/RCF/SCF differed
from the previous cases as the drivers of the reform primarily came from a coalition that included the
Managing Director, staff, and LIC EDs. In regards to powerful states, prior to the onset of the global
financial crisis in 2008, only Britain and France were supportive of replacing the PRGF, while the
U.S., Germany, and Japan stood in opposition. As the crisis developed in late 2008 and early 2009,
opposition from these states dissolved and the new framework was adopted. Unlike in the late 1990s,
NGO pressure played no active role in this policy shift.
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The consensus among staff interviewed is that Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was the
key driver in this LIC policy shift:
Strauss-Kahn was a trigger…he created a huge amount energy and a mandate for every part
of the Fund to rethink what they were doing. We in the Strategy, Policy, and Review
Department were tasked with looking at all our operations and where we needed to refresh
them. We revamped conditionality…structural performance criteria were abolished across
all facilities. We were also tasked with looking at what we could do to make the low
income facilities more tailored and effective for poor countries.249
Often times it only takes a spark. You look at Strauss-Kahn. He didn’t have, given the
world was falling apart, a lot of time devoted to LICs…He would go once or twice to
Africa… But he pushed enough and oriented enough so that the rest of us who believed in
this work could keep going.250

This same sentiment is shared by current and former Executive Board members:
The role of the Managing Director in setting LIC policy is critical. Ultimately it is the
Managing Director’s expression of interest in LIC issues that moves it onto the Board’s
agenda. Strauss-Kahn initiated and continued efforts to reshape IMF facilities to be more
responsive to African needs.251
The Managing Director is critical. Dominique Strauss Kahn wanted to give more fiscal
space to meet the need of LICs and less, more targeted conditionality.252

Staff also point to the March 2009 “Successful Partnership for Africa’s Growth Challenge” held in
Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania as a watershed moment for Strauss-Kahn and the Fund’s relationship to LICs
as Strauss-Kahn formally announced greater commitment to LICs through reforms of the PRGF:
My goal is at least to double the IMF’s concessional lending resources. I also want to
increase the flexibility of IMF financing. We are exploring better ways to provide
short-term financing to members facing immediate financing needs. Raising our access
limits, which have become increasingly binding, is under discussion. We are also
trying to streamline conditionality, and tailor it better to the circumstances of each
individual country. Related to this, we are re-examining our policies on debt limits, to
make them more flexible.”253
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The Fund staff member responsible for organizing the new framework outlined by Strauss-Kahn
highlighted the thinking around the reform focused on flexibility and diversity as follows:
We figured what divides the types of LIC engagement with the Fund are two issues: capacity
and financing needs – in particular – the length of financing needs. With capacity, a critical
component in the new architecture is the explicit recognition that we need an instrument to
provide policy support and financing in the context of a situation where a country cannot
implement a full Fund program. And then the other key difference when we come to countries
that could implement a full Fund program is how long it will take to achieve a sustainable
macroeconomic position. …So to recognize that LICs are now quite diverse in terms of the
time needed between the situation they are in now and a more stable and sustainable
macroeconomic position is what distinguishes the instruments.254

There was also concern among staff that a title including “poverty” produced a stigma for potential
borrowers and that gaps in PRGF LIC policy required a new architecture:
I think there was a need to rebrand [the PRGF] and here the Asia-Pacific Department was
influential. It argued, “whatever we do, don’t call is something to do with poverty.” Why?
Low Income Countries in Asia and the Middle East didn’t like the stigma of poverty. There
also were these near middle income countries and the islands that were eligible to use the
PRGF and the poverty name didn’t fit their reality. When you talk about Vanuatu, for
example, using the PRGF, it doesn’t resonate because poverty is not as pressing in Vanuatu
as it is in Sudan. Then you have states like Georgia and Armenia who are eligible for the
PRGF, but the poverty focus doesn’t fit where they are in their development process. There
were also other clear gaps as well. There were some countries, for example, who had civil
strife and couldn’t get post-conflict assistance because they weren’t officially in a civil war.
And the Finance Department was keen to sort out the mess of the financing and wanted to
change the structure to one trust rather than many pockets.255

Relative to powerful states, there was little initial consensus in regard to replacement of the PRGF
with new concessionary facilities prior to the 2008 crisis. From the U.S., there was growing resistance
to Fund lending to LICs and a push for a focus on grants facilitated mainly by the World Bank
following adoption of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI)256 in 2005:
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The U.S. position was let’s give debt relief and not give them any more loans. They are too
poor, their institutions are too underdeveloped. and there is no nerve to collect money for
these efforts, so let’s go to grants. The IMF should do non-loan arrangements and the Bank
should do grants.257

Germany, although supportive publically of the PRGF, often argued behind the scenes against
greater institutional shift away from a strict focus on monetary issues and maintenance of strict
conditionality: “In the end, Germany always goes along with the reforms but along the way
they challenge us to not weaken conditionality and not to finance excessively.”258
Support for PRGF reform prior to 2008 came primarily from the British and French: “The Brits and
the French position was, ‘We did bad lending in the past. Let’s clear out the space so there can be new
borrowing for better projects.’”259 The British and the French also pushed for long term engagement
with LICs and were supportive of PRGF reform:
The British and the French have more of a tolerance- even perhaps a desire- to see the Fund
engaged on a continuous basis in LICs because they think that having us there with
financing creates positive momentums for reforms and prevents things from going too
badly. The U.S. would like our engagement to be episodic.260

According to staff interviews, low income states were receptive to overhaul of the PRGF and
continued engagement of the Fund in their policy direction. Specifically, finance ministers of LICs
welcomed greater engagement and input into a new Fund architecture:
The finance ministers of the LICs do like interaction with the Fund because they like in
some sense the expertise but also the leverage we bring. Having the perspective of sound
public financial management they see as very important to push reform and have budgets
that make sense…It is really through our program support that we can help build
macroeconomic management capacity and this is very much appreciated by finance
ministers and central banks in LICs.261

Fund through the MDRI-II. As of 2010, $3.4 billion in debt relief was granted to 32 LICs who had reached HIPC
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Divisions among powerful states in regard to PRFG reform quickly evaporated as the 2008 crisis
unfolded and the pressure Strauss-Kahn exerted on the Executive Board after the Tanzania conference:
One other key element in getting the deal done was the dynamics created by the crisis. I
think it is fair to say that our shareholders (states) are often strongly divided on LIC
policy and we needed consensus on this one, mainly because we wanted to create a new
trust. I think the crises got us over the finish line as every Executive Board member came
on board in 2009.262

No evidence of direct lobbying for PRGF replacement was found from the traditional NGO
community focused on the Fund. Staff interviewed also downplayed the impact of NGOs on adoption
of the 2010 reforms:
NGOs are much less influential now than in the late 1990s because they much less to complain
about. It is uncomfortable for them as we go through this crisis that we have all these
countercyclical programs and protection of social spending that are pervasive in our LIC
programs…Some NGOs continue to drum up the same type of issues that they did in the late
1990s, but these arguments are not gaining much traction.263

An Executive Board member representing LICs reiterated this position. While NGOs were the key
actor that pushed the IMF to address issues of debt sustainability a decade prior, they had little input
into the 2010 reforms and have little impact on current LIC policy choices at the Fund:
First, let me recognize the role that NGOs played in debt relief and the adoption of the
HIPC… There reforms occurred in large part due to the constant pressure from NGOs.
Now, debt relief is out of the way and there is much less that NGOs can engage with. The
debt issue was something tangible. The only link you can make now is with inflation policy
where NGOs generally push for higher inflation targets. There is not much left that is
tangible and human that an NGO can get engaged with at the Fund. We do consult with
them but in a limited fashion. Once a year during the annual meetings, along with the
Executive Director’s from the World Bank, we host a civil society forum. We engage, we
have cordial meetings, and nobody complains.264

ECF/RCF/SCF Results
H1-H2: Prior to the 2008 crisis, there was growing division between powerful states in regard to IMF
involvement in LICs. France and the UK advocated for a continuation of PRGF concessionary lending
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and a focus on poverty issues and were sympathetic to more flexible conditionality requirements. The
U.S. instead advocated for phasing out IMF LIC lending programs. Germany was worried with
loosening conditionality requirements and was increasingly concerned that too much focus on
development issues was pushing the Fund away from monetary and fiscal issues. This lack of cohesive
vision among powerful state principals in the mid-2000s allowed Strauss Kahn room to initiate
overhaul of the PRGF. Once the crisis hit, all-powerful states rallied around the ECF/RCF/SCF
initiative pushed by Strauss Kahn and LIC staff and the framework was quickly adopted.
H3: As noted above, NGOs were not involved in efforts to reform the PRGF.
H4: Managing Director Strauss Kahn was the primary internal advocate for the reform of the PRGF.
Several senior members of the African department and SPR also argued for a more flexible approach
to LIC concessionary lending. In addition, Fund chief economist Oliver Blanchard called for a
rethinking of how the Fund approaches monetary and fiscal policy response. Following the 2008
crisis, Strauss Kahn and Blanchard advocated for countercyclical policy response as a component of
the flexibility of the new LIC concessionary lending program. In this context, it can be argued that
these individuals took up the role of internal norm entrepreneurs in this policy change.
H5: Advocates for replacement of the PRGF with the ECF/RCF/SCF initially highlighted that the new
framework would be both more flexible in dealing with LICs and also respond more nimbly to the
diverse realities of LICs. Prior to the 2008 crisis, the reform was not spun as policy shift that would
fundamentally challenge IMF thinking.
Conclusions
Comparison across these cases uncovers the following patterns (see Table 3.1 below). First, two tiers
of actors were identified in LIC outcomes. What I call “primary actors” included the Managing
Director, powerful states, and staff. “Secondary actors” included LICs, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress.
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In all the cases examined, LIC reform occurred either with a coalition formed between at least one
primary and one secondary actor as seen in the HIPC or at least two primary actors as seen with the
HIPC II, PRFG, and ECF/RCF/SCF. While preliminary, evidence from these cases suggests that future
LIC policy change should occur under the following two scenarios. First, if there is broad support
among three primary actors for reform, policy shift should occur. Second, at a minimum, some form of
coalition between two primary actors (MD-staff, MD-powerful states, powerful states-staff) or primary
actor and secondary appears necessary to produce significant policy change. As such, evidence from
these cases also suggests that a primary actor “can’t go it alone.” Without the support of other primary
actors, staff, powerful states, and management must have backing from a secondary actor to initiate
reform successfully. In the HIPC case, for example, the U.S. and UK formed a successful coalition
with NGOs against the preferences of the Managing Director, staff, and other powerful states.
Table 3.1: Coalitions of IMF LIC Reform (1996-2010)
Reform
HIPC

In opposition
-Powerful states
(France/Germany/Japan)
-Managing Director
-Staff

HIPC II

PRGF

-Staff
-Majority of LICs

ECF/RCF/SCF

-Powerful states
(U.S./Germany/Japan)

In support
-Powerful states
(U.S./UK)
-NGOs

-Powerful states
-Managing Director
-Staff
-NGOs
-LICs
-Powerful states
-Managing Director
-Select senior staff in SPR
-Select LICs
-Powerful states
(UK/ France)
-Managing Director
-Staff
-LICs

As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided openings for
management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when staff and the
103

Managing Director shared preferences. In the HIPC case, divergence of state preferences around a
conservative plan of debt forgiveness supported by staff and Camdessus allowed the proposal to go
forward for adoption. Splits among powerful states in regard to overhaul of the PRGF framework prior
to the 2008 crisis also gave Strauss-Kahn and the staff room to initiate a new framework for LICs. If
preference heterogeneity between powerful states on the Executive Board is high in future scenarios,
we should expect management and staff to enjoy the same degree of leverage to initiate or block
reform efforts. Evidence from these cases also points to the importance of the Managing Director and
senior staff in the Strategy, Policy, and Review department in lobbying for change. In the PRGF case,
for example, Managing Director Camdessus and the leader of SPR highlighted the connection between
poverty reduction and long-term growth to a broader audience of Fund staff highly sceptical of this
position. In the ECF/RCF/SCF case, the leadership of Managing Director Strauss-Kahn was a key
variable that ultimately produced this reform.

In regard to delegation chains and the impact of pressure applied distally to principals, evidence from
the HIPC and HIPC II cases is inconclusive. According to staff interviews, NGO direct pressure was
essential and effective in the reforms of the late 1990s (HIPC, HIPC II, and PRGF). Internal IMF
documents also note the impact of NGO efforts that leapfrog delegation chains and apply pressure
directly to Fund staff and management. NGOs, however, also concurrently lobbied states to reform the
Fund. Disaggregating the impact of direct and indirect lobbying on Fund policy choices requires
further study before any conclusions can be drawn. More conclusively, evidence from the HIPC case
demonstrates greater success of direct lobbying when the NGO has at least one primary actor
supporting their position. SO theory hypothesizes that the manner in which a new policy reform is
framed should impact its potential success or failure. In the HIPC and ECF/RCF/SCF cases, the
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argument presented by those who pushed for reform did not challenge the status quo of what was
considered appropriate Fund policy. In the HIPC II and PRGF, those who championed reform did so
in a way that more fundamentally countered IMF thinking. While this is a small number of cases, the
contradictory evidence suggests that the framing of a reform effort matters less in the ultimate success
or failure of its adoption than other variables highlighted above.
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Chapter 4 - Crises of Legitimacy: Constructivist Explanations of LIC Change
As established in chapter 3, the evidence derived from the study of four cases of LIC policy change
suggests that coalition formation is a key mechanism necessary for the IMF to implement formal
policy shift. As predicted by PA models, increased division among powerful state principals provided
openings for management and staff to initiate, resist, or shape LIC policy. This was most salient when
staff and the Managing Director shared preferences. This evidence supports a broader notion also
consistent with PA models that policy changes occur due to shifting degrees of control of more
powerful actors over less powerful actors. This implicitly supports the notion put forth by PA theorists
that less powerful actors (agents) enjoy some degree of autonomy relative to their principals.
Given the evidence in chapter 3, one notion that can be dismissed is the idea that any one powerful
state, even the U.S., can on a consistent basis determine LIC policy choices in the institution. As
highlighted by constructivist scholar Jeffrey Chwieroth, another important contribution of PA inspired
studies of the Fund , and also supported by the evidence in this project, is that the impetus for change
can be driven by agents rather than principals.265

Despite these contributions, Chwieroth and constructivist IO scholars argue that one key weakness of
rationalist theory is that it is ontologically ill equipped to examine the belief systems of staff and how
changes in belief systems impact change. As noted by Chwieroth, “if you want to know to understand
how IOs work and evolve, they we must attend not only to member states’ interests but also to beliefs
that prevail within IOs and the internal processes and debates shaping these beliefs.”266 Chwieroth falls
in line with a series of other constructivist IO scholars who frame their inquiry not as fundamental
challenge to rationalist theory, but one that engages with a different component of reality that
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influences policy outcomes. Relative to our purposes for this project, while PA models can tell us that
some form of coalition appears necessary for change to occur, they don’t elucidate if, how, or why
shifts in thinking among those actors might support or undermine the formation of those coalitions or
other processes that produce reform.

In chapter 4, I model a study of LIC IMF change on methods used by Chwieroth and several other
“conventional” constructivist scholars, including Susan Park, Antje Vetterlein, Bessma Momani, and
Manuella Moschella.267 Chapter 4 first outlines how contemporary constructivist theory explains IMF
change. This is followed by an exploration of how the Fund has come to accept particular ideas of
what constitutes appropriate macroeconomic and development policy in the post-Washington
Consensus period and how these changing ideas impacted IMF LIC reform. This is first accomplished
by tracing how five prominent mainstream frameworks of economic theory have influenced the
economics profession and Fund management and staff. These economic frameworks include
Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis, monetarism, new classical economics, and New
Keynesianism.

Applied to the study of the post-Washington Consensus period, a constructivist framework finds that
the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crisis catalyzed shifts in thinking in the
economics profession and policy elites that impacted change in two key areas of Fund LIC policy. The
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2008 crisis sparked a Keynesian-inspired shift within the economics profession and Fund that
challenged nearly three decades of neoclassical consensus concerning appropriate monetary and fiscal
policy response. Specific to LIC policy, this shift ushered in a new acceptance of countercyclical and
flexible monetary and fiscal policy that helped bring about the replacement of the PRGF with the
ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010.

Fallout from the Asian crisis led to a reevaluation of the role of the state in its relation to market
efficiency, growth, and development. As seen in the Fund’s adoption of the PRGF in 1999 and current
ECF/RCF/SCF framework, support of targeted state intervention to enhance market efficiency,
improve institutional capacity, and invest in human capital is now a fundamental component of IMF
strategies to reduce poverty and support growth in LICs. Despite this shift, several components of
neoclassical ideology remain firmly entrenched in how the Fund thinks about development. In LIC
initiatives, this is expressed through a mantra that consistently and explicitly grounds the IMF’s focus
on poverty reduction since the 1999 reforms as a “pro-growth” strategy staunchly opposed to policy
deemed distortive to markets. While the state is to be used to enhance market efficiency, improve
institutional capacity, and invest in human capital, LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or
undervalued exchange rates, subsidies, redistributive tax arrangements, and large scale entitlement
programs.
Theorizing IO Change: A Constructivist Framework
At its ontological foundation, constructivists frame the world as one being driven by the “logic of
appropriateness.” Humans, as inherently social beings, form collectively held ideas of the world.268
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These collectively held understandings form the primary structure within which humans and
subsequent state behavior and the international system is embedded. Despite the inherent
intersubjectivity of the world, this variant of constructivism argues a positivist framework can
systematically identify how changing patterns of identity formation and shifts in norms and ideas
explain social and political change.

Constructivists frame their study of change as one that recognizes exogenous, systematic factors but
also is consciously and primarily focused on internal, institutionally specific agency and variables of
the IO understudy that can catalyze or resist reform. 269 The agency of IO actors also is constituted and
influenced by institution specific organizational culture. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore,
…IOs..are established to accomplish certain tasks. To do this, they develop general
consensus around their understandings of their core mission and the functions of their
organization; goals to be pursued; basic means to pursue these goals, and some way to
measure results. Thus organizations create a shared discourse, symbols, and values for their
staff. These shared elements, in turn, generate a group identity for the organization and
structure interactions among those within it.270

Maintenance and reproduction of organizational culture and identity is not a passive process. Staff
members internalize particular frames of reference and also socialize new employees to adopt
particular norms and routines within the bureaucracy. Organizational culture therefore is deeply
embedded and serves as the frame of reference through which events and signals from the external and
internal environment are cognitively processed.

Established organizational culture and subsequent policy direction is not predicted to change quickly
or easily in bureaucracies. As noted by Momani, several studies that draw from organizational theory
269
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conclude individuals in bureaucracies have a default position that resists change: “Organizational
theorists contend that individuals resist change because they fear the unknown, have selective attention
to and retention of new information, prefer habit and routine, need the security of the known, and feel
threatened by change.”271 Resistance to change manifests itself at the organizational level “because
there is a lack of trust, differing perceptions and goals, social disruption with change, a limitation of
resources to devote to change, and most importantly change requires a change in the organizational
culture.”272 Despite inertia against radical or swift reform efforts, constructivists highlight that IOs are
also never static entities. Vetterlein notes four prominent features of IOs that make them subject to
change over time. These include shifting relationships with powerful state principals; the fact that the
institution’s original institutional mission evolves due to changing realities in the international system;
modifications in formal organizational structure; and less observable alterations of informal
organizational culture.273

Constructivist Theory and IMF Policy Change
Park and Vetterlein present a framework for studying Fund reform through the concept of “norm
cycle.” Norms, defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of
actors,” are not simply static entities that these institutions either adopt or reject. Rather, policy norms
are reflexive and represent shifting processes of collective understandings of how the world works by
various actors both within and outside the IO. As such, a policy norm “emerges not from thin air but
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always out a specific context of an already existing norm which may be contested or inflexible in a
changing context.”274

Figure 4.1: Norm Cycle.
Norm Contestation

Arguing/Persuasion/Negotiation

Crisis/Externalization/Objectivation

Norm Emergence

Habitualization/Institutionalization/Legitimization

Norm Stabilization

Three points in the life of a norm cycle are identified by Park and Vetterlein: norm emergence, norm
stabilization, and norm contestation (see Figure 4.1 above).275 A norm gains traction and stabilizes
only if it first is granted legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy granted to a new norm and subsequent
policy direction is predicted by examining three constitutive components. The norm has “formal
validity” if it has been integrated into “the IO’s constitution or Articles of Agreement, its operational
strategy, and/or is included in Fund …loan contracts.”276 More informally, a norm has “social
recognition” when it is accepted by actors as the right thing to do. At the policy level, a norm has
“cultural validity” when expressed in programs at the local level. Once accepted as legitimate, patterns
of behavior around the norm emerge and are reproduced through policy creation and become
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institutionalized in the organizational culture. 277 I draw from this framework and hypothesize that
economic ideas also follow a similar pattern of emergence, stabilization, and contestation.

Specific to the IMF, Moschella identifies three constituencies that legitimize development norms,
economic ideas, and policy choices in the institution.278 The first constituency consists of member
states. While the Fund exhibits a high degree of autonomy in its daily operations, as an
intergovernmental organization, it ultimately must have significant support from member states. A
norm or economic idea that fundamentally challenges the position and interests of powerful states is
not expected. The second constituency involves academic economists and the broader economics
profession. Many beliefs shared by IMF staff originate in the economics field that is trained and
generally concerned with maximizing welfare and efficiency above other objectives. Chwieroth also
notes that Fund staff have leverage in their support or resistance to new policy norms due to the fact
that they are socially recognized as authorities and experts in the field of economics. Staff thus exhibit
productive power as they construct meaning and shape and define what policy choices are legitimate
and realistically possible to pursue.279

Studies of epistemic communities demonstrate that there are also networks of knowledge-based
experts who “share knowledge about the causation…of phenomena in an area for which they have a
reputation for competence” and produce “a common set of normative beliefs about what action will
benefit human welfare” in the policy domain in question.280 Like-minded experts can influence what
is considered legitimate in policy direction through a process of administrative recruitment that favors
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individuals that share their ideological positions. This process is similar to what organizational
sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell describe as “normative isomorphism.” Processes of
professionalization produce formal and informal networks that weed out individuals who stand outside
the boundaries of appropriate thinking. Individuals who find positions within professional
bureaucracies will generally share the ideas and norms of the mainstream.281

Along with member states and the economic profession, private market actors also play a part in
granting emerging norms and subsequent policy directives legitimacy at the Fund. Moschella notes
that “it is widely recognized that market actors endorse IMF activities when they acknowledge that the
Fund’s financial assistance to a member country is of help in restoring the conditions for fruitful
investment.”282 In this gatekeeper role, the IMF provides an informal guarantee that member-states
will not pursue policy choices that seriously challenge or undermine the interests of private investors.
Moschella also points to evidence where private market actors have undermined Fund policy
directives. The lack of private support for the IMF sponsored Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS) initiative, for example, limited the success of the process of international data
standardization.283

Leanord Seabrooke also contends that the post Washington Consensus period has witnessed an
expansion of what he terms the IMF’s “social constituency of legitimation.” Fallout from the
controversy over structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and the Asian crisis has produced a
significant “legitimacy gap” for the Fund. In response, the IMF is now focused on gaining support
from the public in member states. The Fund’s decade-old practice of increased transparency and
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participation in PRSPs, for instance, are interpreted as an expression of growing sensitivity to the
concerns of civil society.284

While the process of internalizing norms and ideas into individual and collective identity produces
some form of stability concerning how the organization thinks, they are never fully static or
uncontested. The effort of internal norm entrepreneurs and external systematic shifts produce new
experiences and interpretations that challenge organizational culture, policy practices, and even more
fundamental challenges to legitimacy. Park and Vetterlien identify three triggers that undermine
legitimacy. First, ideological space for reform is opened when there is broad based agreement among
elites that a particular economic or policy program fails. Second, similar to findings from
organizational theory, an unexpected external shock can challenge taken for granted assumptions.
Third, “mass condemnation” occurring in conjunction with acknowledgement of past policy failure
and an external shock can facilitate the acceptance of new ideas and approaches. Once a policy
position norm or idea comes under question in this scenario, staff, management, NGOs, and/or states
use mechanisms of persuasion, arguing, shaming, and negotiation to push for reform. Moschella offers
an additional predictive framework for Fund policy shift based on the aforementioned social
constituencies of legitimation. Given the importance of social acceptance of particular norms and ideas
in the production and maintenance of policy directives, we can expect change to occur when gaps open
between “the institutionalization of specific economic ideas in the Fund’s policies” and “the
acceptance of these policies by the actors of its social constituencies of legitimation.”285
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Paradigmatic Ideas of Development

Contemporary constructivist studies of the Fund focus on two interrelated levels of ideas that shape its
institutional culture and subsequent policy choices. The first level is that of paradigmatic economic
ideas. These ideas are embedded in theoretical debates about economics and set “cognitive
background assumptions” and the interpretive framework for the workings of the economy and shape
what is considered sound policy advice.286 Within the boundaries of paradigmatic thinking sit various
schools and trends in economic thinking that gain and lose legitimacy over time.

Specific to paradigmatic ideas, a focus on shifts in thinking in the economics profession and its
relationship with Fund LIC policy reform requires that we first step back and recognize in broad terms
what constitutes the ideological parameters of acceptable policy choices and debate in mainstream
development economics. Wilfred David, in his study of Fund thinking, identifies five prominent
principles broadly shared among the staff and the larger mainstream economics community.287 The
first is a belief that growth and national income generation are only possible when there is substantial
and sustained capital investment and a skilled workforce. Development strategies for poor societies
therefore encourage policies and institutional reform that primarily facilitates rapid resource
mobilization and investments in human capital. A second principle is that material gain is maximized
only if there is rational and efficient allocation of scarce resources. Alternative choices made
irrationally or without complete information will produce long term increases in scarcity and a
subsequent decrease in growth and living standards. In order to make rational decisions in the
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allocation of scarce resources, prices thus should equal real costs in all markets. Market information
should also be easily accessible and transparent.

A third principle is that the best mechanism to establish efficient allocation of scarce resources is
through market mechanisms. While not perfect, well-functioning and transparent markets minimize
conflict and ultimately are the best mechanism for growth and relatively equitable distribution of
resources. Building on this theme, the fourth principle extends a preference for free markets to the
international arena. A liberal international environment underwritten by the rules of free trade and
comparative advantage will produce the most favorable conditions for development. The fifth
principle frames development as a rational process that is ultimately tackled through technocratic
adjustment of incentives and/or institutions that improve market performance. As summarized by
David, “The ruling paradigm of the economics of development rests on the classical-neoclassical view
of the world in which change is gradual, marginal, non-disruptive, equilibrating, and largely painless.
Incentives are the bedrock of economic growth. Once initiated, growth becomes automatic and allpervasive, spreading among nations and trickling down among classes so that everybody benefits form
the process.”288

These principles express themselves broadly throughout the Fund’s formal mandates. As outlined in
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, orderly global trade and exchange are the most effective tools to
support international equilibrium and development. In Article 1(iii), Article (v), and Article (vi), the
Fund is directed “to promote exchange rate stability,” “maintain orderly exchange arrangements,” and
provide member states “with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
288
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without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” The Articles also
stress that the IMF promote a liberal market international economic order – and in so doing – produce
successful development outcomes. This is articulated most clearly in Article 1(ii) where the Fund is to
“facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income.”

Adherence to an orderly, cooperative, and transparent market system thus sets the broad intellectual
and ideological “goal-posts” of mainstream development economics. Within these boundaries,
however, sits a diversity of policy debates related to two distinct policy areas where the Fund is
actively involved: (1) monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment
disequilibria; and (2) structural reform that improves economic efficiency and stimulates growth and
development. Drawing from a constructivist framework, the following hypotheses are derived for
explaining post-Washington Consensus LIC policy change through a focus on these two policy areas:
H1: Policy reform initiatives that draw from ideas and norms that question market based solutions for
LICs are unexpected.
H2 : A crisis of legitimacy that challenges taken for granted”macroeconomic and development ideas
and/or norms is necessary for substantive LIC policy change.
H3: Chances of LIC policy change are greatest when economic ideas or norms institutionalized within
the Fund are questioned by broader epistemic community of development economists.
Economic Ideas and “Appropriate” Macroeconomic Policies

Constructivist studies of Fund change maintain that the primary constituency of legitimation is the
economics profession. As outlined by Chwieroth, “Cycles, trends, and shifts in economic theory shape
the content of [staff] expertise by helping to determine what constitutes an economic problem and how
such problems are best solved. When the staff members approach their tasks, they necessarily come to
117

rely on the content of their training to develop specialized knowledge and to form judgments about
policy.”289 Capturing how these trends manifest and shape the IMF’s normative culture, policy
direction, and periods of change is achieved by methodologically “drilling down” into what Ben Clift
and Jim Tomlinson describe as the “political sociology of policy instruments” approach.290 I first trace
how five prominent economic schools of thought have shaped internal IMF debates concerning
monetary and fiscal policy and how this has manifested itself in influencing post Washington
Consensus LIC policy reform. These include Keynesianism, the neoclassical synthesis, monetarism,
new classical economics, and New Keynesianism (see Table 4.1 below).

Evidence from interviews, internal staff documents, and LIC lending arrangements shows that ideas
drawn from monetarism, new classical economics, and New Keynesianism produced a highly stable
framework of what constituted appropriate macroeconomic policy from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis
to the global financial crisis of 2008. Since this time, evidence points to greater influence of more
traditional Keynesianism in Fund and LIC policy response. Along with calls for more flexible inflation
targets, a policy of active, countercyclical fiscal response has emerged in LIC policy directives. To
give context to these ideas, I start first with an overview of traditional Keynesianism.

Keynesianism as a Response to Classical Orthodoxy
Keynesian economics developed as a direct critique to classical economic orthodoxy that
predominated in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Classical orthodoxy is based on five
assumptions: (1) markets are perfectly competitive; (2) economic actors are fully informed of market
dynamics; (3) economic actors are rational utility optimizers who make efficient use of information;
(4) in open markets, an equilibrium price is established that reflects when the quantity of the product
289
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Table 4.1 Five Economic Schools of Thought
School of Thought

Major Themes?

Keynesianism

-Critique of “selfcorrecting” logic of
classical economics
-Market failures due to
inadequate levels of
investment/consumption
and self-reinforcing,
subjective conceptions
about the future
-Merges aspects of
Keynesianism and classical
theory
-Markets not self-correcting
in short term but generally
correcting in long term

Neoclassical Synthesis

Monetarism

-Money supply is primary
variable that drives
economic outcomes
-Money supply neutral in
long term and non-neutral
in short term
-Free of government
intervention, markets are
self-correcting in long term

New Classical Economics

-Micro-level processes
explain macro level
outcomes
-Critique of monetarist
assumptions of short –term
market inefficiency.
-Free of government
intervention, “real time”
adjustments by utility
maximizing actors
guarantees efficient markets
in short and long term
-Micro-level processes
explain macro level
outcomes including
involuntary unemployment
- Critique of New Classical
Economics’ assumption of
perfect markets. Imperfect
markets are rule, not
exception.
-Market not efficient in
short term due to menu
costs, efficiency wages, etc.

New Keynesianism

Appropriate Policy
Response?
-Expansionary monetary
policy in moderate
recessions
-Aggressive fiscal policy
during more severe crises
-Public investment
-Redistribution
-Capital controls

When most influential in
IMF?
1945- early 1960s

-Targeted and short term
monetary and fiscal
intervention to counter
recessionary periods.
-Permanent government
intervention discouraged
-Capital control
liberalization
-Limit money supply to
match underlying
fundamentals
-Avoid expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy
-Avoid market distortion in
labor markets
-Capital control
liberalization

1960s-late 1970s

-Avoid expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy.
-Monetary policy as tool to
combat inflation

Late 1970s-2008

-Monetary and fiscal policy
as instruments to correct
market failure. More
effective if used in short
term.
- Inflation targeting as
primary policy goal of
central banks.
-Targeted policy to reduce
market imperfections

Mid 1980s-2008
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2008-present

Late 1960s-late 1980s

demanded is just equal to the quantity of product supplied at that price;291 and (5) given the above
conditions, an economy will self-adjust to clear markets of excess supply or demand,292 allows for
“Pareto-efficient” welfare improving outcomes,293 and will always trend toward its natural level of
real GDP294 and full employment.

Specific to conceptualizations of full employment and its relationship to free markets, the classical
school is rooted in ideas initially developed by nineteenth century economists John Stuart Mill and
Jean Baptiste Say. They begin with the notion that the only reason people produce is to consume. If
the desire to consume drives the effort of production, it is impossible to have conditions of
overproduction in free market systems due to lack of demand. Or as stated in Say’s Law, production
(supply) and selling of one product therefore can be thought of as demand for another product of equal
value.295 If supply creates its own demand, a key mechanism that must be in place to guard against
misplaced production is free market price and wage flexibility. Under open market conditions, the
price mechanism will correct short term misdirected production as owners will either drop prices or
shift production to other profitable enterprises. Free labor markets also allow wages to fall or rise in
accordance to the value of production. In this scenario, any unemployment in the economy is either
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voluntary (e.g. – workers unwilling to take wages below market value) or “frictional” due to short
term imperfections in the labor market.296

This approach also highlights the role that savings and investment have in maintenance of natural
levels of real GDP. A certain percentage of income is saved rather than spent. An increase in savings
reduces the demand for consumption of goods and services. In response, suppliers reduce production
of consumption goods and services, employment falls, and the short term equilibrium level of real
GDP falls below its natural level. While this appears to contradict Say’s Law, the classical argument
counters that savings can be conceptualized as a source of spending for investment. Under normal
circumstances, investment spending fills the gap of lowered consumption spending and the natural
level of GDP is maintained.297 Classical theorists also argue that free markets self-correct when the
demand for investment falls below the supply available via saved income. In this scenario, flexible
interest rates are the mechanism that adjusts saving and investment. In periods of excessive saving, for
example, downward pressure is exerted on interest rates.298 As interest rates fall, savings decrease and
subsequent investment levels increase. Investment levels also increase as high rates of saving
represents decreased demand and prices for consumer goods. As consumer goods industries become
less profitable, resources shift toward investment industries that are in higher demand. Investment, for
classical theorists, thus increases precisely when consumption decreases and moves the economy back
to its equilibrium real GDP.299
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In his seminal The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes leveled a broad based
critique of the logic of market self-correction championed by classical theorists.300 A key argument
pushed by neoclassical economists in the interwar period was that increased wage inflexibility due to
the rise of the labor movement undermined recovery and full employment.301 Keynes maintained that
even if wages, interest rates, and commodity prices are perfectly flexible and adjusted accordingly
downward during periods of economic contraction, there is no guarantee that an economy will selfcorrect. In fact, as seen during the Depression era, an economy can reach equilibrium levels well
below full economic capacity. This radical break from the self-correcting classical logic focused on
three primary interrelated themes: money and its relationship to uncertainty; investment levels,
effective demand, and employment; and the variable of human subjectivity in driving business cycles.

Classical and neoclassical understanding of money maintains that it serves only as a medium of
exchange.302 Keynes instead highlighted that money plays an additional role around the storage and
maintenance of wealth as follows. Saved income can be lent for interest, invested in a capital asset, or
held in liquid form. Individuals, particularly when they are uncertain about the future profitability of
capital investment or return on interest rates, hoard money in liquid form. Given that the holding of
excess savings in liquid form produces no income, money thus serves the function of wealth
maintenance.303 The fact that individuals choose to invest or not invest surplus income in productive
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activity thus undermines the classical argument and Say’s Law in two primary areas. First, individuals
make choices to keep or not keep income in liquid form based on expectations about the future. For
Keynes, these expectations about the future are primarily based on the subjective and often volatile
“conventional wisdom” of the day. Mass psychology, rather than “rational actors responding to a
rational world,” thus is a key variable that determines if and when individuals will invest or hoard.304
Second, when hoarding occurs, this liquid savings is not a component of demand but rather subtracts
from it. Supply does not de facto create its own demand.305

Maintenance of demand in the economy through consumption is also undermined by high inequality.
The wealthy minority has more income than they need for consumption. The poor majority, in
contrast, consumes little due to low income levels.306 Given this reality, Keynes highlighted the
fundamental role that investment plays relative to production of income and maintenance of effective
demand and employment. Investment not only supports demand in the future, it is essential for the
maintenance of current levels of consumption.307 Keynes thus focused on factors that undermine
investment and subsequent full employment. As introduced above, a certain percentage of excess
income is hoarded. Keynes argued that the rate of interest is best understood as the price paid to those
who part with liquid savings.308 The greater the desire to hoard (what Keynes termed the “liquidity
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preference”), the higher the interest rate must be to induce those with liquidity to part with cash.309
Those with liquid assets will only invest these resources if the expected future profits from this
investment are greater than the reward given by current interest rates.310 Several dynamics thus can
produce a downward spiral of economic retraction that can lead to economic recession or depression.
If there is little confidence in future profitability, interest rate levels, even at very low levels, will
exceed future expected earnings and investment decreases. Lower investment translates into reduced
demand, higher unemployment, and reduced profits. Fear of still worse future conditions increases the
incentive to hoard income in liquid form. This produces continued downward expectations on future
profits and the downward cycle begins anew.311

Breaking this cycle thus requires several potential interventions from government to stimulate
investment and aggregate demand. In moderate periods of economic contraction, an increase in money
supply can lower interest rates sufficiently to catalyze investment. In more severe periods of economic
contraction, monetary policy that reduces interest rates may not be sufficient. During these “liquidity
traps,” Keynes maintained that government spending and investment were critical to jumpstart the
economy back toward full productive capacity and full employment.312 Along with short term
monetary and fiscal policy response to economic contraction, Keynes identified a series of additional
measures that reduced instability and unemployment over the long term. These include a steep
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progressive income tax, greater public investment and government coordination of private investment,
and regulations to reduce speculative activities.313

Keynesianism emerged as the dominant economic theory in the 1930s until the mid-1950s and
provided the intellectual foundation for those sympathetic to policies of countercyclical government
intervention and highly regulated financial and international capital markets.314 As the prominent
framework that shaped the creation of the IMF, Keynesian theory also was prominently featured in
early Fund policy.315 This was most strongly expressed in initial support of capital controls. Along
with reducing international volatility in the Bretton Woods framework, capital controls gave states the
ability to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal measures to support full employment
policies. Keynesian-inspired ideas are also expressed in the Fund’s framework of demand management
in relation to balance-of-payment disequilibria. Components of the Polak model (see chapter 2), for
example, are rooted in Keynesian assumptions that balance of payment crisis reflects imbalances of
aggregate demand and supply and that multiple policy levers including monetary and fiscal
intervention should be used to restore equilibrium.316

Contemporary critics of the IMF including Joseph Stiglitz argue that the institution moved away from
its Keynesian roots mainly following the 1982 Mexican debt crisis until the 2008 global financial
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crisis. For Stiglitz, the Fund was guilty of adopting “the pre-Keynesian position of fiscal austerity in
the face of a downturn…which almost always entail contractionary policies leading to recessions or
worse” during this time.317 Several staff members interviewed for this project, in contrast, argued that
Keynesianism has always remained at the center of the Fund’s normative culture, even during the
Washington Consensus era:
Public perceptions have sometimes put the IMF in an ideological corner. I don’t think we
had a dramatically different view [during the 1980s and 1990s]. You have to remember that
we have always been a Keynesian institution. We are an institution of fiscal activists.318

Other staff members and Executive Directors noted that the post-2008 period witnessed a return to
greater acceptance of Keynesian thinking in the economics profession and the institution:
In terms of institutional thinking, I think we started out as a Keynesian institution in
the 1940s and 1950s and then moved quite a lot to the Chicago school, free market side
of things and now it’s a little more middle of the road.319

I explore this possible return to Keynes in further detail below with a look at post-2008 shifts in LIC
policy on inflation and fiscal and monetary counter-cyclical intervention.

The Neoclassical Synthesis
The diversity of opinions among current IMF LIC staff in regard to when and how Keynesian thinking
has influenced the Fund is partially explained by the emergence of the neoclassical synthesis. As
outlined by Chwieroth, the main economics debate in the late 1950s and 1960s was not between
Keynesians and the emerging monetarist school, but rather an internal Keynesian divide. One group,
consisting primarily of economists based at Cambridge University, sought to preserve and build on a
strict interpretation of Keynesian themes.320 These self-described “post-Keynesians” argued for
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maintenance and expansion of capital control and a robust policy of countercyclical full employment
policies.321 Several American economists, including Paul Samuelson and James Tobin (also known as
“neo-Keynesians”), instead argued for a rethinking of Keynes within a neoclassical framework.322

Samuelson et al. pushed for a “neoclassical synthesis” that combined aspects of Keynesian and
classical theory and emerged as the dominant economic school of thought until the late 1970s.
Proponents of the synthesis rejected neoclassical assumptions that economies self-correct and argued
like Keynes that counter-cyclical government intervention is necessary to stimulate recessed
economies to their full productive capacity. Neoclassical synthesists, however, diverged from
Keynesianism in several key areas. While Keynesianism maintained that markets are inherently
unstable and driven by irrational and inefficient use of information, neoclassical synthesists
differentiated between short-term and long-term market dynamics. In the long term, markets are
considered efficient and equilibrating. Long-term efficiency, however, is undermined by short-term
market errors (e.g., asymmetric information, price stickiness). At the Fund, this translated into an
emphasis on targeted, short-term fiscal and monetary response rather than a focus on a more
permanent regime of government intervention.323 The neoclassical synthesis and Fund policy also
distanced itself from Keynes’ support of capital controls. Drawing back to neoclassical assumptions,
both long and short term speculative capital flows were not considered destabilizing, but rather natural
equilibrating factors in an open trading system.
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In what Jacqueline Best describes as the “hollowing out” of Keynesianism, the dismissal of Keynes’
focus on inter-subjective dynamics driving market behavior reframed macroeconomic issues as
essentially technical, short-term issues that could be modeled and ultimately corrected.324 The
ascendency of this interpretation of macroeconomics helped reinforce a technocratic, economistic
norm at the Fund that remains firmly embedded in the institution (see chapter 2). Based on interview
with staff, this form of Keynesianism with a neoclassical and technocratic bent is arguably what many
Fund staff who consider themselves Keynesians self-identify. Fiscal intervention that “works” in the
short run is the primary concern rather than a focus on developing policy that accepts long-term
instability and irrationality of modern capitalist economies.
Monetarism
The neoclassical synthesis focus on demand management emerged as the dominant mainstream
macroeconomic paradigm in the 1960s and early 1970s. Its most direct challenge came from the
emerging popularity of monetarist theory in the 1970s and 1980s. Developed by economists associated
with the University of Chicago including Milton Friedman, monetarists root their analysis in four
primary assumptions.325 First, as with neoclassical orthodoxy, markets free of distortion are efficient
and equilibrating. Second, the amount of money in an economy is the primary variable driving total
spending and overall level of economic activity and output. Expansion of money supply is reflected in
increased economic activity, inflation, and inflationary expectations. Third, a stable and noninflationary economy free of government intervention will tend toward full employment. Fourth, while

324

As articulated by James Tobin, “In the realms of macro-economics, at least, problems were coming to be treated as
technical rather than ideological.” See James Tobin, “The New Economics One Decade Older (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974), p.5 as cited by Best, “Hollowing Out Keynesian Norms: How the Search for a Technical Fix
Undermined the Bretton Woods Regime,” p.383.
325
Influential monetarist works include Milton Friedman, ed. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1956); Milton Friedman, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review 58
(1968), pp.1-17; Milton Friedman and Anna J. Shwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1963) ; and Edmund Phelps, “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal
Unemployment Over Time,” Economica, 34 (1967), pp.254-281.

128

long-term increases in money supply consistent with productive capacity of a society are stabilizing,
short-term changes in money supply are destabilizing. Monetary stimulus unrelated to underlying
fundamentals, for example, produces inflation with no guarantee of increased employment. Attempts
to reduce inflation through a short-term decrease in money supply also are problematic due to what
monetarist describe as “adaptive expectations.” Economic output and employment are reduced but
high wages and prices remain due to lag time “between changes in fundamentals and the market’s
perception of these changes.”326

Based on these assumptions, monetarist theory strongly contrasted with the neoclassical synthesists in
several areas. First, countercyclical fiscal policy is at best inconsequential to growth and often
detrimental as it crowds out private investment. Second, attempts to restore full employment through
fiscal or monetary policy or to manage unemployment through wage intervention are
counterproductive. Monetarists argue there is a natural rate of unemployment consistent with a
society’s productive capacity and that government intervention to stimulate growth results in inflation
with possibly little effect on increasing employment. Intervention in labor markets also produces wage
distortions that unnecessarily maintain or increase unemployment above their natural levels. Third,
given that short-term monetary intervention is problematic, discretionary monetary policy is to be
avoided. Authorities should instead use fixed, rigid rules that support a gradual expansion of money
supply in line with underlying productive capacity.327

Fund historian James Boughton asserts that monetarism “had less impact on the IMF than on the
economics profession at large, and its influence was felt primarily in efforts made to examine and
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ultimately reject it.”328 Rather, it was the emergence of new classical economics (see below) that “had
the biggest post-Keynesian impact on the IMF.”329 This is arguably overstated as several prominent
policy positions consistent with monetarism have shaped policy directives of the Fund. Most evident is
the logic and general conclusion associated with components of the Polak model. While Polak
explicitly differentiates his monetary approach to the balance of payments model as a “Keynesian
inspired IMF version” from that of a competing “Chicago School revolutionary approach,” the main
policy recommendations are the same: Creation of domestic credit leads to loss of foreign reserves of
an equal amount.330 As such, states with balance-of-payment deficits are advised to reduce domestic
consumption.331

Another prominent impact of monetarism in IMF thinking was its stance on capital controls in the
1980s and 1990s. Monetarists frame aversion to capital controls as misguided, arguing that capital
flow volatility is a symptom of speculators and investors responding rationally to underlying policy
and institutional weakness. Capital movement thus is a corrective mechanism rather than a variable in
and of itself that causes economic turmoil. This argument was expressed most forcefully by IMF
Managing Director Michel Camdessus and First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer in the late
1990s as they unsuccessfully lobbied for the Fund Executive Board to amend its Articles of
Agreement to include jurisdiction over capital controls.332 While the fallout from the Asian crisis
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cooled IMF efforts to pursue an integration of capital account liberalization into its formal mandate,
two interconnected monetarist-inspired themes remain influential in Fund debates. First is the notion
that the primary role of monetary policy is sustaining price stability rather than focusing on issues of
full employment. Second, given the political pressure for short term inflationary stimulus, the most
effective institutional arrangement to promote price stability is an arrangement where central banks are
independent and follow fixed rules rather than ad hoc discretion when instituting monetary policy.333
New Classical Economics
As with monetarism, new classical economics gained popularity in the 1970s as Keynesian-inspired
models failed to provide a logical explanation of patterns of stagflation afflicting many major
economies during this time. New classical economics, like monetarism, dismisses Keynesian
assumptions of inefficient markets and roots its thinking in classical conceptions of prices, markets,
and natural rates of unemployment.334 Free of intervention, prices and wage levels clear markets
(balance supply and demand) efficiently. New classical economics, however, diverges from
monetarism in its conception of individual adaptability to changing market conditions. Monetarists
maintain that markets clear in the long run but short-term inefficiencies in markets exist due to
adaptive expectations and the relative inflexibility of prices and wages to adjust quickly to shifts in
money supply. These short-term dynamics impact aggregate demand, employment levels, and
economic output.335 New classical theory rejects the notion that markets and prices only clear over
medium and long time horizons. Rather, rational, utility maximizing individuals and firms constantly
adjust to changing market conditions to maximize profit and/or utility. The aggregate effect of
333
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individuals and firms acting rationally and in “real time” guarantees that prices accurately reflect
underlying fundamentals and quickly balance supply and demand.

Individuals and firms also develop what John Muth initially described as “rational expectations” of
future market direction.336 Rational economic actors learn to predict changes in government policies
and also how to react to these changes to maximize profits and utility. Through this process, new
classical theorists argue that individuals and firms will also offset government policy aims, preventing
them from having a real effect on aggregated demand and economic output.337 This translates into an
aversion of “activist” fiscal or monetary intervention:
Activist policies must be curbed, first, because a growing body of evidence…suggests that
existing models cannot succeed in offsetting the normal fluctuations in output,
employment, or other aggregates. Second, activist policies must be curbed because most of
their effects are uncertain…Third, activist policies must be curbed because even if we
know what their results would be, we wouldn’t know whether they were desirable or not.338

Neoclassicalists instead advocate that governments focus on issues of market stability and intervene
primarily in areas that improve overall efficiency.

Specific to the Fund and LICs, a focus on efficiency and stability rather than activist intervention was
a key component of structural adjustment lending under the SAF and ESAF frameworks in the 1980s
and 1990s. Merging aspects of new classical and monetarist thinking, reduction in government
spending was seen as the most effective macroeconomic tool to stimulate growth by reversing low
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rates of private investment and high inflation found in the majority of poor states during this period.339
Fiscal austerity via cuts in government employment and caps on salaries and transfers was also pushed
to reduce overall consumption and produce so-called “demand compression” to help reverse balance
of payment deficits.340 While conditionality frameworks under the PRGF and ECF/SCF/RCF moved
away from the notion that fiscal austerity and private investment guarantees growth, components of
new classical and monetarist themes remain. In a 2008 staff paper outlining the role of Fund in LICs,
for example, “prudent fiscal policy” entails a “fiscal stance” that helps “ensure macroeconomic
stability and debt sustainability, and avoids crowding out.”341
New Keynesianism
New Keynesianism first emerged in the early 1980s as a reaction to monetarist and new classical
critiques of Keynesian inspired theory. As outlined by Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz, New
Keynesians share with traditional Keynesians three general propositions: “1. During some periods –
often extended – an excess supply of labor exists at prevailing level of real wages. 2. The aggregate
level of economic activity fluctuates markedly…These fluctuations are greater in magnitude and
different in pattern from any that might be accounted for by short-run changes in technology, tastes, or
demography. 3. Money matters, at least most of the time, although monetary policy may be ineffective
in some periods (like the Great Depression).”342 While in disagreement with new classical and
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monetarist assumptions concerning market self-correction, New Keynesians concede that the new
classical focus on microeconomic principles to explain macroeconomic outcomes is an important
advancement. New Keynesians thus adopt the micro-foundational focus of new classical economics
but differ in their assumptions about the nature of markets. While new classical models see market
distortion as the exception rather than the rule, New Keynesians highlight that imperfect information
and other distorting externalities are a “given” in market transactions.343 The cumulative effect of
individuals rationally responding to imperfect market conditions produces aggregate market failure,
particularly in the short run.344

New Keynesians highlight several dynamics that produce price and wage rigidities during periods of
economic downturn that undermine market clearing. Specific to prices, the concepts of “menu costs”
and “price staggering” explain why reduced demand during economic downturn does not necessarily
result in lower prices. Menu costs refer to the cost of changing prices. Prices do not adjust quickly or
continuously as it costs firms resources to implement a new price.345 Price staggering also occurs as
firms are conscious of their prices relative to other firms and don’t want to be the first to decrease their
prices.346 In regard to explanations of involuntary unemployment, the concept of “efficiency wages”
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highlights why wages may remain high despite high unemployment. Firms pay above market average
wages as high wages make workers more productive, produce less turnover, and attract more qualified
and dedicated employees. In the aggregate, the choice of individual firms to pay above equilibrium
wages to their high value workers reinforces involuntary unemployment.347

In regard to macroeconomic policy response, New Keynesians are generally conservative in their
application of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.348 Influential New Keynesians including N.
Gregory Mankiw, for example, are strong supporters of inflation targeting and present their policy
positions primarily as a response to demand shocks (e.g., government spending).349 In the short run,
central bank manipulation of interest rates is to be used to counter inflationary pressure caused by
demand shocks. Given that prices and wages are sticky, however, there will be periods of involuntary
unemployment following a necessary reduction in money supply. The best solution therefore is to
proactively avoid imbalances caused by introducing excessive aggregate demand into the economy. 350
This framing of monetary policy became the norm in the 1990s through broad acceptance within
central banks and the Fund of the so called “Taylor Rule.” Introduced by New Keynesian economist
John Taylor in 1992, it stipulated that central banks “lean against the wind” by systematically
responding to increased inflation “with a more-than-proportional increase” in nominal interest rates.351
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The 2008 (legitimacy) Crisis and a Return to Keynes?
A combination of monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian theory (also referred to as “the New
Consensus”) was reflected in Fund macroeconomic positions from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis to the
2008 global financial crisis. Inflation management was the primary goal of monetary policy along with
a dismissal of countercyclical fiscal policy. Trust in the stability and long term efficiency of markets
also factored into aversion to government intervention into labor and financial markets. Relative low
volatility, low unemployment, and low inflation in most industrialized states from the 1980s to 2008
were attributed to these policy directives. Described as “The Great Moderation,” proponents of the
New Consensus including then Federal Reserve governor Ben Bernanke argued that financial
liberalization and “improved macroeconomic performance, particularly monetary policy” were
primarily responsible for nearly three decades of steady growth and low inflation in industrialized
states.352 Olivier Blanchard, for his part, declared in August 2008 that an intellectual consensus had
formed around appropriate monetary, fiscal, and regulatory response, concluding that the “state of
macro was good.”353

As introduced above, constructivists focused on the IMF argue that a “crisis of legitimacy” can
facilitate ideational change and policy reform. The 2008 global financial crisis proved to be such an
event as components of three decades of macroeconomic policy consensus were called into question.
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, in a 2011 speech delivered at an IMF sponsored forum on “Macro and
Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis,” captured this sentiment in his opening remarks:
The last few years have not only been a crisis for the global economy, but also a crisis for
economics. The Great Moderation led too many of us to underestimate macroeconomic
352
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risks…the recent experience has raised profound questions about the pre-crisis consensus
on macroeconomic policies.354

Blanchard, in an apparent mea culpa, shared a similar notion that the relative stability in advanced
economies prior to the 2008 crisis had “lulled economists and policymakers into a false sense of
security” and that the “Great Recession” required “a reassessment of what we know about how to
conduct macroeconomic policy.” 355 As outlined below in analysis of shifts in monetary and fiscal
policy, the post-2008 period is characterized in part by the growing influence of more orthodox
aspects of Keynesian theory.
Monetary Policy
In regard to monetary policy, Blanchard outlined the pre-2008 consensus thinking in these terms:
Stable and low inflation was presented as the primary, if not exclusive, mandate of
central banks. This was the result of coincidence between the reputational needs
of central bankers to focus on inflation…and the intellectual support for inflation
targeting by the New Keynesian model….There was an increasing consensus that
inflation should not only be stable, but very low (most central banks chose a
356
target around 2 percent).

Blanchard also noted that despite some debate among economists that exceedingly low target inflation
rates could replicate dynamics of deflationary spirals seen during the Great Depression, these concerns
were largely dismissed prior to the 2008 crisis: “The liquidity traps in the Great Depression, combining
significant deflation, and low nominal rates, were seen as belonging to history, a reflection of policy
errors that could now be avoided.”357 Blanchard argued that there is now recognition that inflation
targets were too low in the pre-2008 era and led to “costly” consequences:
When the crisis started in earnest in 2008, and aggregated demand collapsed, most
central banks quickly decreased their policy rate to close to zero. Had they been able
354
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to, they would have decreased the rate further: estimates…suggest another 3 to 5 percent
for the United States. But the zero nominal interest rate bound prevented them from
doing so…it is clear that the zero nominal interest rate bound has proven costly. Higher
average inflation, and thus higher nominal interest rates to start with, would have made it
possible to cut interest rates more, thereby probably reducing the drop in output and the
deterioration of fiscal position. 358

Specific to LICs policy, the debate on appropriate inflation levels prior to the 2008 crisis appeared
more sensitive to the effects of exceedingly low inflation targets on growth rates and monetary
flexibility. In a 2005 staff paper, discussion around appropriate inflation rates recognized that “the
desirability of single digit inflation had been questioned” and that no consensus around the appropriate
inflation rates for LICs had been clearly established. In their ultimate conclusion that LIC policy rates
should be targeted between 5 and 10 percent, Fund staff argued that LICs needed room for short term
expansionary intervention due to the high risks of exogenous shocks to their economies, but also
warned against inflation levels above 10 percent:
On balance, the above considerations support the use of single-digit inflation targets….
However, pushing inflation too low, say below 5 percent, may entail a loss of output and
seigniorage revenue, suggesting a need for caution in setting very low inflation targets in
low-income countries. As these countries tend to be subject to larger output volatility and
more pronounced price shocks, program design should take these economic attributes
properly into account. In particular, inflation targets should be set so as to help avoid risks
of an unintended contractionary policy stance. 359

If discussion prior to the crisis called for higher inflation rates, the 2008 crisis resulted in LIC staff
more forcefully pushing flexible monetary response. As seen in Figure 4.2 below, target rate inflation
levels of LICs negotiated with the Fund have increased under the new ECF/RCF/SCF framework. 20
of 34 LIC lending arrangements negotiated in 2010-2011 have inflation targets above 5 percent as
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compared to 10 of 32 under PRGF lending from 2003-2007. 5 LICs also have inflation targets between
10 and 20 percent under the new lending arrangements.360
Figure 4.2 Target LIC Inflation Rates (1995-2011)
(Number of LICs)
3% below

3.1%-5%

5.1-10%

10.1-20%

1995-1999
(ESAF)

15

13

14

5

2003-2007
(“late” PRGF)

12

10

9

1

2010-2011
(ECF/RCF/SCF)

7

7

15

5

Source: Goldsbrough et al (2007); Martin and Watts (2012)

Staff debates on how LICs should deal with the aftermath of the 2008 crisis maintain that most LICs
were conservative in their monetary response and argue that in future downturns a “more active
monetary easing” is advisable:
In the 2009 downturn, LICs did not fully exploit the scope of monetary easing…while
LICs did lower nominal policy rates, they did so by less than the decline in inflation
would have allowed, resulting in sharply higher real policy rates at the peak of the
crisis. In the event of another global downturn and softening of commodity prices,
more active monetary easing may be appropriate in LICs with moderate inflation.361
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Staff from the Africa Department also argue for Keynesian-inspired monetary policy that reflects
inflation levels and adjusts accordingly: “As inflation falls, monetary policy should be eased…On the
other hand, countries still experiencing excessive inflation many need to tighten monetary policy.”362
Fiscal Policy
New Consensus thinking, drawing from monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian theory,
dismissed countercyclical fiscal policy as an appropriate macroeconomic policy tool. As noted by
Blanchard, “In the 1960s and 1970s, fiscal and monetary policy had roughly equal billing…In the past
two decades, however, fiscal policy took a backseat to monetary policy.”363 For New Keynesians,
aversion to countercyclical fiscal response was coined in terms of rational expectations of individual
economic agents. Individuals aware of plans of increased government spending financed through taxes
or bonds understand that such activity negatively impacts future income. As such, they rationally
chose to decrease consumption to save for future higher taxation. The subsequent drop in consumption
therefore offsets attempts by government authorities to stimulate aggregate demand.364 Monetarists
and new classicalists also portrayed countercyclical fiscal response as irresponsible, as deficit
spending undermined macroeconomic stability through increased inflationary pressure.

Since the 2008 crisis, countercyclical fiscal policy has been reestablished as an appropriate component
of macroeconomic response in the Fund. Strauss-Kahn fired the first shot at the New Consensus in
early November 2008. The crisis, he argued, was “…what economists call a Keynesian recession” and
required coordinated international fiscal expansion to stimulate demand and “avoid a global
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depression.”365 At a November 2008 emergency G-20 summit meeting, Strauss-Kahn welcomed the
fact that G-20 leaders emphasized “fiscal stimulus, which I believe is now essential to restore global
growth.”366 Fund staff papers during the first year of the crisis reiterated similar themes. A joint staff
paper from the Research and Finance Departments in December 2008 urgently argued for a “timely,
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable” fiscal policy stimulus to increase
aggregate global demand.367 In perhaps the most dramatic shift in policy recommendations since the
early 1980s, the paper warned against pro-cyclical balanced budget requirements and called for a
strong public sector involvement to help stimulate demand:
First, …governments should make sure that existing programs are not cut for lack of
resources. In particular, central governments or sub-national governments that are
facing balanced budget rules may be forced to suspend various spending programs.
Measures should be taken to counteract the procyclicality build in these rules….Second,
spending programs, from repair and maintenance, to investment projects delayed,
interrupted or rejected for lack of funding or macroeconomic considerations, can be
(re)started quickly. A few high profile programs, with good long-run justification
and strong externalities, (for example, for environmental purposes) can also help, directly
and through expectations. Given the higher degree of risk facing firms at the current
juncture, the state could also take a larger share in private-public partnerships for
valuable projects that would otherwise be suspended for lack of private capital.368

Acceptance of Keynesian themes of countercyclical intervention has also been seen in the Fund’s
support of “automatic fiscal stabilizers” in the post-2008 era. As outlined by Blanchard et al., the
impact of future recessions could be ameliorated if automatic targeted tax rebates and income transfers
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to “low-income or liquidity-constrained households” were implemented once employment levels fell
below a threshold level.369

As with monetary policy, staff involved with LIC policy diverged somewhat from the broader
institutional and professional consensus on fiscal policy prior to the 2008 crisis. Starting with the
PRGF, fiscal policy advice centered on issues of debt sustainability, strategic financing, and
appropriate public expenditure to support the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).370 Staff
argued that fiscal policy ultimately should work to lower budget deficits and public debt levels to
manageable levels, as doing so would increase levels of private investment and subsequent growth.
Specific to LICs, however, a history of unsustainable debt levels produced dynamics that undercut the
ability of these states to pursue prudent fiscal policy choices. Staff argued for a two tiered strategy.
LICs should work toward a tighter fiscal stance while multilateral institutions and bilateral donors
should concurrently maintain or increase concessionary lending and debt forgiveness to produce
policy space for pursuing MDG initiatives.

Following the broader institutional trend following the 2008 crisis, countercyclical fiscal policy
reentered the policy tool-kit for LICs. A series of staff papers focused on the crisis and LIC response,
for example, highlighted the importance of countercyclical fiscal intervention during the crisis and
rebuilding “policy buffers” going forward in preparation for future economic recession:
Growth was supported by a countercyclical policy response-a first for LICs in contrast to
past crises when the fiscal stance was tightened. Most LICs let their fiscal automatic
stabilizers operate, and the median income in real primary spending was higher than in the
previous five years…Empirical analysis suggests that the response allows vital spending to
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be preserved, in particular on social sectors and infrastructure, and helped mitigate the
negative impact of the global crisis on economic growth and the poor.371

Fund staff involved with LICs also maintained that targeted income transfer plans “to the poorest often
result in a larger stimulus to aggregate demand, given their higher propensity to consume” and argued
for targeted public works programs and income transfer as a component of fiscal stimulus. 372

When asked what drove the IMF to support more Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy choices in the
new ECF/RCF/SCF framework, answers from LIC staff generally came to the conclusion that the
macroeconomic position of LICs leading into the 2008 crisis was the most influential variable shaping
why LIC staff supported a countercyclical position:
Many countries had built up quite significant policy space because debt had been reduced,
inflation had come down, because deficits across the board were relatively small. All of
these things put together allowed countries some room and they used it. I don’t think there
has been some sort of deep ideological change.373
In 2008, many LICs were in much more favorable position then they would have been ten
years prior. Due to their good macroeconomic performance, they had built up policy
buffers that they were able to then use. It was that change that made it very clear to
observers outside the Fund that countercyclical policies have a role.374
This was a new policy direction but the new direction was driven by the conditions in low
income countries. It was at some level pragmatic advice that worked because countries
actually had the reserves and policy space to actually do the stimulus. I would not pin the
Fund’s position too much on any internal change in culture and thinking but perhaps more
of an evolution also of the countries that we work in.375
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Staff explanations as to why the Fund shifted in a more Keynesian direction thus did not reflect
this as representative of a broader crisis of legitimacy.

Structural Reform and Market Efficiency
Unlike fiscal and monetary shifts seen after 2008, evidence points to little significant challenge to
norms that champion improved market efficiency as the primary goal of structural reform. Since the
1982 debt crisis and through the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crisis, IMF
policy has consistently supported market-determined exchange rates, trade liberalization, and aversion
to government-induced price intervention as the most prudent course of action for growth and
development. Specific to LICs, policy focused on poverty reduction that first emerged under the PRGF
and continued with the ECF/RCF/SCF framework explicitly argues for removal of market distortive
policies as a prime tool to meet poverty reduction targets in LICs.

Normative frames wary of market distortion have their roots in debates in the 1950s and 1960s. During
this time period, IMF policy advocating limited state intervention and trade integration contrasted
sharply with those sympathetic to the then popular strategy of ISI. As outlined in chapter 2, proponents
of ISI argued poor states could only develop if they abandoned liberal economic models dependent on
export of primary commodities. ISI instead advocated for internal industrialization through a series of
state interventions that ostensibly reduced dependence on exports and kick-started the economy into
producing manufactured goods for domestic consumption. While those critical of ISI stood outside the
mainstream in the 1950s and 1960s, faltering growth rates in the 1970s across much of Latin America,
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Africa, and the Middle East and the fallout from the 1982 Mexican debt crisis reshaped the
development debate on terms more in line with the Fund’s position.376
Most notable in this respect was a series of influential publications in the 1970s supported by the
Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD),377 the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER),378 and the Brookings Institution379 that focused on various deleterious
effects of market distortions caused by ISI policies. Following the 1982 crisis, two edited volumes
from the Institute of International Economics focused on Latin America reinforced similar themes. 380
Bela Balassa et al.’s Toward Economic Growth in Latin America (1986) underscored how inefficiency
and corruption due to state intervention in Latin America had produced economic stagnation and
dependency on global capital markets to finance deficits.381 John Williamson’s Latin American
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (1990) outlined a growing “Washington Consensus” within
the IMF, World Bank, D.C. -based think tanks and the U.S. government concerning appropriate policy
to reform indebted ISI states.382 These critiques of ISI served as the ideological foundation for
aversion to state intervention in development outcomes that remain strongly embedded in Fund
thinking and policy choices. I explore in more detail below how this has manifested itself in three
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policy areas applied to LICs: market determined exchange rates, support of trade liberalization, and
aversion to government-induced price distortion.
Exchange Rates
A primary purpose of the IMF, outlined in Article I (iii) of the Articles of Agreement, is “to promote
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid
competitive exchange depreciation.” Fund thinking concerning the relationship between exchange
rates, growth, and development in poor states is summarized as follows. Drawing from monetarist
inspired theory, an assumption is first made that aggregate money supply is relatively stable, that
individuals have access to goods and money balances, and that the demand for goods and money is
positively correlated with income. A temporary disequilibrium between current money holding and
long run demand for money produces a movement in international reserves. High demand for money
due to economic expansion and/or deficit spending, for example, generates a trade surplus, as that
economy imports money through increased exports to increase its money supply. Conversely, excess
supply of money gives rise to a trade deficit as the country reduces supply of money through a rise in
imports. Under open market conditions, exchange rate fluctuations reflecting case specific
macroeconomic fundamentals are to be expected and states generally should not act to artificially
create overvalued or undervalued currency values.383

Due in part to the history of ISI, the primary concern of Fund staff over the past three decades is that
developing states may return to a pattern of state intervention that overvalues exchange rates. LICs,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, also demonstrated more willingness than many other developing
states in the post-ISI era to intervene in currency markets to maintain inflated exchange rates during
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the 1980s and 1990s.384 The argument against artificial overvaluation of currency focuses on the
following themes: (1) Overvaluation represents a tax on exports and subsidization of imports.
Discrimination against exporters lowers their ability to compete in foreign markets, lowers foreign
exchange receipts, and subsequently undermines a state’s ability to obtain imports; (2) Limited foreign
reserves may also become rationed and inefficiently allocated by the state; (3) Overvaluation puts
pressure on import-competing industries. As seen under ISI, these interests will lobby for protectionist
measures that further distort markets; (4) Overvaluation stokes possibilities of capital flight,
particularly when currency comes under speculative attack; and (5) Defending an overvalued currency
through tight monetary policy can produce economic recession.385

Exchange rate stability in LICs is also particularly vulnerable to the effects of large and sporadic
inflows and outflows of foreign currency into their economies. Sharp upsurges in income come from
four areas: discovery and export of a natural resource, a price spike in international markets of a
primary export commodity, foreign direct aid, and short term foreign direct investment. Often
described by development economists as symptoms of “Dutch disease,” large inflows of foreign
currency place upward pressure on exchange rates and render traditional export sectors less
competitive in international markets.386 Inflow of money also increases domestic demand for goods
and services and can produce a production shift away from export sectors to the domestic non-trading
goods sectors. For Fund staff, the general consensus is that a shift in production away from traditional
export sectors that “generate learning by doing” undermines a country’s human capital potential and
384
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subsequently undermines long term growth and development. Some form of government intervention
to devalue currency in the short term may be advisable to limit the effects of Dutch disease.387

While there is broad agreement among development economists on the negative impact of overvalued
exchange rates, there is growing concern among Fund staff with strategies that move in the opposite
direction and deliberately undervalue exchange rates. Most pertinent in current internal Fund debates
around this issue are the contributions of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. Rodrik, in a 2008 study
focused on growth rates in developing countries from 1950-2004, presents evidence that growth rates
were higher in developing states that deliberately undervalued their currency. Rodrik asserts that this is
due to institutional factors and market failures unique to developing states that disproportionately
impact traded goods sectors. Rather than the more difficult task of reforming markets and institutions
that would invite investing in tradable sectors, devaluation serves as a “second best” policy for poor
states. While the most prudent solution would be “deep” institutional and market reform, Rodrik
concludes that a more practical course for poor states is to abandon the devaluation scheme and
directly subsidize export sectors and allow exchange rates and wages to adjust to equilibrate the
current account balance.388

Current Fund staff working with LICs are wary of strategies of devaluation or direct subsidies to
export sectors. When asked about Rodrik’s conclusions, for example, a senior staff member in SPR
responded as follows:
Fund advice to countries is, broadly speaking, to try and keep the real effective exchange
rates aligned with fundamentals. There are two reasons why we would not advocate an
387
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active strategy of underevaluation: (1) the beggar-thy-neighbor problem (it is, after all one
of the Fund’s reason d’etre to discourage such policies); and (2) attempts to sustain such a
strategy for an extended period (which policy makers would be tempted to do) would give
rise to other distortions-notably high /rising inflation-that would be harmful to growth.389

Exchange rate policy recommendations for LICs thus remain broadly in line with the Washington
Consensus view developed three decades ago. While overvaluation is the major concern with
developing states, under-valuation can also be detrimental to growth potential. Exchange rates should
reflect underlying fundamentals and be competitive enough to promote export growth, but should not
be deliberately undervalued due to subsequent inflationary pressure and underinvestment in domestic
sectors.390
Trade controls
As with exchange rate policy, contemporary thinking that shapes how Fund staff approach trade
restrictions in LICs has roots in critiques of the ISI model that emerged in 1970s and 1980s. Among
economists, the debate around the appropriateness of trade protectionism was challenged most forcibly
by contributions of Anne Krueger, Jhagdish Bhagwadi, and T.N. Srinivasan. Krueger’s seminal “The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” in American Economics Review modeled the adverse
economic effects on growth that occur when actors compete for import licenses. Krueger argued that
import licenses and other non-tariff trade restrictions create substantial economic rents due to the fact
that they legally grant monopolistic control of market share to favored, politically connected actors.
She highlighted that we should expect hard fought competition for these rents (“competitive rent
seeking”) that misallocate resources in the formal economy and incur a subsequent welfare cost
additional to that caused by tariff restrictions alone. The high cost of winning market share via rents
also incentivizes actors to turn to informal and/or illegal activities (e.g., bribery, smuggling, black
389
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markets) that can further undermine growth and development goals.391 Bhagwati and Srinivasan
generalized Kreuger’s argument to explore further how various market distortive policies create what
the authors described as “Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking” activities.392

The battle against rent-seeking was also tied to the concept of “efficiency prices.” Efficiency prices
are considered those that result in profit maximization per unit of input use and are deemed to exist
under conditions where domestic markets are able to freely interact with international markets. State
intervention into markets undermines appropriate prices and subsequent efficient allocation of
resources.393 Trade liberalization for poor states was thus considered the primary tool to counter
distortive effects and spur growth and development394 and was heavily integrated into the rationale for
IMF (and World Bank) structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and 1990s.395 Krueger, who went on
to serve as the World Bank’s Chief Economist (1982-1986), First Managing Deputy Director of the
IMF (2001-2003; 2005-2006), and interim Managing Director of the IMF in 2004, reflected on this
“radical” shift toward a free trade model in her 1997 presidential address to the American Economic
Association:
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Ideas with regard to trade policy and economic development are among those that have
changed radically. Then and now, it was recognized that trade policy was central to overall
policies of economic development. But in the early days, there was a broad consensus that
trade policy for development should be based on “import substitution”...The contrast with
views today is striking. It is now widely accepted that growth prospects for developing
countries are greatly enhanced through an outer-oriented trade regime and fairly uniform
incentives for production across exporting and import-competing goods…It is generally
believed that import substitution as a minimum outlived its usefulness and that
liberalization of trade and payments is crucial for both industrialization and economic
development…And, while there are still some disagreements over particular aspects of
trade policy both among academic researchers and policy makers, the current consensus
represents a distinct advance over the old one, in terms both of knowledge and of the
prospects it offers for rapid economic growth.396

IMF publications, policy documents, and interviews with staff suggest the “consensus” described by
Krueger remains firmly ingrained in the institution’s thinking. A 2009 IEO report focused on IMF
involvement in trade issues from 1995-2007, for example, observed that “… the IMF’s position on
trade policy reflected a rather broad consensus in the academic and public policy literature on the
merits of liberal trade regimes.”397 The same report notes that Fund staff draw from arguments in the
literature that protectionist measures as representative of “second best approaches” to market failures
are often unrelated to trade. Rather than support the second best solution, Fund policies should instead
target correction (“first best solutions”) of the market failure itself.398 This same ideological support of
free trade is found in Fund policy debates following the 2008 crisis. A 2010 article in Finance and
Development authored by two economists from SPR outlines current trends in protectionism since the
crisis and highlights three areas that the Fund should address to support free trade in the near future:
(1) enhanced monitoring of trade policy that supports discriminatory policies; (2) guard against
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“murky” protectionist policies (e.g., public procurement, product standards, and custom procedures)
and (3) support effort to conclude the current stalled WTO Doha Round.399

Specific to staff working with LICs, Fund position papers on how best poor states can maintain growth
and development in post-2008 crisis environment draw heavily from an argument focused on the
merits of free trade:
Trade is an engine of development and can contribute strongly to reducing
poverty….Perhaps the most important step that the international community can take to
support LDCs- and, indeed, of all LICs-is to conclude the WTO Doha Round…To benefit
strongly from better trade opportunities, the LDCs would need to tackle aggressively their
own high tariff and nontariff barriers to trade…On tariffs, a reasonable goal within a few
years is for a maximum 25 percent rate and a simple average below 15 percent. Nontariff
barriers, such as non-critical road blocks and checkpoints, and overly burdensome custom
practices, significantly slow trade and should be removed.400

The aforementioned 2009 IEO report does note that despite an ideological position strongly supportive
of trade liberalization, the past two decades have witnessed a swing in the conditionality requirements
in LIC lending arrangements that focus on trade liberalization. From the mid-1980s until 2000, the
general trend was active and growing involvement in trade policy issues in SAF and ESAF programs.
From 2000 forward, trade issues have been less central in Fund LIC lending arrangements. Reasons
behind this shift are explored further in chapter 5.

Price Distortions
Government intervention in market prices consists of two broad forms (see Figure 4.3 below). “Fixed”
pricing includes setting producer prices, ceilings on consumer prices, freezing of wholesale and retail
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price margins, and commodity price support. “Input” pricing involves subsidies and use of taxes to
discourage consumption of particular products.

Figure 4.3 Price Intervention Typology
Fixed Pricing
Producer Prices

Common Features
State purchases export at maximum prices
and sells on international market at higher price.

Consumer Prices

Retail price ceiling

Price Margins

Wholesale/retail margins set by law.

Commodity Prices

State purchases select commodities at
guaranteed minimum

Input Pricing
Price Subsidies

Taxes/Disincentive Pricing

Subsidies used to support domestic production
of commodities, support urban populations
and/or encourage use of specific inputs
Artificially inflated prices on inputs and/or
outputs to discourage consumption
(Source: David, The IMF Policy Paradigm, 1985, p.70.)

Most salient to LIC government intervention in market distortion are issues related to the agricultural
sector. ISI inspired policies in the 1960s and 1970s heavily penalized agricultural sectors through
various price interventions. Most common was the practice of fixing low producer prices to
agricultural products. In this scenario, marketing boards of parastatal agencies with monopoly control
purchased from agricultural producers at artificially low rates and then sold at open (world market)
prices. Along with this “tax” on agricultural producers, price controls on basic foodstuffs were also a
common practice during this period. For critics of this model, the narrative is that these policies
ultimately produced a subsidization of urban elites at the expense of the rural and urban poor:
153

The general conclusion is that the rural and agricultural sectors have been taxed in favor of
a relatively high-cost, high-wage, import substituting, and domestically oriented
manufacturing sector. The overall result has been a squeezing of the poor and powerless,
and a general nurturing of a domestic industrial and bureaucratic class earning excessive
monopoly rents. 401

Within this context, Fund and World Bank co-sponsored studies of price distortion in the agricultural
sector are grounded in the following set of arguments. First, as seen under ISI inspired policy,
government intervention into agricultural markets via export taxes, tariffs, or price subsidies worsens
outcomes for the most vulnerable. Food protectionism increases domestic food prices, which impact
poor consumers disproportionately as they spend more of their income on food than the well off.
Government intervention into agricultural markets also does not help the rural poor who don’t own
farmland and have to pay higher food prices and those who do own land but don’t produce for
commercial markets.402 Second, protectionism undermines innovation, supports inefficient processes,
and diverts resources away from rural education, infrastructure development, and technical
assistance.403 Third, while protected agricultural markets might see short term price stability, the
overall cost of market distortion is increased instability in prices in world markets. Both in the medium
and long term, a better strategy is to liberalize agricultural markets.404

Along with concerns surrounding agricultural price distortions, the Fund’s position has consistently
argued against a broad range of subsidies used in LICs. Along with food subsidies described above,
subsidies on energy use and transportation remain a prominent concern. A 2010 staff paper focused on
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the increase in energy subsidies in Africa since the 2008 crisis argues that while well intended, price
subsidies are generally costly and inefficient in allocation and disproportionately benefit the
wealthy.405 The Fund’s response to the global prices spikes in agricultural and oil prices in 2007-8
provides further evidence into how strongly embedded norms wary of market distortive effects remain
in the institution. Masood Ahmed, current Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department
and heavily involved in LIC policy is a lead spokesperson for the Fund’s position on subsidies.406 In a
2008 article in Finance and Development, Ahmed argued for targeted, short-term subsidies to help the
poor rather than long-term state intervention as the most appropriate response to global price spikes.
There is also a focus on “achieving market-led solutions in the longer run” rather than long term,
untargeted subsidies that will undermine producers and contribute to inflationary pressure.407

The Fund’s April 2011 regional outlook on Sub-Saharan Africa argued along similar lines. Food price
controls should be avoided as they “exacerbate scarcity” and “amount to ad hoc taxation of those that
produce, distribute retail items.” The same goes for fuel subsidies. “Country studies show that fuel
subsidies are almost invariably badly targeted” and as such tend to be “highly regressive” and “very
costly fiscally” as they “encourage excessive consumption, and are difficult to phase out because of
vested interests.”408 Several recent Fund loan agreements with LICs demonstrate that the Fund’s
normative position on subsidies is being heeded by member states. Mozambique, for example,
reported that it will gradually phase out fuel subsidies in 2012 and replace food and transport subsidies
405
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with more “targeted schemes,” including a voucher scheme covering low income workers, students,
and the elderly.409 Senegal followed a similar model in 2008 as it eliminated subsidies on food staples,
vegetable oil, and butane gas.410

Evidence thus points to a highly stable norm of free market thinking in the Fund that emphasizes the
distortive effects of rent seeking. This notion has expressed itself consistently as seen in LIC policy
directives on exchange rates, trade, and subsidies since the demise of ISI in the early 1980s. This is
best captured by a senior staff member in the Research Department who argued that the Fund “has
remained fairly Washington Consensus oriented all the way through” his three decade tenure. 411
Conclusions
H1: Policy reform initiatives that draw from ideas and norms that question market-based solutions for
LICs is unexpected.
H2 : A crisis of legitimacy that challenges taken for granted macroeconomic and development ideas
and/or norms is necessary for substantive LIC policy change.
H3: Chances of LIC policy change are greatest when economic ideas or norms institutionalized within
the Fund are questioned by broader epistemic community of development economists.

Returning to the hypotheses above, I draw the following conclusions. First, despite policy shifts
catalyzed in part by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the 2008 financial crisis, LIC reform
measures have remained within the boundaries of paradigmatic conceptions of market based
development established and reinforced for over five decades in mainstream economics. Second, while
LIC policy since the late 1990s promotes limited state intervention and “pro-poor” policies, these
409
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directives are conceptualized and enacted through a script that diverges little from a framework wary
of market distortive protectionist and redistributive policy directives. This sentiment is best captured
by a staff member from the African Department, who describes the PRSPs as follows:
Policies have become more generous, but the basic principles have not changed… When
you boil it down, the core targets were there in 1986 and they are still there today. The core
quantitative conditionality requirements have not changed. Think of it as a new cereal
package. Clearly it looks different on the outside, and there is a bit of difference in what is
inside, but it is still cereal.412

In this sense, it is easy for Fund critics to argue that little has changed in the institution and among its
social constituencies of legitimation in the post-Washington Consensus era.

Analysis derived from constructivist process tracing of ideas, however, points to a more complicated
story. While monetarist, new classical, and New Keynesian arguments wary of market distortive
policy choices remain firmly entrenched in LIC lending arrangements, a shift in thinking has occurred
in monetary and fiscal policy debates. As seen with the response by Strauss-Kahn and Blanchard to the
2008 crisis, policy elites can reach a tipping point where they fundamentally question components of
past policy direction and show willingness for self-critique and reform. Evidence thus points to the
economics profession and Fund management and staff as entities that seek legitimacy in their policy
choices. Specific to LIC policy, rejection of the New Consensus framework of monetary and fiscal
policy popular from 1982 to 2008 has been replaced by more Keynesian ideas supportive of activist,
countercyclical response. Returning to the model of norm cycle presented by Park and Vetterlein, the
notion of activist and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy has achieved stability within the
Fund. We can expect future LIC policy initiatives in the short and medium term to include traditional
Keynesian macroeconomic themes.
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This chapter also highlights that more precise insight into current Fund reform is best achieved by
conceptually treating themes of monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize short term balance of payment
disequilibria as separate at some level from policies choices focused on structural reform and market
efficiency. Evidence from this chapter demonstrates that we can expect more flexibility and change
with the former as most policy choices along the spectrum of Keynesianism to monetarism still falls
within broad paradigmatic themes of mainstream development economics. Alternative development
proposals for LICs that challenge consensus around what is deemed market distortive should not be
expected unless broader and deeper challenges or crisis in capitalism occur that subsequently
challenge deep held beliefs in market efficiency. I address some of these concerns in chapter 5 through
introduction of critical, historical structural engagement with IMF LIC policy reform.
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Chapter 5 Inclusive Neoliberalism: Historical Structural Explanations of LIC Reform
Mainstream theoretical approaches applied to the study of LIC policy in the post Washington
Consensus period provide several new insights into what drives reform in this institution. From
chapter 3, evidence derived through the use of PA models suggests that while the actors may change, a
coalition consisting of at least one primary actor is necessary for policy reform. From chapter 4,
constructivist analysis focused on the role of economic ideas and norm shifts and their relationship to
contemporary IMF LIC policy reform highlights that Fund thinking and subsequent policy reform is
influenced by external crises and policy failures. However, some ideas that frame policy choices are
more sacrosanct than others. While conceptions of what is considered appropriate monetary and fiscal
response have shifted in the post Washington Consensus period and have facilitated LIC policy
reform, ideational frameworks skeptical of market distortion remain firmly entrenched in IMF
thinking.

In chapter 5, I shift gears from current mainstream theory and examine Fund LIC policy reform in the
post Washington Consensus through the lens of a historical-structural framework developed initially
by Robert W. Cox and adopted by several generations of neo-Gramscian IPE scholars. I first
summarize how Cox differentiates what he describes as a “critical” approach from “problem-solving”
studies of politics. I then outline the concept of historical structure and Gramscian concepts of
hegemony, state-society complex, and historic bloc, and explore how a historical structural framework
engages with the study of contemporary international politics. Specific to the IMF, I then apply Cox’s
methodology to trace the historical structural foundations of the institution and how its role has
changed in relationship to LICs and the broader world order in three distinct periods: the hegemonic
era of Bretton Woods, the non-hegemonic Washington Consensus era of globalist supremacy, and the
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current era characterized by attempts of the globalist bloc to reassert a consensual framework of
inclusive neoliberalism. This provides the context to assess two primary hypotheses put forth by
several neo-Gramscian scholars focused on post Washington Consensus reform. First, the social
upheaval and crises born out of the Washington Consensus period threatened to undermine the
legitimacy of market driven development. In order to facilitate long term support for IMF and World
Bank policy, the Fund has become more sensitive to concerns of weak economic growth, poverty, and
increased inequality in LICs. Second, given that the IMF is one component of a broader globalist bloc,
neo-Gramscians maintain that post Washington Consensus IMF reforms are a by-product of
progressive elements within the globalist bloc to (re)establish a hegemonic world order through a more
inclusive form of globalizing capitalism.

Cox, Critical Theory, and Historical Structures
Rationalist and constructivist frameworks employed in chapters 3 and 4 fall into what Cox categorizes
as “problem-solving” theory. Problem-solving theory is designed to study and improve outcomes in a
particular social and political order. Cox argues that problem-solving approaches “take the world as
they find it” and analytically separates the entity understudy from deeper power relations and social
forces that perpetuate the order within which the phenomena understudy are embedded.413
Ontologically, this lends itself to an atomistic understanding of the world. Human agents and their
behavior are “reduced to their outward phenomenal aspects” and historic entities such as the IMF are
conceptualized and studied as independent objects that exist ‘out there’ in a broadly stable (a
“continuing present”) social and political order underwritten by general patterns or laws that can be
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elucidated through positivist methodology.414 Cox highlights two analytical strengths of political
analysis rooted in problem-solving theory. It sets clear limits on the potential variables that impact the
phenomena understudy that allow for precise, targeted examination. Through invoking the ceteris
paribus assumption, it is also able to identify patterns of causal effect between variables and tease out
patterns that can be applied in a predictive capacity to a given social and political order.415

Critical theory differs in its understandings and approach in several key respects. It is an openly
normative framework whose purpose is to systematically evaluate (“historicize”) power structures and
institutional arrangements of an existing world order and analyze the possibilities of alternative futures
and how they might come into effect. Given its focus on historical social process, it rejects an
essentialist understanding of human nature and the notion that subsequent political and social
arrangements (e.g., social relations of production, the state, institutions, and interstate system) have
inherent or timeless qualities. Rather, society is conceptualized as consisting of reflexive human agents
embedded in historically specific social structures and institutions that simultaneously shape – and are
shaped – by their actions. Integral in this reflexivity of human agents is their individualized processes
of interpreting the world. While individual human beings are interrelated to historically specific and
coherent structural arrangement of ideas and institutions, this does not determine in a mechanical
fashion their ways of thinking and acting. This tension between individual agency and
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broader structural intersubjective understandings thus serves as a primary source of historical
change.416

While a dialectic, relational understanding of social structures and human action is inconsistent with
positivist ontological and epistemological assumptions, a critical approach is not devoid of predictive
capacity. Through systematic analysis of the social structures and power dynamics of a world order, a
range of possible alternatives that might emerge are presented.417 Cox describes this as “utopianism
…constrained by its comprehension of historical processes.” 418 Methodologically, this is
accomplished through application of an ideal type that Cox terms a “historical structure.” A historical
structure is a simplified representation of time-specific patterns of forces that frame in broad terms the
“context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place” within a
given world order.419 While these forces don’t determine agency and outcomes directly, they impose
pressures and constraints: “Individuals and groups may move with the pressure or resist and oppose
them, but they cannot ignore them.”420 Three interrelated forces are identified that make up a
historical structure. These include material capabilities, ideas, and institutions (see Figure 5.1 below).

Figure 5.1: Historical Structure
Ideas
Material
Capabilities

Institutions
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Material capabilities describe power resources of a social order tied to level of technology, financial
and military power, and organization capacity. Ideas are divided into two broad categories.
Intersubjective meanings are broad-based and historically derive shared understandings of the world.
Cox stresses the crucial dynamic by which intersubjective understandings take on an objective form
that serves as the foundation of historical structures:
Historical structures express the unity of subjective and the objective. A nation, a class, a
religion are not real physical objects, yet they give real form to the human situation. They
are ideas shared in the subjectivity of innumerable individuals…In being so shared, these
ideas constitute the social world of these same individuals. They attain objectivity in the
structure that circumscribes human action. These structures are as much a part of the
material existence of people as the food they eat and the clothes they wear.421

.
If intersubjective meanings form the objective foundation of historical structures, more contested and
varied are “collective images of social order.” Perhaps best described as more openly ideological
frameworks of thinking, these ideas engage with “both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing
power relations, the meaning of justice and public goods and so forth.”422 Cox highlights that tensions
found between rival ideologies or between ideologies that challenge broad-based intersubjective
understandings can serve as flashpoints of change that may produce alternative material and
institutional arrangements and subsequent shifts in the historical structure.423

Dynamics surrounding the interplay between ideas and power relations are introduced into the
framework of historical structure through discussion of institutions and hegemony. Institutions are
operationalized as expressions of ideational and material forces that subsequently reinforce prevailing
power relations. Here, Cox adopts Antonio Gramsci’s conception of hegemony to capture the critical
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role that institutions play in perpetuating a historical structure.424 Hegemony, as developed further
below, is conceptualized as a form of domination where power relations primarily take on a
consensual form and subsequently lower coercive aspects of rule.425 Institutions such as the IMF can
serve as critical vectors for the formation and reproduction of hegemony in several respects. First, as
institutions are ostensibly designed to serve general interests rather than the interests of ruling groups,
they increase the legitimacy of the status quo.426 Institutions also reinforce the rule of powerful groups
through framing how particular issues are understood and managed. This is particularly salient when
potentially counter-hegemonic ideas challenge power structures, as institutions can absorb and reframe
these ideas in a form that is consistent with hegemonic doctrine.427 As is the case with material and
ideational forces, institutions are not determined in any strict sense by ruling groups. They can “take
on their own life” and facilitate opposing tendencies that challenge and transform historical structures
and subsequent world orders.428

In sum, a critical approach applied to the study of international politics is interested in understanding
how the contemporary world order has come to be, and what forces and dynamics potentially may
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transform it. The structural context of a world order is first established through identification of the
time-specific interrelated material capabilities, ideas, and institutions that underwrite it. The next step
is an application of a historical structural approach that involves clarification in regard to the stability
of that order, and what possible amalgamation of contradictions and pressure points therein could lead
to its transformation. Specific to the focus on the IMF, application of the historical structural approach
will examine how Fund LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus period may be reflective of
nascent attempts to rebuild global hegemony in the early 21st century around “inclusive
neoliberalism.” Employment of Cox’s method first necessitates further clarification as to why a
historical structural framework employs a social relational ontology of the state and power how this
understanding is then applied to the study of the international system and multilateral institutions.
Social Relational Ontology of the State, Power, and Hegemony
Mainstream problem-solving theories of international relations, including neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism, conceptualize a world system inhabited by states that are: (1) the origin and primary
unit of political action; (2) sovereign, rational actors whose unchanging modus operandi is to
maximize their security in an anarchical world system and; (3) unrelated in form and function to social
forces, including those tied to productive processes.429 Historical structural approaches instead argue
for what they describe as a relational understanding of the state. States are not sovereign entities with
preset and timeless qualities or the sole site of political activity. They are instead conceptualized as
time-specific institutionalized expressions and points of linkage between global and local social
forces.430
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A social relational framing of the state is also inconsistent with mainstream realist and structural
Marxist conceptions of state power, multilateral institutions, and hegemony in the international
system. In both neorealism and world system theory, for example, state power is reduced to single
dimension of dominance based on relative economic position and/or hard power capabilities.431 For
historical structural IR scholars, this approach fetishizes state power as it fails to elucidate social
forces and dynamics that ultimately produce the conditions necessary for the state to act. Power
instead should be “seen as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of
accumulated material capabilities that is as the result of these processes.”432 If power is derived from
social processes, a relational framework also rejects the notion that power can be reduced or
conceptually tied only to territorial entities such as the nation-state. Historical structural analysis
therefore recognizes the global system as a totality within which power tied to social processes and
forces operates at multiple sites of human activity within, above, and below the state.433

Cox, drawing from the tradition of historical materialism,434 argues that a universal component that
shapes historical structures includes social forces in the human experience tied to productive
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relations.435 While an integral component of social structures, Cox and neo-Gramscians stress that
productive relations should not be conceived in economistic terms: “Production…is to be understood
in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It
covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals, and
institutions that are the prerequisites of the production of physical goods.”436 Nor do social forces
engendered by productive processes determine in a unilinear direction political outcomes. Rather, Cox
maintains that historical comparisons of different modes of social relations of production elucidate
how new productive processes generate social forces and power relations and how these forces shape –
and are shaped by – particular forms of state and world orders.437

Specific to forms of state and its relationship to social forces of production, I return to the relational
ontology introduced above and develop further several components of Gramscian theory. Cox
describes the state in terms of state-society complexes underwritten by historical blocs. A historic bloc
describes the configuration of social forces that serves as the foundation of a particular state form. This
is conceptualized in dialectical terms, where interacting and mutually constituted subjective (ideology,
political organization, etc.) and objective elements (physical means of production) form a complex of
social relations that is expressed in the form and function of the state.438 By state-society complex,
Cox draws from Gramsci’s analysis of the Western capitalist state as constituted by both a coercive
435
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apparatus of government and a highly developed private sphere of civil society (“extended state”)
critical to the formation and reproduction of historic blocs and hegemony.439

In this context, civil society has within it multiple sites (education, the media, religious institutions,
etc.) where ideological frames of common culture are formed that produce a base level of cohesion
and stability among the multiple and often contradictory elements of a historic bloc. Intellectuals tied
to the dominant class (“organic intellectuals”) also play a prominent role in the production of
hegemony in civil society as they “perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental
images, technologies, and organizations that bind together the members of a class and of a historic
bloc into a common identity.”440 Under conditions of hegemony, we can expect that ideology, power
relations, and prominent institutions are not perceived as representing the interests of a particular class
and as such promote “buy in” from subordinate groups. This dynamic will serve to reproduce cohesive
rule and reduce challenges that undermine structures of power and interests of the leading class.441

If hegemony is established at the national level, Cox contends that this can also expand and operate
upward and outward to the global level. Based on analysis of the past two centuries, this involves
several components: (1) an emergence of a preeminent state power and its historic bloc that facilitates
the expansion of a new social relations of production and the interests of its leading class on a world
scale; (2) construction of a world order that is universal in conception and; (3) opportunities for
hegemony to operate in globally formed expressions of civil society that support the dominant mode of

439

Gramsci defines the state follows: “For it should be noted that the general notion of state includes elements which need
to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that state=political society + civil society,
in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion).” See Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks,
pp.262-263.
440
Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Methods,” p.168.
441
Ibid.

168

production and historic bloc.442 As summarized by Cox, world hegemony is best conceptualized as “a
social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure….expressed in universal norms,
institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces
in civil society that act across national boundaries-rules that support the dominant mode of
production.”443

While hegemonic periods lower coercive rule and increase stability, they are never uncontested or
permanent in character. Shifts in productive relations and subsequent state-society complexes, a
breakdown of class coalition formation in a historic bloc, or counter-hegemonic social and political
movements can undermine hegemony in historical structures. Non-hegemonic world orders are
characterized by a lack of ideological cohesiveness, increased conflict, and more overt use of coercive
force by powerful entities. In the capitalist era, Cox identifies the “era of rival imperialisms” (18731945) and the current period of globalization (1965-present) as non-hegemonic in character. This
stands in contrast to the hegemonic world orders of mid-19th century pax Britannica and the post-WW
II US led Bretton Woods era (1945-1965).444

Tracing the Historical Structural Foundations of the IMF
Application of the historical structure method to the study of post Washington Consensus IMF reform
involves historical comparisons of power relations and social structures that led to the formation of the
institution in 1945 and how the nature of these forces and the Fund have changed over time. In this
section, I first summarize prominent dynamics of the 19th century pax Britannica and the subsequent
era of “rival imperialisms” to establish context for the formation of the IMF and roles it played in the
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reproduction of post-World War II historical structures. Specific attention is focused on the rise of a
Fordist historic bloc in the United States during the first half of the 20th century and how this
development provided the foundation for the post-World War II hegemonic era of pax Americana
supported by multilateral institutions, including the IMF. This provides the necessary context and a
comparative anchor to evaluate current hypotheses that IMF LIC reforms in the post-Washington
Consensus signal a broader attempt by a dominant transnational historic bloc to rebuild global
hegemony around an inclusive neoliberal model.

Cox’s point of departure in his study of modern world orders focuses on the first industrial revolution
and the emergence of capitalist social relations in Great Britain in the late 18th century and early 19th
century. With the rise of capitalist social relations in Britain, the ascendant bourgeoisie successfully
used state power to replace feudal and mercantilist practices (e.g., protectionist measures, guild
mandated regulation of production, state granted monopolies and corporations) with laws that
promoted conditions for free markets. By the mid-19th century, the formation of a hegemonic historic
bloc and liberal state form in Britain served as the foundation for an outward expansion and expression
of liberal hegemony at the global level.445 The liberal hegemonic world order of pax Britannica was
supplanted by a non-hegemonic and conflictual period described by Cox as the “era of rival
imperialisms” (1875-1945). Challenges to British power from the rise of Germany and the United
States in later half of the 19th century and sustained periods of economic crises across Europe and
North America from the 1870s to the outbreak of World War I catalyzed competitive imperial
445
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expansion across Africa and Asia. The political and economic fallout of World War I undermined any
remaining vestiges of the liberal global economy of the mid-19th century. Following multiple attempts
to revise the international gold standard in the 1920s, the project was abandoned in 1931. Competitive
“beggar they neighbor” currency devaluations to correct balance of payment deficits and stimulate
demand combined with a sharp rise of protectionism spurred by the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930
soon followed. Protectionism and the effects of the Great Depression produced severe drops in global
trade and economic outputs that further reinforced the international turmoil and competition leading up
to WW II.

A shift away from liberal hegemony and the liberal state form also coincided with radical shifts in
productive relations in the late 19th and early 20th century. The replacement of small-scale capitalism
with assembly line factory models of production transformed the nature of work, social relations, and
historical structures. Most notable in this respect was the emergence of scientific management
(“Taylorism”) of mass-based industrial production initially developed in the United States in late 19th
century. In this model, the pacing and control of production was removed from skilled workers and
replaced with an assembly line model of fragmented, highly specialized tasks performed by low
skilled labor.446 The introduction and eventual consolidation of mass-based production and
consumption was underwritten by new social structures, ideology, and practices initially described by
Gramsci as “Fordism.”447
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Gramsci maintained that this production regime was successfully implemented and reproduced in the
United States through a combination of coercive and persuasive tactics.448 Leading industrialists of the
early 20th century including Henry Ford, for example, employed direct coercive means to undermine
unionization yet paid high wages, offered company-based pensions and insurance, and supported an
expansion of the state’s role in protecting worker well-being.449 Rupert, in his study of early 20th
century U.S. state-society relations, also highlights the critical ideological and cultural dimensions that
helped create and sustain Fordism. These included a reframing of “the American way” as consistent
with the values of employer-employee partnership, industrial and labor efficiency,450 and mass
consumption.451 Moreover, a focus on maximizing productivity was framed in universalistic terms.
Moving beyond just the American reality, all of humankind was to benefit from the productivity and
prosperity of the U.S. capitalist model.452

Despite such lofty aspirations, the implementation and reproduction of Fordism was not without
significant struggle. Through multiple waves of confrontation between a growing trade union
movement and powerful American industrialists in the 1920s and 1930s, Fordism evolved to include a
critical dynamic of class compromise expressed in the policies and ideology of FDR’s New Deal.453
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Here, a welfare state committed to full employment policies was complemented by moderate unionism
supportive in principal to capitalism and loyal to the U.S. government and its policy objectives.454 As
discussed further below, the formation of this hegemonic historic bloc and the productive forces
unleashed by Fordism was an integral component of the post-World War II world order of pax
Americana managed in part by the IMF.

The social relations and state forms born from the assembly line factory model manifested itself
differently in Europe than the United States with important ramifications for the trajectory of postWorld War II historical structures and multilateralism. The highly productive model that emerged in
the United States was not hampered by what Gramsci described as the historical hangover of
“parasitic” classes and social forces in Europe.455 While European industrialists attempted to emulate
U.S. factory methods, pushback from powerful non-productive classes undermined full
implementation of Taylorism. This shaped state/society relations in two major areas. First, states in
Europe became more active intermediaries in the industrialization process as they attempted to balance
the interests of large scale industrial capital supportive of “scientific” production methods and reinter
classes who stood in opposition. Lower productivity and powerful non-productive classes in Europe
also undermined attempts to reproduce the high wage, mass consumption strategy of Fordism that
helped moderate the American union movement. Managing the class antagonisms and demands of
industrialists, non-productive classes, and a radicalized workers movement in Europe, was manifested
in what Cox describes as a corporatist “welfare-nationalist” state form. Invoking nationalist and
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militaristic sentiment, these state forms championed protectionism, selectively integrated demands of
capital through government managed industrialization, and undermined more radical elements of labor
through expansion of welfare provisions. This state form was reinforced by World War I and World
War II as governments played an integral role in planning and implementing national strategies of
industrial production for war efforts. This translated into strong support of tripartite corporatist models
involving government-business-labor coalitions.456
The IMF as a Mechanism of Hegemony in the Bretton Woods era
The outward expression of U.S. based Fordist hegemony to an international scale represented the
major force that reshaped the post-World War II global order. In this section, I outline the major
dynamics of this process with emphasis on the relationship between an ascendant internationalistFordist historic bloc, the transformation of the nationalist welfare state to a liberal-Keynesian state
form,457 and how the formation and early IMF played a central role in these efforts. Building on this
foundation, I then discuss how neo-Gramscians focused on the Fund theorize its modern role in a
contemporary non-hegemonic world order characterized by a transnational restructuring of capitalism,
the formation of a globalist historic bloc, and the emergence of the transnational state form.

Neo-Gramscian interpretations of pax Americana maintain that this hegemonic world order had its
roots in the restructuring of U.S. state-society relations during the Depression years around the Fordist
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“politics of productivity.”458 Here, the New Deal consensus that emerged in the interwar years and
World War II was reinforced by a broad-based belief that American industrial capitalism, stripped of
its most abusive characteristic by a moderate labor movement, had proven superior in productive
capacity both to totalitarian models (e.g., fascism, communism) and capitalist European states. High
growth rates through capital-labor consensus, in turn, had produced the social stability and conditions
in the U.S. for liberal democracy and individual freedom to flourish.459 This understanding thus
equated problems in politics with inefficiencies in production that could be overcome by conditions
that maximized economic growth.460 The formation of interclass coalitions focused on growth, rather
than a focus on redistribution or restructuring of social productive relations through class-based
political action, thus became a central tenet for those championing the American capitalist model. As
with the formation of Fordist hegemony in the U.S. in the interwar period, the internationalization of
Fordism also was articulated as serving a higher universal purpose. As noted by Stephen Gill, its
“ideological banners included the concepts of liberty, modernity, affluence, welfare and the ‘end of
ideology,’ fused into a concept of ‘the West’ and an anti-communist alliance.”461
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For the U.S., reconstruction of the post-World War II order along peaceful, prosperous, and noncommunist lines thus required at baseline a commitment from its allies to maximize economic
productivity and growth through adoption of the Fordist model. An additional critical dynamic that
emerged in the U.S. in the interwar period and World War II was the ascendance of an international
Fordist historic bloc. This coalition of liberal minded government officials, internationally oriented
industrialists and financiers, and the leadership of major industrial unions found common ground in
the notion that productivity and subsequent American interests were undermined by the wide-spread
protectionism of the interwar years.462 For this historical bloc, a post-World War II order could only
serve American and universal interests if Fordism was combined with an open global economy.

The state form created in the reconstruction of capitalist Europe through the Marshall Plan reflected
the vision of the international-Fordist historic bloc. This included the adoption of American business
and labor management practices, support and integration of a moderate union movement and centrist
political parties, and a commitment to free trade through participation in the nascent Organization for
European Economic Cooperation.463 As highlighted by Cox, the state form that emerged in the late
1940s in capitalist societies also had to manage three established components of the welfare-nationalist
state from the previous era at odds with liberal economic ideology. First, states were now active
managers of the economy through corporatist arrangements and Keynesian demand management.
Second, states selectively intervened to protect vulnerable social groups from market forces. And
third, as a component of a half century of state economic management, capital investment was
462
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concentrated in a powerful oligopolistic sector more open to world markets that coexisted with
domestically oriented and smaller competitive sectors of small businesses and the state sector.464
With the support of the oligopolistic sector, capitalist states passed laws and supported the creation of
institutions including the IMF to facilitate integration into an open world economy. However, these
states also had to balance the demands of domestic groups who often were the short term losers in the
transition away from more generous welfare state policies and protectionism. This tension manifested
itself in the dynamic of “embedded liberalism” discussed in Chapter 2. Transitional and selective
exceptions to liberalization were granted to cushion particular domestic sectors while the national
economies as a whole were restructured to integrate into an open world market.465

It is within this context of the internationalization of Fordism, the rise of an international Fordist
historic bloc, and the emergence of a post WW II liberal-Keynesian welfare state form that historical
structuralists analyze the early IMF. As outlined in chapter 2, the Fund had clear policy objectives
when formed in 1945. It promoted global trade stability and liberalization through the implementation
and management of a flexible gold standard and provision of conditional short term lending for states
with balance of payments deficits.466 Historical structural understandings of the IMF add several more
layers to this analysis. The IMF at its inception reflected in large part the interests and belief system of
the U.S. led international historic bloc. This bloc stood increasingly at odds with more left leaning
proponents of Keynesian state capitalist models that prioritized full employment policies and
protectionism over open market policies.467 Member states with balance of payment deficits that
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borrowed from the IMF, for instance, were disincentivized from pursuing full employment policies
due to loan conditionality that prioritized currency stability and a return to payments equilibrium.

Fund policy concurrently reflected the tensions found in emerging liberal-Keynesian welfare state
forms between forces that lobbied for a maximization of liberalization and the historical hangover of
class compromise forged in the interwar years. While the IMF prioritized a commitment to balance of
payment equilibrium over full employment, its conditional lending program allowed for a softer
landing of internal adjustment than was seen during the 19th century classic gold standard.468 In
addition, the IMF’s support of capital controls during the Bretton Woods era allowed individual states
to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policy decisions. This gave national politicians room to
appease domestic constituents who had grown accustomed to the full-employment policies of the
interwar years. During pax Americana, the Fund also did not push industrialized states to abandon
corporatist arrangements or mixed market economies. These policies facilitated the popular buy in to
the new hegemonic project of international Fordism in advanced capitalist states.

The policy choices advocated by IMF in regard to LICs during the Bretton Woods era also can be
traced to the social forces and contradictory elements of international-Fordist hegemony. As
introduced in chapter 2, much of the developing world during this time embraced ISI policies. While
Fund policy makers were opposed to the heavy state intervention and protectionism of ISI, IMF
conditionality requirements for poor states did not require internal structural reforms to liberalize their
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economies during this time period. Fund policy therefore reflected a position of compromise between
the policy objectives and ideology of a U.S. led international historic bloc and elites in ISI states. For
the former, tepid support of state capitalist – but anti-communist regimes – was a necessary
compromise given the realities of Cold War politics. The integral role of generally anti-communist
unions in the corporatist model of ISI also was congruent with the model of Fordist class coalitions
seen in wealthy capitalist states. Rather than force structural reforms to dismantle ISI through the
leverage of conditionality requirement as was done in the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF instead pushed its
anti-statist agenda through technical assistance programs such as the IMF Institute. Cox argues that
this less coercive dynamic of winning hearts and minds of elites in peripheral states to reflect the
interests and belief systems of dominant social and economic forces is a critical component of how
international organizations, including the Fund, reproduce hegemony.469
The IMF, Globalization, and the Politics of Supremacy
If the IMF played a central role in – and was reflective of – the formation and reproduction of a
hegemonic world order during the Bretton Woods era, neo-Gramscians maintain that the Fund also
played a critical role in the shift away from U.S. led international Fordism starting in the late 1960s.
Here, historical structural analysis of the contemporary world order and its relationship to the IMF and
its LIC policy choices focuses on four interrelated themes: the introduction and acceleration of
globalized production following the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s; the rise of an American led
globalist historic bloc dominated by an emerging transnational capitalist class unable to secure global
hegemony; a restructuring of the liberal-Keynesian welfare state form to a transnational, neoliberal
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state form; and counter-tendencies that have emerged that challenge what Stephen Gill describes as the
“politics of supremacy” employed by the globalist historic bloc.470 I develop these themes below.

For two decades following WW II, the Fordist model produced historically unprecedented rates of
growth, labor productivity, low unemployment, increased living standards, and redistribution in
developed capitalist economies.471 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fordism and the hegemonic
Bretton Woods order began to falter. Drops in productivity and consumption in wealthy capitalist
states, combined with the spikes in oil prices due to Middle East conflict, produced both high
unemployment and inflation. Profit rates also fell sharply through the 1970s, as did exchange rate
stability when the Bretton Woods modified gold standard was abandoned in 1973.472 Marxist and
neoGramscian scholars point to this “crisis of capitalism” as the catalyst that sparked a new epoch
characterized by a movement away from nationally organized capitalism and Keynesian state forms
toward a world characterized by the emergence of globalized capitalist production and transnational,
neoliberal state-forms.473

A key variable in the restructuring of capitalism and state forms is the emergence of what Robinson,
Kees van der Pijl, and Leslie Sklair describe as the “transnational capitalist class” (the TCC).474 The
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TCC, made up of the owners and managers of transnational corporations and transnational financial
institutions, has become the “owners of the major productive resources of the world” and as such
“imposes the general direction of production worldwide and conditions the social, political, and
cultural characteristics of capitalist society worldwide.”475 The TCC also serves as the dominant class
in an emerging globalist historical bloc described by Robinson as follows:
At the center of the globalist bloc is the TCC…and also includes the elites and bureaucratic
staffs of the supranational organizations agencies such as the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the WTO. The historic bloc also brings together major forces in the
dominant political parties, media conglomerates, and technocratic elites and state managers
in both North and South, along with select organic intellectual and charismatic figures who
provide ideological legitimacy and technical solutions…Below this transnational elite is a
small, shrinking layer of middle classes who exercise very little real power but who,
pacified by mass consumption, form a fragile buffer between the transnational elite and the
world’s poor majority.476

Since the 1970s, this bloc has supported a two dimensional strategy to restructure social and economic
systems to support global capitalist production. The first dimension involves worldwide market
liberalization and the formation of legal and regulatory structures to support globalized production and
trade (e.g., the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995). The second involves the internal
restructuring and integration of national economies into the liberalized global economy.477 As
documented by multiple studies of the IMF and World Bank, the Bretton Woods institutions were
central players in this process in LICs, particularly after the 1982 Mexican debt crisis.478 Robinson, for
example, highlights that the IMF and World Bank implemented over 566 structural adjustment
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programs in over seventy countries from 1979-1992 focused primarily on dismantling state heavy and
protectionist strategies of ISI.479

The restructuring of the national economies through the efforts of the IMF, World Bank, and other
members of the globalist bloc also is interrelated to the “transnationalization” and “neoliberalization”
of state forms. In comparison to the state form of pax Americana, the most critical difference in
contemporary state-society relations is the marginalization of organized labor. As noted above, class
compromise forged in capitalist states in the mid-20th century served to constrain both emerging
factions of globalizing capital and nationally based capital in the Bretton Woods era. In the postBretton Woods period, the mobility of capital and concentrated efforts of the globalist bloc to
undermine unions and Keynesian welfare state policies has drastically reduced the bargaining position
of labor.480 As articulated by Robinson, “In the new capital-labor relation, labor is increasingly only a
naked commodity, no longer embedded in relations of reciprocity rooted in social and political
communities that have historically institutionalized in nation-states.”481 In both industrial societies and
LICs, this has translated in part to sharp reductions of unionization levels, and subsequent increases in
flexible labor markets, subcontracting, outsourcing, part-time and temp work, and informal economic
activities.482

Gill and Robinson contend that this more adversarial relationship between labor and capital is one
example of a broader theme of the “politics of supremacy” that has marked the post-Bretton Woods
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historical structure and actions of the globalist historic bloc. Supremacy in this context refers to “rule
by a non-hegemonic bloc of forces” that exercise dominance over other groups.483 Multiple factors in
the contemporary era facilitate supremacy over hegemony. These include the socially destabilizing
effects of inherent contradictions found in capitalism (e.g., overproduction and under consumption,
polarization of wealth) that are exacerbated by the increased scale of globalized production and the
elimination of Keynesian welfare and ISI state forms.484 In addition, the globalization of production
produces tension between the ascendant transnational and weakening nationally based capital.
Workers tied to transnational capital will not share the same interests and policy positions (e.g.,
rejection of protectionism) as those tied to nationally based companies.485

The globalist bloc has also failed to produce and sustain a universal and unified social vision to
ideologically legitimate its dominant position and policy reforms. This is not due to lack of effort.
Most salient in this regard is the influence of discourses surrounding globalization employed by the
globalist bloc. Starting in the 1980s and becoming most pronounced after the collapse of communism
and the economic boom of the 1990s, liberal market globalization was articulated as the inevitable and
best option to maximize economic well-being, individual freedom, and democratic rule. Manfred
Steger, in his study of the ideology of the globalist bloc, describes this framing of globalization in
liberal market terms as “globalism”:
…globalism…endows the concept of globalization with market-oriented norms, values, and
meaning. The only viable public policy, so this dominant story of globalization goes, is one
supportive of economic deregulation, privatization, free trade, unfettered capital movement,
low taxation, and fiscal austerity, especially with regard to social programs.486
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Specific to the IMF, its implementation of SAF and ESAF lending served as a primary vector to
reinforce this ideological framework of globalism in the 1980s and 1990s in LICs. As with the framing
of Fordism, the implementation of new policy direction was presented in universal terms. Liberal
market restructuring and the elimination of ISI, despite the fact it prioritized the interests of local elites
tied to transnational capital, was to benefit the population at large in the new global era.487

By the early 1990s, several factors undermined the globalist vision in LICs and broader prospects of a
hegemonic world order. The success of the Asian miracle, built around state centered export-led
industrialization, appeared to contradict the liberal market positions pushed by the Fund and Bank.
Low and negative growth rates in LICs that had implemented SAPs also increased internal and
external criticism of Washington Consensus programs and policy directives. As documented in chapter
3, protest movements and NGOs also began to more forcefully challenge the liberal market
restructuring of state-society relations and did so through presenting alternative conceptions of
globalization. Specific to the IMF and LICs, the reaction to these challenges was primarily a defensive
posture in the late 1980s through the mid-1990s. Rather than address the concerns of policy insiders
and NGO critics, the Fund and World Bank rolled out a new program focused on “good governance.”

Proponents of good governance within the Fund argued that the primary variables responsible for poor
growth outcomes in LICs that had entered into SAPs were corruption and/or poor government
institutions. Structural adjustment was not to be abandoned, but rather deepened through accelerated
privatization efforts in conjunction with conditionality requirements that focused on restructuring
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government institutions in ways that would reduce potentials for rent-seeking and corruption.488 This
position was captured in the Fund’s 1997 overview of its role in governance issues, where the staff
was advised to highlight how corruption and rent-seeking could sabotage the benefits derived from
privatization:
The potential risk that poor governance could adversely affect private market confidence
and, in turn, reduce private capital inflows and investment…should also be brought to the
attention of the authorities. IMF policy advice should …be based on the broadly agreed
best international practices of economic management and on the principles of transparency,
simplicity, accountability, and fairness.489

NeoGramcians argue this linkage of governance issues to structural adjustment served to strengthen
the hand of elites in LICs who pushed highly unpopular privatization policies in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.490

Fallout of these policy decisions included a dramatic increase in social upheaval in much of the global
South during the Washington Consensus period. Along with pockets of violent resistance (e.g. the
Zapatista movement) to policies of trade liberalization, over 146 austerity protests against IMF and
World Bank restructuring were documented in LICs between 1976 and 1992.491 Incidents of protest
and social movement mobilization continued through the 1990s. In Latin America and the Caribbean,
for example, 281 protest campaigns and 961 protest events targeting various aspects of liberalization
and privatization policies occurred between 1995-2001.492 Various campaigns focused around the fifty
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year anniversary of the IMF and Bank in 1994 also highlighted the lack of broad based ideological buy
in and consensus around the benefits of the globalist model.493

NeoGramscians also highlight the central role of the U.S. in reinforcing a global governance
framework that facilitated the interests of the globalist bloc, but reinforced this process primarily
through non-consensual means. Gill, for example, argues that U.S. pressure was central in Fund and
other multilateral institutional efforts to restructure global governance and country specific reforms in
a manner that attempted “to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic
capitalism, the sole model for future development.”494 Gill describes the governance strategy pushed
by U.S. led globalist bloc as “new constitutionalism.” Under new constitutionalism, governments
were pressured to limit the input or influence of politicians and citizens on fiscal, monetary, trade, and
investment policy. This was manifested in a move toward central bank independence in many LICs
and laws to forcefully protect private property rights and free trade. Managing Director Camdessus, in
a 1995 speech on the theme of globalization and the IMF, reiterated these themes as follows:
First and foremost, countries must maintain sound domestic macroeconomic policies that
will attract and retain the market’s confidence. In particular, policymakers must recognize
that the scope for countries to depart from traditional macroeconomic discipline is now
sharply reduced…Trade liberalization, privatization, and the establishment of transparent
regulatory systems…help create an environment in which capital inflows can be more
readily used for long-term productive investment…At the same time, it is critically
important to establish solid domestic institutions – especially independent central banks and
strong domestic banking systems – that can accommodate tighter fiscal and monetary
495
conditions as the need arises.
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Along with support of good governance and “traditional market discipline,” the new era of
globalization also required that the Fund increase its surveillance role in member states.496 As outlined
by Camdessus, in order to avert the cascading effects of economic and financial crisis, the IMF has
developed a relationship with LICs that was “…more continuous, intensive, and probing.”497

In sum, a historical structural understanding of the IMF in the Washington Consensus period
highlights how a reconfiguration of social forces and state-society relations by a globalist bloc tied to
transnational capital shifted the role of Fund in relation to LICs. Rather than reinforce a hegemonic
world order underwritten by Fordist class compromise and U.S. consensual leadership as seen in the
Bretton Woods era, IMF LIC policy in the last three decades of the 20th century reflected the interests
and actions of an emerging globalist bloc unable to secure hegemony. As such, the social and
economic restructuring of LICs to support globalizing capital were implemented generally through
disciplinary measures. Specific to the IMF, this included conditionality requirements focused on
dismantling remnants of ISI in SAF and ESAF concessional lending agreements. Not surprisingly, this
approach failed to garner broad based support from a variety of sectors in LICs, including elites tied to
national capital and urban working and middle classes who had previously benefited from the ISI
model.498 If the globalist bloc was unable to secure hegemony by the mid-1990s, the growing number
and militancy of protest movements focused on the policies of the IMF, World Bank, and the newly
496

Themes of surveillance and ‘new constitutionalism” in LICs was also reinforced by the Uruguay Round of the GATT
(lasting from 1986-1994) and the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. Three trade agreements were formed
during the Uruguay Round that moved multilateral trade policy beyond a focus only on manufactured and agricultural
goods. These included the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures (TRIMs). The
GATS, TRIPs, and TRIMs were incorporated into the newly formed WTO along with the controversial Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). A state can lodge a formal grievance to the DSB if they believe another member state has violated its rights
under WTO agreements.
497
Camdessus, “The International Monetary Fund and the Challenges of Globalization,” p.6.
498
Resistance also occurred in the industrialized world. Rupert, for example, documents various progressive and
reactionary responses to the implementation of NAFTA in the early 1990s. See Mark Rupert, Ideologies of Globalization:
Contending visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge, 2000).

187

formed World Trade Organization in the late 1990s further undermined attempts to form a consensual
global political order.

Internal dissent among policy elites in regard to the wisdom of the Washington Consensus also
increased following the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. By the turn of the century, prominent economists,
including Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Krugman, and Jagdish Bhagwati, called for alternatives
to the development and trade strategies pushed by the U.S. and the IMF.499 Powerful institutional
leaders, including World Bank president James Wolfensohn, United Nation’s General Secretary Kofi
Annan, and World Economic Forum (WEF) Executive Director Klaus Schwab, lobbied for a
rethinking of development and trade strategies, often invoking the theme of “globalization with a
human face.”500 Critiques of the IMF following the Asian crisis also came from conservative voices,
particularly within the United States. In return for support of Clinton administration funding requests
for the IMF in 1998, the Republican controlled Congress created the Financial Institution Advisory
Commission (known more commonly as the “Meltzer Commission”) to review the IMF and other
multilateral institutions. The Meltzer Commission highlighted multiple IMF policy failures in LICs
and called for a drastically reduced role for the institution in structural adjustment lending.501
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For Gramscian scholars focused on this time period, the growing criticism of globalist orthodoxy
from below and internal division among elites signaled a prominent shift in the nature of the
contemporary historical structure and world order. Robinson, for example, argued that the “clamor for
reform from the top down” signified “a crisis of confidence in the global capitalist system within the
ranks of the transnational elite and a willingness among the more politically astute to promote a ‘post
Washington Consensus’ project reform to save the system itself.”502 Rupert highlights a similar loss of
confidence and consensus among globalist bloc elites that emerged in the late 1990s.503 Even U.S.
president Bill Clinton, perhaps the most ardent cheerleader for neoliberal reform throughout the 1990s,
now argued that these same policies bore some responsibility for undermining working class support
of free trade and globalizing capitalism.504
Toward a new hegemony? IMF LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus.
The turmoil and crisis seen within the globalist bloc in the late 1990s and early 2000s serves as the
contextual foundation for neoGramscian explanations of post Washington Consensus policy change.
As introduced in chapter 1, Robinson and Rückert maintain that post Washington Consensus reforms
are a form of “inclusive neoliberalism” ultimately designed to undermine growing resistance and
challenges to the globalist bloc and the broader project of globalizing capitalism. Specific to the IMF,
reforms including debt relief through the HIPC and HIPC II initiatives, “pro-poor” lending through
introduction of the PRGF, “participatory” development strategies with the introduction of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and Keynesian-inspired policies of the ECF/RCF/SCF are
explained as attempts by the globalist bloc to “attenuate some of the sharpest social contradictions of
502
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global capitalism” in the interests of assuring “long term stability and reproduction” of the current
historical structure.505 In this section, I assess and build on this interpretation of IMF LIC reforms in
the post Washington Consensus as follows. I first briefly outline the concept of “inclusive
neoliberalism” as initially developed by David Craig and Doug Porter and applied by contemporary
neoGramsians to their understanding of contemporary multilateral policy reforms. I then examine if
and how post Washington Consensus IMF LIC policy changes were reflective of discord within the
globalist bloc. I focus specifically on if there is evidence to support the notion that the impetus for
these reforms is rooted in broader attempts by the globalist historic bloc to build a new hegemonic
order reinforced by a more inclusive form of capitalism and development.

Gramscian explanations of post-Washington Consensus Fund policy reforms maintain that these
policy shifts are rooted in a new inclusive form of capitalism that has emerged within the globalist
bloc. As outlined by Craig and Porter, the inclusive liberal market model is rooted in the belief that the
pursuit of free markets and social goals are not only mutually compatible, but also produce a positive
feedback loop of improved development outcomes.506 Within the IMF ( and World Bank), this has
translated into the “participatory” and “pro-poor” reforms that emerged in the late 1990s that focused
on the interdependence of the economic growth, reduced poverty, and increased social empowerment
and inclusion.507 As outlined in the Fund’s current guidelines for LIC policy, for example, poverty
reduction strategies “should be…country-driven, promoting national ownership of strategies through
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broad-based participation of civil society; …partnership-oriented, involving coordinated participation
of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors); and based on a
long-term perspective for poverty reduction.”508

Craig and Porter maintain that explanations for a move away from the strict model of market
liberalization to a more inclusive variant is clarified through comparison of early 21st century
dynamics to those seen in episodes of 19th and 20th century capitalist development. They argue that
prior to the current era of globalizing capitalism, trends followed roughly Karl Polanyi’s concept of
“double movement” in market-society relations.509 The first movement of market liberalization and
state-society restructuring to support capitalist development was supported by an ideological
framework that separated economics from politics and replaced traditional and local social regulation
with the ‘laws’ of market-based relations. The second movement, social regulation and government
policies that moderate the effects of market forces, followed soon thereafter as was seen in the
emergence of Keynesian welfare states, ISI state models, or more nefariously expressed in state
capitalist models of fascist regimes.510

For Craig and Porter, the post Washington Consensus period differs from previous eras in that policies
of inclusive neoliberalism appear to pre-emptively undermine the possibility of the second movement
in LICs:
Comparison with Polanyi’s account leads to the conclusion that Poverty Reduction and
Social Inclusion are in fact an attempt to secure and embed liberal reforms in the social
order…but one that is being actively managed from the top down, drawing potential
adversaries into managed dialogues and partnerships… [and acts as]…a kind of pre508
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emptive, strategic inoculation against a more broadly and socially contested double
movement, the kind of double movement arguably most feared by the agents of a wider
liberal project.511

Rückert argues that a key dynamic in this “strategic inoculation” against more statist or redistributive
centred reactions to the Washington Consensus period is the role that the Bretton Woods institutions
currently play in absorbing radical challenges to a market driven development paradigm. Two primary
mechanisms are identified. First, incorporation of LIC elites into decision-making processes around
poverty reduction strategies and policy choices tied to lending arrangements undermines potential
challenges to the globalist model. Increased dialogue with civil society over the last decade also
absorbs “counterhegemonic ideas and concepts to make it seem as though the concerns of critics are
being heard and taken seriously.”512

Internal IMF documents over the past decade and interviews with various IMF LIC staff demonstrate
that the institution was aware of growing resentment and push back by the late 1990s. Fund staff, for
example, specifically recognized and articulated the need to secure ‘buy in’ from various constituents
in LICs as seen in a 2001 staff paper titled “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs”:
Ownership matters because it directly affects program implementation…When the program
is owned by the country, decisions on such action are likely to be made quickly and in
support of the program, which makes is more likely that the program will succeed.
Furthermore, ownership will make it easier to generate domestic political support for the
program, since it is likely to be seen, as an indigenous product, rather than a foreign

imposition.513
In 2003, the IMF prepared an internal “Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organizations”
that reiterated similar themes. The rationale for engaging with civil society concluded that “Active
civil society involvement with global institutions like the IMF is not only an inescapable fact of life in
511
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21st century politics, but there are also significant reasons for the Fund to welcome and nurture these
relationships.” These reasons included dispelling “public misconceptions regarding the Fund and its
activities,” increasing “support for Fund backed measures,” and deepening “ownership of the policies
that the Fund advances.”514

LIC staff interviewed also highlighted a shift toward a more consensual approach with LIC authorities
following the turmoil of the late 1990s and early 2000s:
One area where there has been a sea-change in the last ten to fifteen years is that we are
turning more and more to the countries and saying, “What’s your plan?, What do you
think? How can we help you do this?” rather than “This is the answer, the Washington
Consensus, here is the recipe.”515
We noticed with the debt campaigns in the late 1990s how important it was that certain
topics be discussed in the public domain and that we take into account what people are
thinking about these things and listen carefully to what they say.516
Structural adjustment had gotten a very bad name over the ten years from 1986, particularly
within the recipient countries. I think it is still debatable whether that was a cover for their
own failings, but structural adjustment certainly coincided with a time that really was very
hard for low income countries. It is natural that people would say that it was the IMF’s
fault. You still hear that a lot in Ghana and Nigeria as they went through very difficult
periods. So our changes reflected at some level the pressure from the African countries on
our policy who said we couldn’t go on like this, that we had to rethink how you do
business.517

A move toward a more consensual approach is noted by several LIC country authorities, including
the former Permanent Secretary of Tanzania’s Minister of Finance, who noted a shift in the Fund’s
“willingness to listen” following the Asian crisis.518The notion that the Fund was sensitive to public
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perception and the need to build legitimacy at the turn of the century is further supported by evidence
from a series of Executive Board evaluations of its external communications strategy. These studies,
undertaken in 1998, 2000, and 2003, included in-depth analysis of the number and slant of media
reports on the IMF and also undertook surveys to gauge public opinion.519 The 2003 report concluded
that in regard to its public perception, “the challenge the Fund faces is long-standing and deep rooted”
and “that its public image continues to be slightly less favourable than the World Bank, and both trail
the United Nations in polls of elites and the general public.”520 The report also noted that despite
current low favourability ratings, the IMF was now seen as a less secretive institution and “should
seize on this opportunity to build on this opportunity through a continuous, well-coordinated
communications effort aimed at improving understanding of and support for the Fund and its
activities.”521

Field studies that evaluate the engagement of the Fund with civil society actors in African LICs
undertaken by Jan Aart Scholte also support the notion that the IMF actively worked to increase
consensus building in the 2005-2010 time period.522 Since 2006, the IMF and Bank have sponsored
up to forty civil society actors from LICs to participate in each round of the Annual and Spring
Meetings. In 2007, the Fund also created a “civil society liaison” position within its external relations
department focused specifically on relations with LICs. And in 2010, a new Regional Advisory Group
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for Sub-Saharan Africa was formed that includes three civil society representatives among its twelve
members.523

Fund Documents and staff responses also point to the fallout of the 2008 crisis as deepening the
participatory, consensual approach to IMF LIC policy implementation. LIC staff highlight the March
2009 Tanzania conference organized by Strauss Kahn as a key moment in this process. As articulated
by a senior LIC staff member of the African Department, while the direction of LIC policy didn’t
radically change due to the Tanzania conference, the interactions with LICs policy makers shifted
considerably:
Another watershed moment was the Tanzania Conference where Strauss Kahn said, “Look,
I want to speak for you at the G-20, but you need to tell me what you want me to say for
you.” It can sound a bit patronizing, but it wasn’t seen that way. The point of this was that
now it was our turn to listen to the LICs. The very fact of the way he said it and the way he
held that conference, it didn’t change fundamentally the advice we were giving or the
economic framework we had on our mind, but it changed the way policy makers would
approach and talk to us, and assert themselves. The Tanzania Conference, on one hand, can
be seen as a bunch of fluff because the intellectual ideas bantered about were not new, but
it was the idea that this is your institution that has to be responsible to your [LIC] needs. So
tell us, talk to us about what you want.524

Along with a concerted effort to build a more consensual framework of market-driven development in
the past fifteen years, the Fund also revamped the form in which LIC conditionality requirements are
implemented and monitored following the 2008 crisis. Since the introduction of the SAF in 1986, the
Fund employed highly specific “structural performance criteria” to assess if countries borrowing from
the institution were on track to comply with loan conditions focused on structural reform. If a member
state failed to meet these structural performance criteria, a formal waiver approved by the EB was
needed to gain access to future release of loan resources. In May 2009, structural performance criteria
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were eliminated from IMF conditional lending and replaced by a more general review process
coordinated by the EB. The Fund describes the rationale behind this shift as follows:
In the past, the IMF has been criticized by some governments and civil society
organizations for demanding too many reforms in exchange for financial assistance….
structural performance criteria came to be seen as a key source of stigma attached to
borrowing from the IMF. The IMF is hoping that its new lending framework will overcome
the lingering mistrust that has marred its relations with some countries, particularly after
the Asian crisis in the 1990s, and that countries in need of help to overcome what has been
billed as the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression will no longer hesitate to
approach the IMF.525

According to a senior staff member in the SPR Department, the elimination of the structural
performance criteria was a calculated cost-benefit analysis focused on increasing buy in from LIC
authorities and civil society to the necessity of structural reform: “There was a feeling that
conditionality had gotten a bit out of control and it was time to trim it back. The benefit is that you will
have a program that had greater ownership by the authorities and we were willing to go down that
road.”526 IMF LIC policy reform in the post-Washington Consensus period thus is characterized by an
active consideration for consensus building and a less disciplinary framework of market driven
development.

More controversial is the claim articulated by Robinson and Rückert that post-Washington Consensus
IMF policy shifts and broader themes of inclusive liberalism are the by-products of a conscious effort
by elements of the TCC and the globalist bloc to move away from the “politics of supremacy” toward
a more consensual, hegemonic global order. As introduced above, Robinson argues that since the late
1990s, “the transnational elite had moved from the offensive to the defensive as the system began to

525

Camilla Anderson, “New Rules of Engagement for IMF Loans,” IMF Survey Online 13 April 2009, p.1 , available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/pol041309a.htm.
526
Author interview with Fund staff member from the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, Washington D.C., 20
September 2011.

196

enter a crisis of legitimacy.”527 Reforms including the HIPC, HIPCII, PRGF, and ECF/RCF/SCF thus
represent a reaction to “a crisis of confidence in the global capitalist system within the ranks of the
transnational elite and a willingness among the more politically astute to promote a “post-Washington
consensus” project of reform in order to save the system itself.”528

In the final section of chapter 6, I examine if there is evidence to support this notion through analysis
of annual meetings and policy documents of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the postWashington Consensus period. The WEF, as highlighted by Robinson, is the “comprehensive
transnational planning body of the TCC.” 529 Kees van der Pijl makes similar claims: “The most
comprehensive transnational planning body operative today, the WEF…is ….a true International of
capital, the first identifiable forum in which concepts of control are debated and if need be, adjusted,
on a world scale.”530 If Robinson’s assertions have validity, we should at a minimum witness three
tendencies within the WEF in the post-Washington Consensus period. First, recognition of various
crises that characterized this time period. Second, recognition that these crises represent a broader
threat to globalizing capitalism. And third, in response to these crises, debate and policy suggestions
designed to increase buy in from the global citizenry to the globalist political project.

I focus my analysis on WEF Annual Meetings. Held each January in Davos, Switzerland, the meetings
focus on one central theme (see figure 5.2 below) and involve approximately 2500 participants.

527

Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World, p.146.
Ibid., p.163.
529
Ibid., p.127.
530
Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations, pp.132-133.
528

197

Figure 5.2 Central Themes of World Economic Forum Annual Meetings (1999-2012)
Year

Theme

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Responsible Globality: Managing the Impact of Globalization
New Beginnings: Making a Difference
Sustaining Growth and Bridging the Divides: A Framework for Our Global Future
Leadership in Fragile Times: A Vision for a Shared Future
Building Trust
Partnering for Security and Prosperity
Taking Responsibility for Tough Choices
The Creative Imperative
Shaping the Global Agenda: The Shifting Power Equation
The Power of Collaborative Innovation
Shaping the Post-Crisis World
Improve the State of the World: Rethink, Redesign, Rebuild
Shared Norms for the New Reality
The Great Transformation: Shaping New Models

I start with the 1999 Annual Meeting focused on “Responsible Globality.” WEF documents highlight
that participants demonstrated concern in regard to fall out of the economic crises in Asia, Brazil, and
Russia, the limitations of free markets, and discussed how to reform globalization in a more inclusive
manner:
Crucial discussions were held to look at where globalization is taking us and how we can
make it a more responsible process. In the midst of the Asia crisis, after the financial
collapse in Russia, and the Brazilian crisis,… it was clear that globalization and free
markets left to themselves do not always produce the desired or necessary results for
society at large. There was wide spread agreement that although a free market system is the
best and most efficient, there are inequalities that government, in new partnerships with
other sectors of society, needs to address.531

Direct reference was also made to the IMF’s role in the Asian crisis and a need for Fund and other
multilateral institutions to “adjust their modus operandi and programmes to the new requirements
created by the global economic environment” in order to respond to the “growing backlash of large
segments of the world’s population.”532

531

World Economic Forum, World Economic Forum Annual Report 1998/1999 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 1999),
p.8.
532
Ibid.

198

These themes of crisis, backlash, and a more inclusive form of globalization dominated the discussion
a year later at the 2000 Annual Meeting. As described by a WEF summary of the event, the fallout of
the failed 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization’s meeting was a wakeup call for those in Davos who
championed globalization:
Two themes dominated the Annual Meeting in Davos this year- the Internet and Seattle.
And while opinion was fairly unanimous on the former – it’s going to change the world –
few exactly knew what to do with the latter. One and a half decades into the technological
revolution there is an increasing number of people crying “stop the world, we want to get
off.” In Seattle, the protesters may not have spoken with a clear voice that was heard above
all others. Although the 20,000 plus protesters that hijacked the agenda probably had as
many individual goals, they shared a common view that globalization has somehow turned
the planet into a commodity. It was certainly easier in Davos to forge an ideological
consensus in favor of globalization, but in the aftermath of Seattle, there also seemed little
doubt that the system needed reworking.533

Within this context of “reworking the system,” a panel led by British Prime Minister Tony Blair
focused on the difference between market economy and market society. “The market economy has
clearly won the battle. While people are happy – even eager – to live in a market economy, most do
not want to live in a market society. The challenge addressed in Davos is to ensure that society is more
than just the market.”534

A panel including U.S. President Bill Clinton and World Bank President James Wolfensohn focused
on issues of inequality and globalization. Clinton referenced the Seattle protests in his discussion,
noting “that too many people felt that had no voice in a world that is changing very rapidly.”535 He
also scolded fellow Davos participants to stop ignoring the realities of increased inequality: “Number
one, we should stop denying that there is in so many places an increase in inequality, and we should
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instead start explaining why it has happened and what we can do about it.”536 Rolf-Ernst Breuer, CoChairman of the Annual Meeting 2000 and Spokesman of the Group Board, Deutsche Bank introduced
the term “globalization trap” to describe two levels of individuals divided by income that have
emerged in the era of globalization. Wolfensohn, while recognizing global stratification, also argued
that “you have to look at other factors including the quality of economic policies being pursued by
nations, policies that foster the rule of law, a sound financial system, a strong social framework and
measures to combat corruption.”537

While a focus on acute crisis receded from 2002-2008 at Davos, the theme of reducing inequality
remained. This was complemented by heightened discussion around the eradication of extreme
poverty, particularly in Africa. At the 2005 Annual Meeting, for example, the kickoff event prioritized
poverty and equitable forms of globalization as the two primary areas in need of attention. 538 The
headline panel (including rock star Bono) focused on African poverty also was representative of
another trend seen throughout this time period. Namely, voices previously highly critical of the WEF
were now invited to participate. This also extended to relations with the NGO community. As outlined
in the WEF 2004/2005 Annual Report, “The World Economic Forum has always recognized the
importance of engaging civil society, encouraging its representatives to articulate their views to all our
events. During 2004/2005, we continued to foster strong relationships with an expanding cross section
of unions and NGOs.”539
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While the 2002-2008 period was relatively stable, fallout from the 2008 crisis was of deep concern to
WEF participants. At the 2009 Davos meeting, aptly titled “Shaping the Post Crisis World,” the
discourse of global crisis management and social backlash reemerged. WEF Executive Chairman
Klaus Schwab summarized his concerns as follows:
There is a growing consensus, among the young and the old as well as across developing
and industrializing countries that we are experiencing a transformational economic crisis-one
that is on course to fundamentally change globalization well beyond the domain of
international finance. We face a destructive social backlash that could foment political
instability, revive economic nationalism, and reverse development gains should our leaders fail
first to develop effective solutions to the current economic crisis and then fail to manage the
growing roster of global risks such as climate change, non-proliferation, and food security.”540

The theme of social unrest and protectionism was reiterated by then French Minister of Finance
Christine Lagarde: “Social unrest and protectionism are the two major risks of the world economic
crisis.”541 In the short term, the message from the 2009 Davos meeting was that a three pronged
strategy was necessary to climb out of the crisis. This included a coordinated global fiscal stimulus, a
restoration of capital flows to the developing world, and increased global financial regulation.542 In
regard to the former, “although some participants held out hope for “quantitative easing,” most agreed
coordinated fiscal stimulus in the G-20 countries is the best hope for supporting global demand.”543

Along with calls for Keynesian inspired policy response, the 2009 report also documented a more
fundamental discussion that emerged in regard to 21st century capitalism. Schwab, for instance,
argued that the crisis required that Davos participants “overhaul our institutions, our systems, and
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above all, our way of thinking.”544 Specifically, Schwab called for a rethinking of short versus long
term economic gain:
Businesses need to look deeply at their systems of remuneration and governance. Industry
leaders, policy makers and regulators…all have to consider the damage wrought by
excessive greed. In today’s highly interdependent world, the pursuit of short term gain is
not a sufficient driver of optimal decision making. The systemic and intergenerational
impact of our actions now are more important than they have been before – our ethics, as
well as our governance institutions and regulatory systems, must somehow reflect this new
reality. 545

A focus on short term greed among Davos participants was also noted within the context of public buy
in or rejection of globalizing capitalism: “In Davos, the potential for social backlash was clearly high
on the agenda as participants were discussing how to keep rising joblessness and public outrage over
perceived corporate greed from sparking a rollback of globalization. Capitalism need not be jettisoned,
they concluded, but it needs to be brought back in line with its role as tool for humanity’s
advancement.”546

Themes of reforming capitalism continued into the 2011 and 2012 Davos meeting. A synopsis of a
2011 session on “Rethinking Market Capitalism,” for example, concluded that the “Anglo-Saxon”
model of capitalism favored by multilateral institutions had fallen out of favor and inferred that a more
regulated form was preferable: “Capitalism has created lucrative returns for a few over the past few
decades, but has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Some 34 million jobs have been lost
in the last two years alone. Such trends have caused a crisis of confidence in capitalism and corporate
executives in particular… Financial institutions that relied on the Anglo-Saxon model of profit
maximization fell out of favor in many regions, while Asian banks remained largely healthy and even
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expanded their market share….Some new global regulatory structure is needed and the G-20 may be
best positioned to formulate it.”547

In sum, evidence from the Davos meetings in the past decade and a half supports Robinson’s claim
that the globalist bloc recognizes that crises of the past decade and a half threaten their interests. In
response to both the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008, members of
the TCC demonstrated concern and increased sensitivity to the fact that the status quo of liberal market
capitalism was not in the long term best interest of the globalist bloc. Specifically, themes of short
term vs. long term profit, inclusivity, poverty reduction, and reduction of inequality were framed as a
necessary response to maintain global buy in to the project of transnationalizing capitalism.
Conclusions
Historical structural analysis of post Washington Consensus IMF LIC reform explains these policy
shifts through the development of the following themes. First, the Fund is conceptualized not as a
thing, but as an expression of time-specific social forces and power relations. A focus on explaining
change at the IMF thus directs analysis toward clarifying the major tendencies and contradictions of
social forces and power relations in a particular historical structure and how the Fund is interconnected
to those tendencies. Second, world orders are broadly characterized as either hegemonic or nonhegemonic in nature. During the Bretton Woods era, the IMF played a key role and was an expression
of a hegemonic world order led by a U.S. international-Fordist bloc. From the late 1960s to the 1990s,
the IMF’s role changed with shifts in historical structure. Along with other multilateral institutions, the
Fund now helped reinforce a non-hegemonic world order characterized by the emergence and
consolidation of transnationalizing capitalism and a U.S. supported globalist historic bloc prone to
547
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exert more overt forms of coercive power. A key component of this shift in historical structure
included the dismantling of Keynesian state forms in the global North and ISI state forms in much of
global South. Specific to IMF LIC policy, this was expressed in an increased focus on structural
reform issues designed to move poor states away from the ISI model by the late 1970s. Following the
1982 crisis, the Fund more assertively pushed for liberal market economic restructuring in LICs
through use of SAF and ESAF conditional lending followed by a focus on issues of good governance
in the early 1990s.

Growing resistance to the agenda of the globalist bloc and the Washington Consensus model of
development grew throughout the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the combination of growing global protest
movements and the Asian crisis ushered in the current post Washington Consensus period. For neoGramscians including Robinson and Rückert, the post Washington Consensus is seen in broad terms
as an attempt by the globalist bloc to soften globalizing capitalism in order to secure its long term
survival. Specific to the IMF and LICs, this is expressed primarily in how policies supportive of liberal
market development are implemented. Rather than the top down, disciplinary mode of the Washington
Consensus period, there is now a focus on inclusion of LIC elites and civil society organizations into
lending arrangements through the introduction of the PRSP process. This participatory process thus is
one strategy to secure long term buy in to the globalist political project. Another “strategic
inoculation” against more radical challenges to capitalist development includes the connection of
participation with a focus on poverty reduction. As seen with the replacement of the SAF and ESAF
with the PRGF in 1999, lending to LICs now requires both participation and specific policy plans to
reduce poverty. Following the 2008 crisis, the removal of structural performance criteria also supports
the notion that the Fund has adopted a less disciplinary development model.
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Robinson and Rückert maintain that IMF post Washington Consensus reforms are tied to a broader
and conscious effort by an increasingly concerned TCC wary of potential backlash to the globalist
political project. Evidence from Davos meetings held between 1999-2012 demonstrates that members
of the WEF expressed deep concern of potential blow back from the Asian crisis and the 2008 crisis
and also saw these crises as potential threats to the contemporary world order. Recommendations to
manage globalizing capitalism that emerged from the WEF through the post Washington Consensus
period mirror those found in IMF LIC reform. For example, the general consensus coming out of
Davos following the 2008 crisis was the need for broad based and coordinated countercyclical fiscal
stimulus and a rethinking of New Consensus monetary policy. At the IMF, this need for a Keynesianinspired response was shared by Managing Director Strauss Kahn, chief economist Oliver Blanchard,
and staff, and was implemented in the ECF/RCF/SCF policy reform. IMF staff, however, were broadly
dismissive that their policy choices following the crises of the late 1990s and 2008 were driven by
broader concerns of global capitalist crisis management. Rather, the shift in the institution toward
more pro-poor and Keynesian practices was a practical response to events on the ground in LICs.
Further analysis is needed to tease out how LIC staff self-perceptions around the implementation of
LIC reform speaks to the broader role the IMF plays in hegemony construction. I examine this
dynamic in chapter 6.
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Chapter 6- Drivers of Change: Explaining IMF LIC Reform in the post Washington Consensus
This project focuses on five major areas. First, through a comparative case study of IMF LIC reform
from 1995 to 2010, it identifies potential variables and mechanisms that drove these instances of
policy change. Second, it evaluates if there are any recognizable patterns across these cases of policy
reform. And third, it assesses if and how policy reform is interconnected to changing social relations
and social forces in the contemporary historical structure. These three areas, covered in chapters 3-5,
constitute the empirical component of this project and are first briefly summarized below.

The next two goals of this project revolve around theoretical concerns and constitute the primary focus
of this concluding chapter. I first assess the strengths and weaknesses of rationalist, constructivist, and
historical structural theory in regard to the study of contemporary IMF LIC reform. I then evaluate the
potential and limitations of a research framework focused on IMF change open to use of both
positivist and social relational ontologies. Such an approach will not produce one correct answer and
suffers at some level from divergent baseline understandings of the social world. I focus specifically
on what I see as intractable differences between theoretical frameworks of IO change that conceptually
see the social world as made of externally related ‘things’ versus approaches that embrace Marxistinspired conceptions of dialectic, internal relations. Despite these tensions, I maintain that the
complexity of that world and processes of change within it merit space for mainstream and critical
ontologies and epistemologies. Future studies of the IMF should explore more fully how diverse paths
of inquiry can be effectively used to explain policy reform.

Drivers of IMF LIC Change
From chapter 3, evidence uncovered through the use of principal-agent modeling and sociological
organizational theory suggests that a necessary condition for IMF LIC change involves processes of
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coalition building between two tiers of actors. Primary actors include the Managing Director, powerful
states, and IMF staff. Secondary actors include weak states, NGOs, and the U.S. Congress. In all four
cases of LIC policy reform studied, some form of coalition that advocated for reform was formed
between two primary actors or a primary actor and a secondary actor. Second, principal-agent theory
maintains that increases in preference heterogeneity between powerful states produces conditions that
give staff or management greater room to initiate or resist change. Evidence from these cases supports
this hypothesis. In the case of the HIPC, for instance, divisions among powerful states gave Managing
Director Camdessus and staff leverage to initially block attempts to institutionalize large scale debt
relief. While the HIPC was ultimately adopted, Camdessus and the staff were able to water down the
scope and depth of debt relief. Third, principal-agent theory also hypothesizes that pressure applied by
NGOs on the IMF for policy reform will not be effective if that pressure is directly applied. Rather, if
NGOs instead focus on winning over powerful states, the IMF will respond to these proximate
principals. While the general consensus among staff and management interviewed was that NGOs
played an integral role in IMF’s adoption of the HIPC and HIPC II, this project is unable to discern if
pressure applied distally or proximately had any more or less causal effect on processes of reform.

In chapter 4, three major hypotheses that draw from conventional constructivist theories of IMF
change were identified. First, changes in economic ideas and norms about development impact LIC
policy reform. Second, the mechanisms by which ideas and norms change within the IMF revolve
around crises of legitimacy. Actors within the Fund are hypothesized to change their framework of
thinking around certain policy choices when these frameworks are deemed illegitimate by a critical
mass of elites including the economics profession, powers states, and private market actors. And third,
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a rejection of ideas or development norms that fundamentally challenge liberal market solutions to
LIC issues is unexpected.

The evidence derived from a constructivist study of IMF LIC reform is as follows. First, systematic
crises appear to play a central role in changing ideas around what is deemed legitimate in policy
choices. A stable framework of economic ideas (the New Consensus) constituted what was considered
appropriate monetary and fiscal policy from the early 1980s until the 2008 global financial crisis. The
2008 crisis delegitimized ideas and policy recommendations of the New Consensus among
development economists and IMF staff. This opened up ideational space for more traditional
Keynesian themes to emerge in IMF LIC policy and helped catalyze the replacement of the PRGF
with the ECF/RCF/SCF framework. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s led to a reevaluation of role in
the state in its relation to market efficiency, growth, and development. Here, in reaction to the policy
positions of the Washington Consensus, emphasis on poverty reduction and investment in human
capital were reflected in the replacement of the SAF/ESAF with the PRGF and the introduction of
PRSPs. The Asian crisis and the 2008 crisis, however, did not challenge more intractable ideas deeply
embedded in institutional common sense. Despite the turmoil of the late 1990s and 2008, confidence
in free markets and aversion to large scale and coordinated redistribution remains firmly entrenched in
IMF thinking. As of 2014, LICs are advised to avoid protectionism, over or undervalued exchange
rates, subsidies, redistributive tax arrangements, and large scale entitlement programs.

In chapter 5, use of a critical framework focused on the post Washington Consensus period invoked
the concept of “inclusive neoliberalism” to study contemporary IMF LIC reform. Global elites,
increasingly conscious of the fallout of economic crises and resistance to globalization, have embraced
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strategies designed to build long term support for the economic and political project of
transnationalizing capitalism. IMF post Washington Consensus reforms thus are one expression of
these efforts. Inclusivity in this context has two dimensions: shifts in thinking embedded in new policy
positions and processes of how the policy positions are implemented. In regard to the latter, Fund
policy documents and interviews of IMF staff and management demonstrate that the Fund consciously
shifted the manner in which its policy initiatives were implemented to increase buy in from LICs.
Along with a focus on participation through the PRSPs, this move away from top down approaches
has also included the removal of structural performance criteria and increased LIC NGO participation
in formal Fund events.

In regard to the nature of the policy shifts themselves, the shift toward poverty reduction and “propoor” policies in the post Washington Consensus period has been framed as something best achieved
through maintenance of market efficient processes. In this sense, this study verifies claims put forth by
Gramscian scholars that a central component of IMF LIC policy choices remains firmly entrenched in
neo-classical aversion to market distortive policies. The major ideational shift that has happened in the
post Washington Consensus period is support of countercyclical, expansionary fiscal and monetary
policy. This move toward more Keynesian practices through the adoption of the ECF/RCF/SCF is seen
by the majority of LIC staff interviewed as a practical response to economic downturn rather than a
reaction to a broader crisis in capitalism. This interpretation by Fund staff as to why the IMF shifted
policy direction, however, stood in contrast to the discourse seen in elitist forums including the Davos
Annual Meetings of the World Economic Forum. Here, individuals clearly identified that the
governance of globalization required substantive reforms to make capitalism work for the world’s poor
majority.
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In sum, while this study is unable to report that there is one thing that explains LIC policy reform, the
process of testing hypotheses from three distinct ontologies uncovers potential causal variables and
mechanisms associated with contemporary IMF LIC reform. I also maintain that each framework
offers a reasonable way of looking at social reality and also offers a plausible causal story concerning
why the Fund shifts policy position. In this sense, the spirit of this project and conclusions reached
about potential future research open to multiple ontologies falls in line with recent calls for “analytic
eclecticism” in middle range IR analysis. As outlined by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein:
Analytical eclecticism…trains its sights on connections and interactions among a
wide range of causal forces normally analyzed in isolation from one another. This
does not guarantee consensus on forecasts or prescriptions that can assist
policymakers and lay actors. It does, however, encourage a wider, more openended conversation about how the different causal forces identified by proponents
of different paradigms might coexist as part of a more complex, yet useable
analytic framework that helps in making sense of concrete social phenomena.548

In this spirit, I turn to an assessment of strengths and tradeoffs of rationalist, constructivist, and
historical structural approaches used in chapters 3-5. I then explore the potential and limitations of
moving forward with a research program open to use of both mainstream and critical theory.
Assessing Strengths and Weaknesses of IO Theories of IMF Change
This project is driven ultimately by normative and practical concerns. While the power of the IMF to
shape policy outcomes across the globe is well established, explanation as to why the institution shifts
policy direction is not. Given that IMF decisions impact millions of individuals, scholarship that
accurately pinpoints dynamics that produce change in the institution is critical to real life outcomes. It
is this context that I first assess the strengths and weaknesses of rational, constructivist, and historical
structural frameworks.
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In chapter 3, the question of IMF LIC policy change is approached through application of principalagent modeling supplemented by components of sociological organizational theory. The primary
strength of this approach, as is the case in rational frameworks generally, is that its assumptions take
what is a complex reality and simplifies it. It identifies who the major actors are (powerful states,
Managing Director, staff) and what drives their behavior around instances of policy reform (shirking,
increased preference division among powerful state principals, and aversion to market distortive
practices). It therefore has the advantages typical of parsimonious approaches: high predictive capacity
and generalizable application. Returning to Cox, the rational approach thus falls clearly into the
problem-solving category. As such, application of this approach has the highest potential of producing
useable knowledge on how to induce successful reform efforts in the institution. In this project, for
example, use of a rationalist framework to compare cases of LIC change highlights that coalition
building appears to be a necessary condition to produce policy reform. If future studies more
conclusively demonstrate that coalition building is for LIC change, this knowledge can be used toward
practical ends by NGOs or internal Fund actors interested in policy reform.

Conventional constructivist studies of IMF policy focus start with the following ontological
assumptions. The primary entities that drive IMF behavior are individuals within the institution driven
by the “logic of appropriateness.” These individuals seek legitimacy from peers and external actors in
regard to economic ideas and policy choices. If a policy choice, economic idea, or development norm
is deemed illegitimate by a critical mass of fellow economists, powerful states, or private market
actors, change can occur. While this framework recognizes the interrelationship between multilateral
institutional actors and broader structural forces and power relations, it argues that every institution
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has unique dynamics and that ultimately change comes from within. This approach thus ontologically
recognizes a complex social reality, but presents a relatively simple causal story: delegitimization of
economic ideas increases the chance for periods of reform. The methodological legwork required to
support hypotheses derived from this logic involves process tracing and discourse analysis to establish
how individuals think about economic ideas or development norms at time X, if they change at time Y,
and if that change in thinking impacts policy reform.

The notion that every institution has its own particular dynamics and culture that must be studied to
clarify processes that lead to reform is not a radical one. Yet, this emphasis on institution-specific
“change from within” pushed by constructivist IO scholars has fundamentally reshaped how this
literature studies multilateral institutions. Process tracing into dynamics of how ideas shape outcome
in the IMF, for example, provides stronger empirical support to verify or refute claims concerning its
institutional behavior. This method also can uncover new information pertinent to explanations of
reform. In chapter 4, for example, drilling down into how the IMF thinks uncovered two levels of
ideas that shape IMF LIC policy choices. Market distortive practices, including protectionism,
subsidies, and large scale redistribution, remain off limits in the institution. Any policy reform that
suggests adoption of these policies as solutions to LIC issues, even after the 2008 crisis, is unexpected.
Ideas around appropriate monetary and fiscal policy and policy choices to reduce poverty and
inequality through non-distortive mechanisms instead fall within the debatable category.

While the methodological focus on internal micro processes is an important contribution, I argue that
constructivist insights into IMF LIC change are limited in two key areas. At the ontological level,
constructivists draw from a dialectic approach in presentation of their causal story focused on the role
of ideas and social legitimacy in institutional change. Rather than externally related variables, norms,
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individual agents, and institutional culture are presented as internally related, ontologically intertwined
entities. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore: “Bureaucratic culture guides action but does not
determine it. The rules and routines of a bureaucracy shape bureaucrats’ views of the world, define
their social tasks, shape their interests, and orient them in similar way toward the world.”549
Organizational and bureaucratic culture, likewise, is conceptualized as constituted and implicitly
shaped by these same norms and individuals: “…the relationship between bureaucrats and rules is
mutually constitutive and dynamic. Bureaucrats create rules that shape future action, but action, in
turn, shapes the evolution and content of rules.”550 Alexander Wendt, along similar lines, describes the
internal relation of structure and agency as follows: “Just as social structures are ontologically
dependent upon and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal
powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are constituted and therefore explained by
structures.”551

While constructivists present a framework that highlights the constitutive nature of structure and
agency, the current emphasis on multilateral institutional change from within contradicts at some level
how and where this understanding is applied. Specifically, the trend among constructivist IO scholars
involves the analytical separation of the multilateral institution in question from social forces and
power relations ‘out there’ as a means to more precisely capture internal dynamics that impact reform.
Chwieroth is perhaps the most adamant in this respect as he emphasizes “the role of personnel and
internal institutional configurations” rather than a focus on dynamics above or below the IO in
question.552 Momani makes similar arguments: “...social constructivists are not suggesting that
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international organizations are closed-systems where an organization is argued to be self-contained
and independent of power considerations in the international system… Nevertheless, international
organizations are also bureaucratic entities with their own internalized sets of norms, ideologies, and
cultures that need to be considered when studying their behavior and responses to change.”553

The analytical and methodological practice of bracketing off processes that occur within the Fund
highlights further the tradeoffs of parsimonious and complex analysis. Along with the rationalist
approach in chapter 3, the relative simplicity of the constructivist approach in chapter 4 allows us to
cut through the multiple and often contradictory layers of social realty, identify key potential causal
variables, and test if patterns uncovered can be applied in a predictive capacity. However, this
framework conceptually is unable to engage with how and why particular processes of ideational
change, crises, and processes of legitimization are interrelated with broader shifts in social structures
and power relations unique to the post Washington Consensus period. If applied on its own terms, for
example, the constructivist approach would simply ignore how factors tied to the rise of
transnationalizing capitalism and the crises therein have impacted how economic ideas and policy
choices gain or lose legitimacy.

A historical structural framework focused on IMF LIC change approaches the phenomenon from a
fundamentally different ontological and epistemological position rather than rationalist and
conventional constructivist frameworks. As such, the nature of the questions being asked and answers
to these questions provide insights that mainstream IO approaches leave unexamined. I highlight three
unique contributions of historical structural approaches to the study of IMF change that are explicitly
tied to its social relational understanding of the world. First, it introduces a causal story that sees
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processes of contemporary Fund policy change as dialectically related to the multiple and often
contradictory dynamics embedded in the transnationalization of capitalist social relations. The Fund,
and capitalism for that matter, are not “things” that stand separate from each other. Rather, they are
understood to be internally related components of a broader social totality.554 In this sense, explaining
IMF change thus also involves explaining at some level how that change both acts on – and is
impacted by – a particular configuration of social forces and power dynamics tied to productive
relations.

Second, it recognizes the role that the Fund plays in the production and reproduction of hegemonic or
more overtly coercive world orders. This broadens and gives deeper meaning to the notion of
legitimacy crisis presented by constructivist IO scholars. Post Washington Consensus IMF reform, for
example, is explained in part by the fact that the institution plays a crucial role in managing
globalizing capitalist social structures. When that order is under threat, as was seen in the late 1990s
and 2008, Fund policy reform should be expected. The policy choices that the reform address, and
how it addresses them, is also expected to reflect dynamics and tensions point unique to the historical
structure under study.

Third, the social relational roots of historical structural theory provide a unique foundation to evaluate
where and why certain ideas have been folded into post Washington Consensus reforms, while others
have not, and what that signifies about the contemporary role that the IMF plays in the early 21st
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Rupert, drawing from Carol Gould, explain the difference between internally and externally related understanding as
follows: “…an internal relation is one in which the inter-related entities take their meaning from (or are constituted within)
their relation, and are not unintelligible (or non-existent) outside of the context of that relation….Carol Gould contrasts
these with external relations, “in which each relatum is taken as a separate self-subsistent entity, which exists apart from
the relation and appears to be totally independent of it.”” Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production
and American Global Power, p. 210, footnote 3.
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century world order. As uncovered in chapter 4, one prominent shift in the post Washington
Consensus period is acceptance of Keynesian inspired countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy
response since 2008. Combined with a focus on pro-poor participatory policies introduced after the
Asian crisis of the late 1990s, this represents both a substantive and procedural shift in IMF thinking.
As I developed above in Chapter 5, Craig and Porter invoke Polyani’s conception of double movement
in their explanation of this phenomenon. Through implementation of inclusive liberal policy reforms
for some of the world’s poorest societies, the Fund and other multilateral institutions undermine a
potential backlash ( second movement) that would more fundamentally challenge market based
development (first movement) on a broader scale.

Not surprisingly, IMF staff and Executive Directors interviewed for this project did not share this
understanding as to why the institution implemented post Washington Consensus reforms. They see
themselves as practical, non-ideological technocrats who simply responded to the changing facts on
the ground and shifted their policy positions accordingly. This framing of post Washington Consensus
policy decisions as merely technocratic tinkering while Rome burned is curious indeed. As developed
in chapter 6, the Marxist and Gramscian roots of a historical structural framework is uniquely suited to
explore why a technocratic self- understanding remains at the core of IMF thinking around policy
reform. It also may provide clues as to why that identity is essential to how the Fund participates in
(re)building hegemony in the contemporary historical structure.

Briefly introduced here, Marx recognized that the historical development of capitalism and capitalist
social relations and modes of surplus value extraction requires that the realm of production be
conceptualized as a distinctly economic space free of – and externally related to – that of the
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political.555 This framing has embedded in collective common sense a myth that there exists a separate
and natural world of economics with its own laws and logic. Marx argued that this creation of a
seeming apolitical economic sphere in capitalist social relations is implicitly a political act as it
disguises at some level the power relations that produce the conditions necessary for market based
exploitation and subsequent human alienation.556 This separation of the economic from the political
also is integral to the separation of public/state from private/civil society.557 Civil society is the
apolitical economic space where individual’s right to private property and pursuit of selfish interest is
expressed. The state, in contrast, is the public space where one can “do” politics.558

Applied to our concerns here, we can see that the self-identification of Fund LIC staff as rational
technocrats rather than ideologically and politically motivated individuals reinforces in broad terms
the separation of the economic and the political. In so doing, the IMF plays a central role in the
reproduction of contemporary capitalist social relations that are increasingly transnational in scope.
This understanding also can be applied to explaining the seeming contradictions that several IMF staff
interviewed for this project articulated. While recognizing that IMF policy and market based
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In pre capitalist societies, the concept of economy as separate from other components of society did not exist. Feudal
ruling classes, for example, used directly coercive means to extract surplus from producers who had direct possession of
the means of production. As summarized by Rupert, with the emergence of capitalism, labor is simultaneously freed from
direct coercion and separated from the means of production. In order to survive, labor “must now enter into an “economic”
relationship with capital in order to secure the means of physical survival….Surplus labor is now extracted from the
producer through the purchase of their labor power in the market (and its subsequent employment in the labor process
which is controlled and directed by the capitalist class, owing to their ownership the means of production). No explicitly
political coercion need enter directly into capitalist exploitation of labor, for it appears as a simple exchange of
commodities in the market: labor-power is exchanged for a wage.” The power and exploitation of capital over labor thus
remains at some level hidden from everyday view in the apolitical economic sphere that runs on ‘natural’ laws. Coercive
power instead is more explicitly expressed in the form of the capitalist state and “appears as law and order enforced in the
public interest.” See Rupert, Producing Hegemony, The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power, pp.2122.
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Alienation in capitalism takes on myriad forms. Workers, due to the fact that must sell their labor power to capitalists for
survival, are estranged from potentially fulfilling potentials of productive activity, both from themselves and with others,
and even from nature itself. Ibid.,p.20.
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Paul Thomas, Alien Politics Marxist State Theory Retrieved (New York: Routledge, 1994), x-xi.
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The capitalist state, however, can’t ultimately serve as a vector to overcome alienation. Its existence and survival is tied
to maintaining the myth of dualistic separation of the economic and the political.

217

development more broadly need to work for the poor, the boundaries of what is open for debate does
not include policies that challenge deep held beliefs in market efficiency. Following the logic of Marx,
this makes sense, as debating the efficacy of market distortive policies would bring “politics” into the
arena that liberal market economists argue don’t belong and potentially could open up more radical
challenges to the current historical structure. We should therefore expect that hegemony construction
in the post Washington Consensus will be most successful if themes of poverty reduction, lowering
inequality, and pro-poor policies in general remain framed as technocratic problems.

In sum, use of three distinct theoretical traditions provides insights into different components of social
reality that inform and drive IMF LIC reform. Taken as an aggregate study of IMF reform, we perhaps
begin to overcome the common tradeoffs of parsimony versus complexity. More parsimonious
frameworks uncover specific mechanics of policy reform that are unique to IMF and can be used by
current policy makers and activists to shape future policy reform. These mechanisms of change,
however, are ultimately interrelated to broader social forces and power relations elucidated by
historical structural analysis. While the use of multiple ontologies produces greater knowledge in this
project, there are some tensions inherent in an approach open to the use of positivist and critical
relational theory that must be further explored before we can simply embrace it as viable option for
future research.

Squaring a Circle? Problem-Solving and Critical Theories of IMF LIC change.
Robert Cox’s framing of problem-solving versus critical theory sets the foundation to assess if an
approach open to use of both of these frameworks is ultimately a workable or productive enterprise.
As is often quoted, for Cox, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” As is also the
case when debating major ontological differences and purposes of political science, Cox’s
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differentiation between problem-solving theory and critical theory highlights in broad terms some of
the major tensions that a research program open to rationalist, constructivist, and historical structural
frameworks must address. Problem-solving theory, as used in chapters 3 and 4, “…takes the world as
it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they
organized as the given framework for action.” Critical theory, in contrast, begins from a more overtly
normative and radical position. It is critical because it “does not take institutions and social power
relations for granted.” Through systematic analysis of historical processes, it serves as roadmap for
possible transformative change: “In this way critical theory can be a guide for strategic action for
bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions
which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order.”559
Given this understanding, a major “elephant in the room” that emerges with an approach sympathetic
to components of problem-solving and Marxist-inspired historical structural analysis is that the latter
ultimately finds the ontological and epistemological position of problem-solving approaches as a
mythology of sorts, and one that potentially blocks transformative social change. For critical theorists,
the treatment of social reality as one where you have atomistic social objects, externally related and
“out there” acting on each other is a clear expression of subject-object duality that has evolved with
capitalist social relations. If we are examining the IMF through a lens that reinforces these concepts,
do we at some level reinforce reification of social reality? And if so, doesn’t that undermine our ability
to systematically examine often unobservable power relationships that reinforce particular outcomes
that undermine transformative possibilities?

There are therefore several ways one can deal with what appears to be an unresolvable tension
between critical and problem-solving approach. First, we can reject attempts to bridge the gap and
559
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return to more paradigmatically separate positions. Second, we can ignore the normative “elephant in
the room” and focus only on the particular strengths and insights that both problem-solving and
historical structural approaches bring to the table. I reject both of these. In regard to the former, this
project demonstrates that problem-solving and critical approaches focused on the phenomenon of IMF
LIC policy change produce more knowledge, and I offer more high quality knowledge about that
phenomenon than if we looked at it only through a mainstream or critical lens. In this sense, I thus find
common ground with the growing popularity of the analytical eclectic approach mentioned above
which prioritizes knowledge construction over sometimes needless paradigmatic divisions.

In regard to the latter, it certainly would be easier at some level to neuter the normative concerns of
historical structural theory and focus only on how it empirically supplements the findings of positivist
frameworks. This, however, feels intellectually dishonest and may ultimately undermine the strengths
of research open to the use of both mainstream and critical approaches. I advocate for a third
possibility as follows. First, a question or concern is raised to be studied. Second, a case is made as to
why use of mainstream and historical structural theory is well suited for the question under study.
Third, when introduced, each framework more explicitly lays out its normative position and
understanding of the world, identifies potential limitations born from this understanding, and then
moves forward in full embrace of that position in looking at the phenomenon under study. Historical
structural theory, for its part, should be presented and understood as a radical critique. However, it also
should be noted that it doesn’t have a monopoly on the politics of transformation, nor does use of
social relational ontology in any way exhaust all the possible ways that political scientists can produce
a future world better than this one. Problem-solving theory, for its part, should also clearly frame the
parameters of its strengths and weaknesses. As outlined by Cox, it should make explicit that it is best
suited for teasing out patterns within a given historical structure and that it is less well suited in
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explaining how the phenomenon under study is tied to broader and deeper social forces or periods of
historical structural change. It should also be recognized that despite notions of objectivity, the
ontology and epistemology upon which positivist approaches are built also have normative qualities.
Once respective strengths and weaknesses are out of the closet, each theoretical framework on its own
terms should look at the question under consideration. It is through this process that we stay
intellectually honest to different understandings of politics, and then use those different understandings
to produce a better world.

Next Steps

In conclusion, I highlight limitations of this project and several next steps. While evidence from the
cases provides new insights into dynamics of past cases of LIC policy reform, several limitations of
this study necessitate further development. Specific to chapter 3, inclusion and comparison of
instances where Fund LIC policy reform did not occur in future positivist-oriented research would
strengthen the potential predictive capacity around the mechanics of IMF reform. This could include
examination of the roughly ten years span between the PRGF and ECF/RCF/SCF where no formal
LIC policy reform was implemented. In chapter 4, one area that needs more examination is how hiring
practices at the Fund could change normative positions. In chapter 5, a focus on the World Economic
Forum as the prominent voice of global elites is a reasonable assertion. However, analysis of other
elite forums in regard to how they have reacted to the past decade and a half of capitalist crisis and
popular backlash would more forcefully support or refute notions that the TCC is a self-conscious
group that collectively has agency in shaping outcomes in multilateral institutions, including the IMF.
Finally, further analysis in regard to the benefits and limitations of approaches to IMF LIC change that
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employs multiple ontological frameworks is in order. One possible way to evaluate the effectiveness
of such an approach would be to apply it to other cases of multilateral institutional reform.
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APPENDIX 1: Interview Questions

MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. General Background
What is your position in the Fund?
What specific experience do you have in regards to Low Income Countries (LICs)?
What do you see as the Fund’s appropriate role in LICs?
II. Policy Paradigms and LICs
Historically, the Fund has been resistant to call itself a development institution. Where do you fall on this? Is
the Fund in the development business? If so, is this a good thing?
Given that the Fund is staffed primarily by economists, scholars focused on the internal culture of the Fund
argue that its thinking is often a reflection of values and worldviews seen in the broader economics field. Does
Fund thinking and changes therein reflect broader trends seen ‘out there’ in the economics discipline? Or is the
Fund more prone to produce its own internal thinking regarding policy choices?
From your perspective, has the Fund witnessed any significant shifts in its institutional ‘thinking’ during your
tenure (i.e. Hayekian vs Keynesian thinking). Is so, when did these occur and how did they manifest themselves
in policy outcomes regarding LICs?
Since the 1982 Debt Crises, the Fund has introduced three concessionary lending programs for LICs: The
SAF/ESAF in the mid 1980s, the PRGF in 1999 and the recent replacement of the PRGF with the
ECF/RCF/SCF in 2010. Where any of these policy shifts representative of ‘deeper’ institutional change at the
Fund? Why or why not?
III. LIC Policy Determinants
The literature points to various variables that shape Fund policy choices. Please comment on how significant
each of the following are in shaping LIC policy choices:
a) Powerful states, particularly the United States
b) Recipient states
c) IMF management
d) Managing Director
e) IMF staff
f) the World Bank
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g) NGOs
h) economic crises
i) public opinion
other ?
Looking at the variables above in a comparative perspective, which have become more and less important in
shaping LIC policy outcomes at the Fund during your tenure?
Several IMF scholars argue that Fund programs focused on debt relief and development issues for LICs have
been initiated from management and /or pressure from member states rather than from staff. Would you agree
with this assessment?
How much input do LIC member states have in shaping policy choices?
IV. Case 1-Introduction of ECF/RCF/ SCF
What do you see as the primary factors that led to elimination of the PRGF and establishment of the ECF/RCF/
and SCF in 2010?
Who were the primary actors within the Fund who pushed for the ECF framework?
How has the shift from the PRGF framework to the ECF been received by staff working with LICs?
Can one identify any significant institutional change in thinking about LICs with the introduction of the ECF?
Why or why not?
Any other comments or thoughts in regard to introduction and implementation of ECF framework?
V. Case 2-Introduction of PRGF/PSRPs/ HIPC II/MDRI
What do you see as the primary factors that led to elimination of the ESAF and establishment of the PRGF in
1999?
Who were the primary actors within the Fund who pushed for the PRGF?
How was the shift from the ESAF/SAF framework to the PRGF received by staff working with LICs?
What explains the emergence of a “pro-poor”, participatory framework seen under PRGF?
Who pushed for the establishment of the Policy Support Instrument?
There is a consensus in much of the political science literature looking at this period that the Fund adopted propoor positions and policy jargon to accommodate growing external criticism and protest movements in late
1990s. Is this accurate? Why or why not?
Any other comments or thoughts in regard to introduction and implementation of PRGF framework?
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APPENDIX 2: List of Interviews and Archival Material
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Date
06.13.11
06.13.11
06.13.11
06.14.11
06.14.11
06.15.11
09.19.11
09.20.11
09.20.11
09.21.11
09.26.11
01.24.12
01.24.12
01.25.12
01.26.12

Position
Director, External Relations Department
Assistant Director, Research Department
Deputy Director, Africa Department
Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy and Review Department
Division Chief, Strategy, Policy, and Review Department
Senior Advisor, Middle East and Central Asia Department
Senior Advisor, Africa Department
Advisor, Western Hemisphere Department
Special IMF Representative to the United Nations
Deputy Division Chief, Africa Department
Assistant Director, Asia and Pacific Department
United States Executive Director
Nordic and Baltic Alternative Executive Director
Adviser to the UK Executive Director
Sub-Saharan Africa Executive Director

Phone and E-mail Interviews
Date
Position
01.28.12
French Executive Director
02.24.12
Former Sub-Saharan Africa Executive Director
06.29.12
Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy and Review Department

Archives: International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C.
IMF, Issues and Developments in Multilateral Debt and Financing in the Heavily Indebted CountriesPreliminary Considerations, SM 96/57, 7 February 1995 (IMF Archives).
IMF, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM 95/ 12, 24 February 1995( IMF Archives).
IMF, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, EBM 96/ 34, 8 April 1996 (IMF Archives).
IMF, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997).
IMF, Analytical Aspects of the Debt Problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, SM/96/23, 31
January 1996 (IMF Archives).
IMF, Concluding Remarks by the Chairman: Issues and Development in Multilateral Debt and
Financing for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries-Preliminary Considerations, Executive
Board Meeting 95/19, BUFF 95/18 (IMF Archives).
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/43, 16 April 1999. (IMF Archives).
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/95, 30 August 1999 (IMF Archives).
IMF, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting, EBM 99/102, 13 September 1999 (IMF Archives).
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